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The thesis deals with the law and practice of immigration control in the
United Kingdom and Kenya. A study of the law and practice of immigration control
naturally falls into the fields of Constitutional and Administrative Law. 'There¬
fore, although attention will be focused on the analysis of the immigration laws
and their administration one must remember that the problems that are raised invari¬
ably touch on various aspects of Constitutional and Administrative Law.
Part I of the thesis first examines the scope and content of certain important
aspects of the immigration laws of the two countries. The matters examined are:
(i) those relating to people who have the right of free entry
and stay, that is, patrials and citizens;
(ii) those relating to the rules and regulations for the
guidance and administration of control;
(iii) those relating to appeals and
(iv) those relating to deportations.
The thesis then deals briefly with the purposes or ends that the immigration
Laws are intended to serve in each country.
Part II of the thesis contains detailed examinations of the administration of
the laws in the U.K. and Kenya in that order. The administration of the laws
ixtends from pre-departure requirements, to the purposes for which one may apply for leave
to enter a country and to the regulations such a person is subject to if allowed
mtry and stay.
The detailed examination of the United Kingdom and Kenyan immigration law and
systems of control inevitably entailed separate treatment because of the many differ-
snces between their laws and the varied methods of administration of the laws,
fhere possible, however, comparisons have been made between the two systems.
Part III is devoted to a comparative examination of the control of discretionary
lowers of the immigration authorities in both countries through administrative and
ludicial means. The constitutional importance of such control cannot be over¬
emphasised.
The final section of the thesis suggests the most urgent amendments that should
-e made to the immigration laws of both countries if the laws are to become more
onsonant with the constitutional requirements of civilized societies that believe in
he liberties of individuals. The suggestions are by no means exhaustive and should
ot be taken to mean that the thesis is exclusively reform-oriented.
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Finally, it must be mentioned that immigration will probably always remain
an aspect of state sovereignty of all countries. For this reason countries
will be, in varying degrees, unwilling to surrender its control entirely to
an independent adjudicator. Be that as it may, it is the assertion of this
thesis that human rights must always take precedence over the notion of
sovereignty and to that extent there is a case for arguing that the U.K. and
Kenya, indeed all other countries of the world, owe it to humanity to start
moving towards making immigration entirely a matter of law of rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration has received much publicity in recent times. •
It has been a topic of intense and passionate debates and discussions.
Some highly charged literature has been written on it. In many ways
the causes have been the massive movements of people from one country
to anothero Modern societies are typically characterised by these
movements. The United Kingdom and Kenya, on which this thesis will
focus, are examples of countries that are experiencing the movements.
In both countries are to be found people of different races, colours
and nationalitieso They may be permanently settled, they may be
working, they may be students, they may be visitors or tourists and
they may also be engaging in business. Whatever each one individual
is pursuing the result is the production of an emalgam of people of
different races, colours and nationalities in one country.
Until recently immigration was, relatively, of little importance
in the United Kingdom and Kenya. In the sixties, however, there
was, in both countries, a sudden upsurge of public demands for more
control of immigrants. Many writers see a causal connection of these
public demands with racial consciousness, political manipulation and
economic conditions of both the receiving countries and the 'exporting'
countries. Whereas occasional references will be made to those
things, the scope of this thesis will be limited to the analysis of
the immigration laws of the United Kingdom and Kenya. It must be
mentioned at once that the immigration authorities are clothed with
a lot of discretion in the execution of their daily duties. Part
of this thesis will be devoted to this area which still remains
largely unexplored. In particular, the ways by which these
discretions are checked will be examined.
The history of the development of immigration law in each country
which will be looked at now is a necessary background for the
appreciation of the present laws.
United Kingdom
The U.K. Immigration Act of 1971 may be termed as a point of
convergence in the history of its immigration law. Bdbre then there
were two distinct systems of immigration laws: one for aliens1
2
end the other for the nationals of British colonies and the Common¬
wealth countries.
In general nationality goes back to the time of Prince
2
John and the loss of Normandy under him in the 11th century. At
this early period control was aimed merely et the King's enemies
3
irrespective of allegiance or nationality. It is only in the 17th
century that there began to emerge an organised control of immigra¬
tion of aliens as the distinction between subjects and aliens be¬
came clear. Allegiance became co-extensive with nationality end
4
the former was a condition precedent to becoming a national.
Aliens
5
In 1793 the first Aliens Act was passed. The express
purpose of the Act was, in the words of Lord Glenville the then
Secretary of State:
"for establishing Regulations concerning Aliens
in this Kingdom or resident therein, in certain
cases.1'
D
The Act was a forerunner to later Acts on immigration which draw
a lot from it. T.W.E. Roche has himself remarked that the restric¬
tions imposed on the aliens:
"were similar to those imposed on aliens in 1914
differeing from them...in two prominent points,
first that their enforcement was left to magist¬
rates, the King having no organised police to
undertake the duty; secondly, that the return of
an expelled alien rendered him liable on his
conviction to transportation and, if he returned
a second time, to capital punishment."^
By modern precedents what the King lacked was an organised immigra¬
tion civil service at ports of control. It is worth noting that
officers of the Customs Service were also used. They still con-
O
tinue to play this role albeit on a diminished scale. The Act
required each alien to submit written submissions to the Chief
Magistrate within IB days of their arrival giving:
"full and true eccount in writing of his or her
Name, Rank, Occupation, or Description and also
of his or her Place of Abode specifying the
street and number...in and at which he or she
shall be dwelling, and of the length of time
during which he or she shall have been resident
within the United Kingdom and the Place or
3
"...Places of his or her principal residence
during six months immediately preceding his
or her delivering such accaunt."g
This provision forms the central feature of control of aliens under
the Act. The Act remained in force until 1803 when it was repealed
by another Act which gave the Secretary of State draconian powers
to deport an alien on mere suspicion.
The above controls were relaxed by the William IV Act*"'".
Towards the end of the 19th century there was an influx of people
from Eastern Europe who found it easy to enter into the U.K. as
immigration control was lax. For the first time ever there was a
furore of public outcry against the uncontrolled entry of aliens
who, it was alleged, ware causing a fall in living standards. No
time was wasted in appointing a Royal Commission on Alien Immigra¬
tion. The Commission published its report in 1903. In a nutshell,
it urged the exclusion of certain categories of alien immigrants
(those of bad stock) and made recommendations for the appointment
ip
of officers to carry out the task of control. ~ The recommendations
were embodied in the 1904 draft of the Aliens Bill which became law
in 1905. The Act stipulated also that alien immigrants were to
land at specified ports.
With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 it be¬
came imperative that the control of aliens at the ports of entry
and inside the country be more thorough. Accordingly the Aliens
Restriction Act of 1914 was passed swiftly as part of the war effort.
It replaced the 1905 Act and placed in the hands of the Secretary of
State wide discretionary powers to control the movements and activi¬
ties of aliens in the course of the war. For the first time, notes
T.W.E. Roche:
"Here was laid the foundation of the service (im¬
migration officers) as we know it today."^3
From 1914 it also became necessary under the law for every person
entering the country to produce a passport or other document of
identity and each person had to undergo the scrutiny of immigration
officers. The latter requirement has come under fire from some
14
writers in recent times. It is feared that it contravenes con¬
stitutional principles relating to privacy and human dignity.
In 1916 there was an Order in Council which made it com¬
pulsory for ell aliens to register with the police once they are
4
in the country. This has been continued to the present.
With the declaration of the 1920 Aliens Order the immigra¬
tion lav/ relating to aliens was at last laid down along sound lines
thus paving the way for a firm foundation. T.W.E. Roche has summed
up its effect thus:
"...no alien might land without the leave of an
immigration officer, nor elsewhere than an ap¬
proved poi~t: the immigration officer might re¬
fuse leave to land to any alien or might attach
such conditions as he saw fit to the grant of
leave to land; he might not grant to five types
of aliens (those excluded). There were numer¬
ous other powers, duties and penalties..."^
The Aliens Order of 1920 remained in force until 1953
T when there was a new-Aliens Order which brought the former Orders up
to dote. With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1971, the 1953
Aliens Order was repealed and aliens were brought within the pur-
16
view of the ,1971 Act. Aliens are therefore controlled under the
1971 Act.
Since the entry of the United Kingdom into the European
Economic Community Britain is bound, under the Rome Treaty relating
17
to the free movement of labour within the member countries, to
apply differential treatments to the nationals of the Community.
Rules have been made by the Secretary of State under the 1971 Act
to cater for them and these rules give the impression that nationals
of member countries are more leniently treated than other aliens.
This development is altogether unique in that it represents a shift
on the part of the Government to use immigration law as a means of
economic integration rather than as a means of racial integration
which was the purpose of the 1971 Act.
Commonwealth Nationals
The second leg of the history of immigration law of the
U.K. is that of the nationals of the Commonwealth countries. Trad¬
itionally Commonwealth nationals enjoyed free entry into the U.K.
At the beginning of the 1950s there started a wave of anti-Common¬
wealth immigration which has culminated in the passing of the 1971
Immigration Act placing Commonwealth nationals on the same footing
as the aliens.
Any discussion of Commonwealth immigrants starts with the
arrival of the Empire Windrush at the port of Avonmouth in June 1946
5
from the West Indies. It is said that this was the beginning of
18
the arrival of Commonwealth immigrants in the U.K. The United
Kingdom hod hitherto been regarded as a non-immigration country as
the movement of the U.K. nationals had been in an outward direction.
One fact that is often overlooked in the study of immigration law
is the decision of the Labour Government to give independence to
India after the War. As India became a Republic within the Common¬
wealth it was necessary to effect a modification to the 1948 Nat¬
ionality Act of Britain. The change effected was a fundamental one.
It enabled both countries to fit their citizenship laws into a new
overall framework of British citizenship Jt is as a result of this
that the United Kingdom has been otherwise relieved of its legal
obligations to members of her former colonies whom it regarded and
treated as her own citizens. Most of these colonies are now inde¬
pendent within the framework of the Indian model. But of even more
importance, however, because of the modification to the British
Nationality Act it is with ease that pressure has been brought to
bear on the Government to curb immigration from Commonwealth coun¬
tries. The severance of the farmer links with colonies and in par¬
ticular the modification to the British Nationality Act left poli¬
ticians free to respond to public demands without incurring inter¬
national condemnation for abandoning their legal and moral obliga¬
tions to her own subjects.
After World War II there was a steady flow of Commonwealth
immigrants into the U.K. In particular, there were many West In¬
dians, Indian and Pakistani nationals. Succeeding British Govern¬
ments were aware of this and they employed various controls by ad¬
ministrative means. These means did nothing to abate the pace of
the flow of the immigrants. Consequently the U.K. was forced to
enter into 'agreements' with India, Pakistan and Jamaica in a bid
to slow down immigration. Unanimity on such matters as imposing
restrictions on the issue of passports or demanding that a person
deposit a large sum of money before leaving for the U.K. was reach-
19
ed. But with no way worked out on the sharing of responsibilities
the measures failed en masse. Notably, there was a racket of false
passports and other documents in India which enabled people to
travel to the U.K. in spite of the restrictions on the issue of
passports there. So, the whole purpose of the 'agreements' was de¬
feated.
6
By 1962 the Conservative Government was pressurised to
breaking point by public demands to stop immigration of coloured
20
people into Britain - this was a parallel to the public furore at
the end of the 19th century. It is in this background that the
British government for the first time introduced legislative mea¬
sures to control Commonwealth immigrants. This was done by the
passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. The effect of
the Act was noticeable in the balance of the labour force which
switched progressively from unskilled to skilled and professional
workers by the use of a selective system of regulating the issue
of employment vouchers designed to meet the needs of the market and,
in the balance, within the immigration which changed from a prepon-
21
derance of wage earners to a preponderance of dependants.
The 1962 Act proved inadequate through the abuse made of
it by people who started to enroll themselves as students when in
fact they were not. This came about as a result of the special pri¬
vilege given to students in the priority of entry. There was also
a widespread falsification of documents to enable people to get al¬
most unrestricted entry. These were practical difficulties on the
part of the administration calling for stern legislative entry
22
measures. But perhaps the most important thing that led to the
amendment of the 1962 Act is that at last there was a definite Gov¬
ernment policy on Commonwealth immigration to which administrative
controls previously pursued would henceforth be secondary. Control
by administrative means was always a measure of expediency. The new
policy was, broadly speaking, what has been described as:
"The Little England policy based unilaterally on
the social and economic needs..." „
of the U.K. It is on this policy that the Commonwealth Immigrants
Act of 1968 was generally based. The measures introduced by the
1958 Act were regarded in some circles as an invasion of civil li¬
berties and, in particular, the powers of deportation intended to
24
help stamp out the evasion of the immigration rules. The criti¬
cisms gave birth to what, in the view of this thesis, was the
greatest innovation in the history of immigration law in the U.K.
The Wilson Committee was set up in 1967 to look into the setting
of a formal inquiry into immigration control procedures. Its re¬
commendations were accepted by an Act of Parliament in 1969 which
established a system of Immigration Appeals Tribunals. Although
7
the 1969 Act was repealed by the 1971 Immigration Act the Appeals
Tribunals have been retained in the new Act. The decisions of
these Appeals Tribunals are a major insight into the working of
immigration law to aliens and Commonwealth nationals besides being
one of the best known methods of checking discretionary powers of
immigration officials.
The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was repealed partly due
to a crystallisation of the general Government policy as indicated
above resulting in the introduction of the "Patrial" concept and
partly due to the need to plug more tightly the loopholes open to
Commonwealth immigrants . Some of the many considerations that
brought these policies into being will be looked at later.
As has been noted the Immigration Act of 1971 brought under
one umbrella all non-patrial Commonwealth nationals and aliens for
the first time. It retains the system of appeals introduced by the
1969 Immigration Appeals Act. The overall picture that emerges
from all these measures is that the Government is determined to
streamline immigration law and employ it as an instrument for
limiting the number of immigrants coming into Britain, particularly
coloured immigrants, by restricting entry to those coming to work
in needy sectors of the economy. Settlement of immigrants is to
be discouraged by all means. It is perhaps paradoxical that the
1971 Act opens an avenue for millions of Commonwealth nationals of
European stock to come into Britain and, if they wish, settle without
Iocjica/
any checks on them. This is the antithooio of the patriality
concept.
Kenya
The development of immigration law in Kenya must be seen in
the historical context of the country itself. This may be roughly
divided into two phases, that is, the colonial phase and the independence
phase. The first phase represents the period of the 1890s to 1963
and the second phase from 1963 to the present.
During the colonial phase there was an active British interest
in Kenya. As far back as 1902 the British Government was anxious
23to see the annexation of Kenya carried out. European settlement
in Kenya was a matter of high priority and the Government actively
encouraged it. Varying methods to encourage settlement of "White
Settlers" were used but the most commonly acknowledged one was
26alienation of land in the cool highlands exclusively to Europeans.
8
At this time there were no legel restraints on the part of the Euro¬
peans to immigrate into Kenya. The only known immigration controls
27
were brought in in 1906 to limit the number of Asians immigrating
into the region. The limitations placed on Asians were motivated
by a desire to ensure the continuance of white hegemony in the ter¬
ritory.
Asians were mainly railway workers, artisans and middle
level to low level administrators. They were sought by the Colonial
Government and early administrators to help in administering the
territory. As time went by rivalry between As,ians and Europeans in¬
tensified, particularly on questions of alienation of land to A-
sians in the upland area and Asian representation in the Legisla¬
tive Council. By 1920 there was an open conflict between them.
The Europeans who felt more entitled to determine matters there
were naturally incensed by the obnoxious demands of the Asians and
accordingly advocated tighter immigration restrictions on the A-
sians. Later, vocal demands for the total immigration control of
28
Asians Were made by the Electors' Union in 1949 and the 1953
Conference of the Electors' Union. It is indeed paradoxical that
the attitude of Europeans had not been effected by the distinguish¬
ed services of Asians during the war in defence of theWestern demo¬
cracy and civilisation like in the U.K. where immigration of Common-
29
wealth nationals was directly related to the war. For this reason
it is hard to conceive that even as late as in 1953 the Conference
of the Electors' Union should have been heard to resolve that there
should be:
"no further Asian immigration into Kenya except
for the employment of key men on a temporary
basis.»30
What is more difficult to understand is the basis of these
resolutions as there were no citizenship laws at the time in Kenya.
It is said of the Asians by way of justification of these measures
that they had no stake in the country, that they were:
"temporary residents whose sole purpose was to
make.as much money as possible before retiring
to India.
It is deducible that the measures to restrict Asian immigration were
merely discriminatory on grounds of race. Nothing shows this more
glaringly than the 1956 Immigration Ordinance which was passed as a
9
response to the demands of the European settlers. The Act placed
wide discretionary powers and control in the hands of the Princi¬
pal Immigration Officer. It is in line with the policy of the Act
therefore that from the 1st of July 1956 to the 31st of December
1957 958 European applications for certificates of permanent resi-
32
dence were granted and 19 were refused. For Asians 227 were
33
granted and 68 refused. The 1956 Immigration Ordinance was amen¬
ded in 1959 to further consolidate the hold of Europeans in Kenya.
The independence phase is initially characterised by the
*-l/l C
passage of citizenship laws. Until 1967 the 1956 Act as amended0
35
remained in force. In the Independence Constitution of 1963
there was a provision inserted to the effect that non-citizens who
were ordinarily and lawfully resident in Kenya on the date of inde¬
pendence had a right to reside in the country and were free from de-
37
portation. Both of these placed severe limitations on the part
38
of the Kenyan Government to deal with immigrants.
In pre-independent Kenya non-Africans and, in particular,
Europeans and Asians, though numerically small, held all the key
positions in the public and private sectors. With the advent of
independence meny Africans looked to it not merely as:
"a transfer of sovereignty into African hands, but
as implying a new emphasis upon African participa¬
tion in high level posts...
In other words African participation in top posts in all sectors of
the economy was urged and, indeed, it was looked upon es the only
guarantor of true independence, national security, economic develop¬
ment and political stability. This necessitated a fundamental re¬
vision of colonial priorities which the Government could not do
while it was bound by the Constitution and the Immigration Act
passed during the colonial era. With mounting African pressure
the whole colonial stratum had to be dismantled in one way or other.
The Government's first response was the amendment of
s. 25(3)(d) of the Independence Constitution.4'0 Although the amend-
J \"--Q
y ment gave the Government a free hand in dealing with non-citizens
resident in Kenya it was soon discerneble that It did not go far
enough. Immediately the question of the future of the immigrant
communities in Kenya became one of crucial importance. This was a
central problem as the Kenyan Constitution does not allow dual
10
citizenship. It is in this background that the Immigration Bill of
1967^ was introduced. It was passed into levy in the same year as
was expected. From then the future of immigrant communities in Ken¬
ya was curtailed. By and large the Asian immigrants were the ones
most adversely affected by the measures introduced by the 1967 Act
and others which allowed preferential treatment to Africans in
matters of employment, trade licensing & loanejamong other things.
The Act gave immigration officers and the Minister for
Home Affairs wide powers of dealing with immigrant communities in
all areas. It is a sign of the depth of committment to the African-
isation sentiment that in spite of the wide powers given to immi¬
gration authorities and the Minister for Home Affairs, come members
43
of Parliament felt that the Act did not go far enough.
For the first time the 1957 Act gave immigration autho¬
rities power to deport non-citizens, which their predecessors were
44
not allowed to do. These powers have surely been used.
It can be said by way of conclusion that the Immigration
Act of 1967 was introduced to underwrite the Africanization policies
in general. The detailed provisions and the means by which immigra¬




1. Control of aliens in Britain started roughly in the 12th cen¬
tury. An alien is a person who is not (a)a British subject,
(b)a British protected person or (c)a citizen of the Republic
of Ireland. In Kenya immigration controls were introduced for
the first time in 1906.
2. C. Parry p. 28 and T.W.E. Roche p. 17.
3. C. Parry p. 28-
4. Englishmen in colonies were British subjects: dictum in CRAW v
RAMSEY (1669) Vaugh 274 quoted in C. Parry p. 54.
5. Statute no. 33 Geo. III.
6. T.W.E. Roche p. 47.
7. Ibid. p. 48.
8. H.C. 81 (1973) and H.C. 79 (1973)•
III
9. Statute no. 33 Geo./Part. XIX. Quoted in T.W.E. Roche p. 51.
10. Statute no. 43 Geo. Ill Cap. 155 (1803): Repealed by Act of Wil¬
liam IV Cap. XL (1836).
11. Ibid.
12. Those to be excluded were (a)persons convicted of any crime in
any foreign country within 5 years; (b)prostitutes; (c)people
living on the proceeds of prostitution; (d)people who were like¬
ly to be a charge on public funds; (e)people with no visible or
probable means of support and (f)people of- notoriously bad
character-
13. T.W.E. Roche p. 79.
12
14. See generally R. Moore and T. Wallace.
15. T.W.E. Roche p. 99 and I. Macdonald p. 8.
IS. The Immigration Act 1971 Schedule S.
17. E.E.C. Treaty, articles 48 and 49; European Communities Act
1972, s. 2(l),(2) & (3). Detailed provisions on the freedom
of movement found in E.E.C. Council Regulation 1612/68.
18. T.W.E. Roche p. 205.
19. The Indian Government introduced a check on the issue of pass¬
ports in 1955 and 1958 on the request of the U.K. Government.
The Commonwealth Relations Office also had informal talks with
the Pakistan Government as a result of which there was a re¬
quirement on intending immigrants to deposit £187.50 before
leaving for the U.K. Further the Senior Manley Commission of
1956 to the West Indies had the same intent of restricting
immigrants into the U.K. at source. The practices continued
until 1962 when British controls came into force as a result of
legislation.
20. For example, 1958 Nottingham Dale Disturbances.
21. E.J.B. Rose chapter 8.
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THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF IMMIGRATION
LAWS IN THE U.K. AND KENYA
In this part the scope and purposes of immigration laws
in both countries will be examined in some detail. Chapter one will
be an examination of the following topics: (a)people who have the
right to free entry in each country and how that right is acquired;
(b)the Rules and Regulations that are part of the laws; (cjthe im¬
migration appeals system of the U.K. and lastly (d)the grounds and
methods of deporting immigrants.
The topics are a small portion of the number of topics that
could be made out of the laws, but since they are the most important
to immigration law detailed examination will be limited to them.
Many more questions than can be answered will be raised. The lav; is
so complex and full of gaps that any examination will naturally lead
to an examination of certain implications of various provisions.
Accordingly some side issues will be pursued from time to time to
establish the complexity or the gaps of the various provisions, and,
where possible, the examination of such side issues will be kept to
the minimum.
Chapter two will be an attempt to discover the purposes of
immigration laws in both countries. Generally speaking, the ends
that such laws serve may be the purpose. One must also look at the
motives of the legislators and the public at large to establish the
purpose of a law. We will examine both the ends that the laws serve
and the motives of the legislators and the public and from them
draw conclusions as to the purposes of the immigration laws.
CHAPTER ONE
In the U.K. the Immigration Act of 1971, which is the main
source of immigration law, represents a codification of what used
to be separate and distinct systems of immigration laws for aliens
and Commonwealth citizens. The Act gives the Secretary of State
new powers in that he can now deport a Commonwealth citizen from
the U.K. if he deems the deportation of that person to be conducive
to the public good."*" He did not have this power before. Certain
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powers like those empowering him to require aliens to register with
2
the police are retained. The Act does not, however, impair the
powers exercisable by the Crown in relation to aliens by virtue of
prerogative powers.^
In most other respects the 1971 Act not only codifies
the laws that existed previously, but also assimilates them. From
the point of view of bureaucratic and administrative efficiency
the assimilation and codification of the laws is a selutqry step.
If the law is properly used without abuse it can only lead to the
promotion of efficiency and to the benefit of all concerned. For
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example, in 1973 nearly 7 million people entered the U.K. That
works out to nearly 20,000 people going through the U.K. ports
each day. Since immigration officers have to scrutinise each per¬
son individually it saves time to apply standard rules for each
instead of first finding out whether one is an alien or a Common¬
wealth citizen and then thinking what rules to apply. It is there¬
fore important that the immigration laws are now under one Act.
There are also a number of good political reasons for essimilating
the two systems of immigration laws. For example, Britain's entry
into the E.E.C. was definitely a very important and decisive poli¬
tical influence.
fi) Patrlals and Citizens
In this part we will examine the meaning of the terms
"patrial" in relation to the U.K. and "citizens" in relation to Ken¬
ya.
Patrials; A patrial is the technical term given to a person
who has the right of free entry (or the right of abode) into the
U.K. Before we examine those who are patrials it is important to
examine British nationality laws first. This is necessary for the
better understanding of the patriality "concept".
Before 194B everyone who owed perpetual allegiance to the
British Crown was a British subject. As some countries within the
British Empire became self-governing there was a need to identify
people who would be its citizens. Thus in 1946 Canada passed its
own citizenship laws. Many other countries like South Africa had
their own citizenship laws. Because of the moves of those countries
to have their own definition of their citizens its became imperative
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for the U.K. to pass its own nationality laws. Thus, in 1948 the
British Nationality Act was passed and it defined distinctly those
people who were to be citizens of the U.K. and colonies, among others.
The lasting effect that the Act created for the future of immigration
law was that it established a continuing status of British subject.
Any citizen of the U.K. and colonies, any citizen of a self-governing
former British colony and citizens of the Republic of Ireland, who
retained their connection with the U.K., were all British subjects.
The 1948 British Nationality Act was not enacted with immigration in
mind for it was assumed that:
"anyone living under the imperial aegis of
Britain ..." 5
was not only entitled to call himself a British subject, but was also
free to come into the U.K. without any restrictions. In order to
appreciate the classes of people that the British Nationality Act of
1948 created, it is necessary to list them all.
g
Firstly, the Act created citizens of the U.K. and colonies.
These were:
(i) persons who, or whose fathers, were born, naturalised
or registered under the Act in the U.K., the Channel Islands or Isle
of Kan in any of the remaining colonies (then not self-governing);
and in any of the Associated States in the West Indies;
(ii) persons born in foreign countries whose fathers were
citizens of the U.K. and colonies by descent and whose births were ^
registered at a British Consulate;
(iii) persons who, or whose fathers, derived their citizen¬
ship from a connection with a former colony or other dependency, but
who did not acquire the new country's citizenship automatically at
independence. The majority of the East African Asians fall into this
category.
(iv) persons adopted in the U.K. by a citizen of the U.K.
and colonies.
Secondly, the Act created two other categories of people:
(i) British subjects without citizenship - these were
people who were British subjects before 1st January 1949 and potentially
citizens of either the United Kingdom, Sire, or one of the Commonwealth
countries listed in the British Nationality Act 1948 s.1(3), but had not
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acquired such citizenship or become aliens; and
(ii) citizens of the Republic of Ireland born before 1st
January 1949 who were then British subjects and have remained so by
7
making a formal claim as provided by the Act.
In addition to the above categories there were British
Protected Persons. They were an anomalous class of people in that
they were neither British subjects nor aliens.
Except for British Protected Persons all the other cate¬
gories of people above were British subjects whether their country
became independent or not. Since British subjects were free to
come into the U.K. as they wished it is clear that citizens of a
former British dependency as well as the existing dependencies were
free to come into the U.K. whether they originated from the U.K. or
not. That, of course, remained the case until 1962.
In 1965 another category of people was added to the list
of British subjects. These were women who. registered as British
* 8
subjects under the British Nationality Act 1965 by reason of their
marriage to British subjects without citizenship (above) or by reason
of their marriage to citizens of the Republic of Ireland who formally
claimed to retain their status of British subject.
Over the years there have been many amendments to the 1948
British Nationality Act making it complex and difficult to follow.
One of its most serious drawbacks is that since 1962, when immigration
controls were first introduced against certain categories of British
subjects, the Act has failed to give a ready definition of who has the
right to enter and leave the U.K. freely. As a result of this the word
patrial was introduced by the 1971 Immigration Act to try and define who
of all those British subjects are still free to enter the U.K. freely.
In other words, patrials are a class of British subjects who are free
to enter and leave the U.K.. The right to freely enter and leave the
Q
U.K. is known also as the right of abode in the U.K..
We are now ready to discover who of the British subjects are
patrials. There are five different ways of becoming a patrial which
we will now look at:
(i) If one is a citizen of the U.K. and colonies who has
that citizenship by his birth, adoption, naturalisation or registration
in the U.K. or the Islands.10 In this section patriality is
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co-extensive with citizenship of the U.K. arid colonies if the birth,
adoption, naturalisation or registration of that person occurred in
the U.K. or the Islands0 Accordingly, a citizen of the U.K. and
colonies born, adopted, naturalised or registered in an overseas
dependency is not a patrial unless he qualifies as such under the
other heads below. If he does not so qualify under the other said
heads then he has no right of abode in the U.K. notwithstanding that
he is still a citizen of the UCK. and colonies. In that case the
effect of the British Nationality Act of 191*8 is drastically changed
because patriality denies free entry to any citizen of the U.K. and
colonies who is not a patrial. It is submitted that immigration law
should be related to citizenship and that rights of entry conferred
by the status of citizenship must not be curtailed by immigration
law even by a fractiono Once a citizen's rights of free entry are
interfered with by immigration law then constitutional problems of
the rights of free movement of a citizen are automatically attracted.
Not every person born in the U.K0 and the Islands is a citizen.
There are exceptions which are valid also in immigration lawc Thus,
the following people born in the U.K. and Islands are not citizens
of the U.Ko and colonies and accordingly are non-patrials and subject
to immigration control:
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(a) children born to foreign diplomats who are in the U.K. and
(b) children born in eipspy occupied territory and whose fathers
are alien enemies. If, however, this makes the child
stateless and the mother is a U.K. citizen the child will be
a U.Ko citizen13 and accordingly a patrial by its birth.
The birth must, however, have occurred in the U.K. In
other words, an enemy occupied territory must be part of
the UoKo and the Islands.
The British Nationality Act 191*8 merely tells us that a person
shall not be a citizen of the U0K. and colonies by birth if at the
time of his birth his father is an enemy alien and the birth occurs
11*
in a place then under enemy occupation. For the purposes of the
Immigration Act 1971 and, in particular, patriality, we must assume
that the enemy occupied territory is a section of the U.K0 or the
Islands. Now, there is no comprehensive definition of the word
20
enemy alien, but its primary meaning is a person whose Sovereign or
State is at war with the U.K. and in relation to civil rights it de¬
notes a person of whatever nationality^ including British, who is
carrying on a business or is voluntarily resident in the enemy's
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country or occupied territory. We are not told whether or not a
child born to a familyjin which the father is involuntarily in the
section of the U.K. and Islands then under enemy occupation, is a
citizen of the U.K. and colonies. Further, we are not told whether
a child born to a British national who is an enemy alien by reason
that he is voluntarily living in the enemy state will or will not be
a citizen of the U.K. and colonies if that child is born in the sec¬
tion of the U.K. then under enemy occupation. In the circumstances
it is not possible to say whether or not such children are patrials
or non-patrials.
(ii) If one is a citizen of the U.K. and colonies and is
IS
born to or legally adopted by a parent who had that citizenship
at the time of the birth or adoption, provided that the parent eith¬
er then had citizenship of the U.K. and colonies by his birth, a-
doption, naturalisation or registration in the U.K. or any of the
Islands, or had been born to or legally adopted by a parent who at
the time of that birth or adoption had such citizenship. This sec¬
tion witholds patriality from people born or legally adopted by a
parent who was not, at the time of the birth or adoption, a U.K.
citizen by birth, adoption, naturalisation or (subject to the Immi¬
gration Act 1971, s.2(2)) registration in the U.K. or the Islands;
or if the parent had been born to or legally adopted by a person who,
at the time of the birth or adoption was a U.K. citizen by birth,
17
adoption, naturalisation or registration in the U.K. and the Islands.
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In one case there were two sisters born to a mother who was a ci¬
tizen of the U.K. and colonies. The mother was born in India in
1921. Her father was also born in India, but her paternal grandfa¬
ther was born in the U.K. The mother was admitted into the U.K. as
a patrial by reason of her paternal grandfather's birth in the U.K.,
but the two girls, who were born in Kenya and India respectively and
were citizens of the U.K. and colonies were, it' was held, non-pa¬
trials because their mother did not have her U.K. citizenship by her
birth, adoption, naturalisation or registration in the U.K. and
their maternal grandfather, though he may have been a citizen of the
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U.K. and colonies at their mother's birth, did not have that citi¬
zenship by virtue of his own birth, adoption, naturalisation or
registration in the U.K.
In C.fan infant) v ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER, HONG KONG19
the appellant was an illegitimate girl citizen of the U.K. and co¬
lonies, born in Hong Kong. Her mother did not fulfil the above re¬
quirements of birth or adoption by a parent who was a U.K. citizen
by birth, adoption, naturalisation or registration etc, and accor¬
dingly she was not a patrial. The little girl's natural father was
born in the U.K. and his parents had been born and married in the
U.K. He was, therefore, a patrial. On the facts the Tribunal held
that the law did not recognise the natural father of an illegitimate
child and for the same reason "grandparents" could not be taken to
include the paternal grandparents of an illegitimate child. It is
obvious from this case and the former one that patriality is res-
trictively interpreted and one must fit squarely into the four cor¬
ners of the law in order to qualify as a patrial. The cases also
illustrate that the categories of people who are or are not patrials
are far from certain.
Under the Immigration Act 1971, s. 2(l)(a) and (b), if a
child is adopted jointly by a citizen of the U.K. born, adopted,
naturalised or registered in the U.K., on the one hand, and by an
alien married to the British citizen on the other hand, the child
may or may not be a patrial. If both joint adoptive parents are
citizens of the U.K. and born, adopted, naturalised or registered
in the U.K. obviously no problems will arise. However, problems
erise immediately:
(a) if one of the adopting joint parents is not born,
adopted, naturalised or registered in the U.K. although he or she is
a citizen of the U.K. and colonies and
(b) if one of the adopting joint parents is an alien.
Such children should be free of immigration control.
(iii) If one is a citizen of the U.K. and colonies who has
at any time been settled in the U.K. end Islands and who then had
been ordinarily resident there while being such a citizen for the
20
last five years or more.
- 21In LEVENti v I.R.C. the Court defined ordinary residence.
Viscount Cave L.C. said that ordinary residence:
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"connotes residence in a place with some degree of
continuity and apart from accidental or temporary
absence*
If a person goes away for a holiday, therefore, it does not mark a
break in the continuity of the ordinary residence. A person may al¬
so be ordinarily resident in the U.K. even though he is subject
23
to restrictions on the length of his stay. This follows from the
meaning given to the word "settled". In R. v.GOVERNOR OF PENTCVILLc
2a
PRISON ex parte AZAM Lord Denning M.R. held that:
"special provision was made for people who entered
lawfully on a permit for a limited period and o-
verstayed their time...Having entered lawfully
their subsequent 'remaining*...did not convert
them into illegal entrants. But they were not
* settled'...Such a person was put into a batter
position than an illegal entrant. He was spe¬
cially catered for. He was regarded as ordinary
resident... though he had remained in breach of
immigration laws. He could not be deported on the
ground that his presence was^conducive to the
public goad. But he could be deported on the
ground that he had overstayed his time unless he
had been here for five years or more."
It follows, therefore, that a person can be ordinarily resident in
the U.K. although subject to the limitations as to the length of
his stay.
A person is not to be regarded as free from immigration
restrictions where he is exempt from them by virtue of membership of
25
the armed forces or membership of a diplomatic mission. Nor, in¬
deed, is a person who is not a patrial to be treated as ordinarily
resident in the U.K. or the Islands at a time when he is there in
or no
breach of immigration laws. In AZAf.1 v HOME SECRETARY" it was
held that the words "when he is there in breach of immigration laws"
do not require that there should be subsisting a breach in respect
of which sanctions may be imposed, but cover the case of a person
whose presence arises from a breach, for example, of any case of il¬
legal entry. It is enough, therefore, that an entry is not in ac¬
cordance with the Immigration Act and/or the rules made thereunder
to constitute a breach.
A citizen of the U.K. and colonies who has been "settled"
in the U.K. or the Islands by a period of five years of "ordinary
residence" in accordance with the definitions above will be a patrial.
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This provision has been restrictive in terms of the East African
Asians who, although they were citizens of the U.K. and colonies,
could not establish ordinary residence in the U.K. for at least five
years. They also suffered from another disability in that most of
them could net establish that- their parents or grandparents were
born, adopted, naturalised or registered in the U.K. or the Islands
at the time of their birth or adoption.
It has been held that the alien wife and her children of
a person who is 'settled' in the U.K. have no right to enter the
28
U.K. unless she complies with the Immigration Act. This is not
likely to affect women from Commonwealth countries married to people
29
settled in the U.K. as above.
(iv) If one is a Commonwealth citizen born to or legally
adopted by a parent who, at the time of the birth or adoption
had citizr.eship of the U.K. and colonies by his birth in the U.K.
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or in any of the Islands. It must be noted that the birth or a-
doption is restricted to Commonwealth citizens only and, unlike
s. 2(l)(b) of the immigration Act ((ii) above) relating to the ci¬
tizens of the U.K. and colonies born abroad, the Act limits the
linkage of a Commonwealth citizen to one parent only and not to that
of a grandparent. Under this section, therefore, a Commonwealth
citizen is a patrial if his or her parent was at the time of his or
her birth or adoption a U.K. citizen by birth in the U.K. or the
Islands. Note that if the adopting parent is a U.K. citizen by a-
doption, naturalisation or registration in the U.K. or the Islands
or has
and adoptsja child by birth who is a Commonwealth citizen then,
presumably, that Commonwealth citizen does not become a patrial.
This is because the Act says specifically that at the time of birth
or adoption of the Commonwealth citizen by a parent, that parent
must be a U.K. citizen by birth in the U.K. If the parent adopted
or hod the Commonwealth citizen by birth before 1949 and the parent
was, at that time, a British subject, then the Commonwealth citizen
will be a patrial.^
It has been submitted that the practical effect of the a-
bovc provision is to confer patrial status on a Commonwealth citi-
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zon whose mother was born in the U.K. or the Islands. This result
is arrived at because the British Nationality Act 1948, s. 5(1)
clearly stipulates thatji person shall be a citizen of the U.K. and
colonies by descent if his or her father is a citizen of the U.K.
and colonies. This is the concept of the ius sanguinis which is du-
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ly recognised by English law and is restricted to the first
extra-territorially-born generation only. Patriality requires that
the birth of the parent adopting a Commonwealth citizen or to whom
the birth of such a Commonwealth citizen has occurred must have ta¬
ken place in the U.K.
It has been suggested that the provision above compensates
for the fact that a married woman does not confer her citizenship
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upon hor child under the British Nationality Acts. A child of a
U.K. mother who marries an Australian man would be a patrial if the
mother retains her U.K. citizenship. The same would not be the case
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if the woman marries a U.S.A. citizen. " It is not entirely safe
to argue that s. 2(l)(d) of the Immigration Act compensates for the
fact that a woman who is a U.K. citizen does not confer citizenship
upon her child under the British Nationality Acts. All that can be
said is that the effect of s. 2(l)(d) is to confer patriality on
Commonwealth citizens one of whose parents was born in the U.K. or
the Islands and this is the case under the Immigration A.ct whether
or not Parliament intended to confer U.K. citizenship on them.
(v) The final method of becoming a patrial is if, in the
case of women, one is a Commonwealth citizen and either:
(a) is the wife of any such citizen of the U.K. end
colonies as is mentioned in s. 2(l)(a},(b) and (c) above or any
such Commonwealth citizen as is mentioned in s. 2(l}(d) above, or
(b) has at any time been the wife:
(1) of a person then being such a citizen of the
UK and colonies or Commonwealth citizen, or
(2) of a British subject who but for his death
wouldxon the date of commencement of the British Nationality Act 1948
hove been such a citizen of the U.K. and colonies as is mentioned in
s. 2(l)(a) end (b) .
From the above provisions it is obvious that a Commonwealth
woman who marries a patrial becomes a patriel automatically or, if
before 1949, she married a British subject who but for his death
would have become a patrial by virtue of being born, adopted, natur¬
alised or registered in the U.K. or the Islands or by virtue of his
parents or garndparents having been born, adopted,naturalised or re¬
gistered in the U.K. or the Islands. There are, however, two hurdles
to women in this category.
Firstly, s. 2(2) of the Immigration Act makes s proviso
that in s. 2(l)(a) and (b) references to registration as a citizen
of the U.K. and colonies shall not, in the case of a women, in¬
clude registration after the passing of the Immigration Act under
or by virtue of the British Nationality Act 1943 unless she is also
registered by virtue of her marriage to be a citizen of the U.K. and
colonies before the passing of the Immigration Act 1971. The effect
of this proviso is that a marriage to a patrial by a Commonwealth
woman who is not registered as a citizen of the U.K. and colonies
before the Immigration Act 1971 came into force does not confer pa¬
triality on the Commonwealth woman automatically. In that case the
Secretary of State reserves the discretion to register the woman as
a patrial notwithstanding that she is registered as a citizen of the
U.K. and colonies by virtue of s. 6(2) of the British Nationality
Act 1943 and the registration occurred after the Immigration Act 1971
came into force. The woman will became a patrial automatically,
however, if she registered as such a citizen of the U.K. and colonies
by virtue of s. 6(2) of the British Nationality Act and the regis¬
tration occurred before the Immigration Act 1971 came into force.
Secondly, a Commonwealth woman married to a patrial and
herself claiming to be a patrial by reason of that relationship is
required to prove it by means of such certificate of patriality as
may be specified in the immigration rules unless she shows that she
3S
is a patrial by reason that:
(a) she is a citizen of the U.K. and colonies who has
at any time been settled in the U.K. and Islands and had at that
time (and while such a citizen) been ordinarily resident there for
the last five years or more, or
(b) she is a Commonwealth citizen born or legally
adopted by a parent who at the time of the birth or adaption had ci¬
tizenship of the U.K. and colonies by birth in the U.K. or in any of
the Islands. Unless a Commonwealth woman married to a patrial can
show that she belongs to either of the two classes above, then she
must produce a certificate of patriality to prove her patriality.
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In R. v SECRETARY OF STATE ex parte PHANSOPKAR the Court of Appeal
heard that the immigration authorities had laid down for themselves
a rule of practice that a wife who desired a certificate of patriality
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must obtain it in her own country of origin and for that reason they
had refused to entertain an application by Mrs. Phansopkar, the wife
of a settled patrial, and accordingly required her to return to In¬
dia and make an application for the certificate to a British rep¬
resentative there. The rules clearly stipulated that the certificate
could be obtained from the Home Office in the U.K. or from a British
representative overseas. Given these facts the Court held that if
such a certificate could be issued either by a British representative
or by the Home Office, it fallowed than an application for it could
properly be made to one or the other. The only requirement on such
a woman is that she has,not unreasonably, to satisfy the authorities
of the fact of her marriage, but having done so, is entitled to the
certificate of patriality. The fact that she a Commonwealth citizen
married to a patrial entitles her and her children to be patrials
and as such have the right of abode in the U.K. on production of the
certificate of patriality.
Alien women married to patrials have to obtain visas, if
so required, before comming to the U.K. and if they do not do so
they will be refused leave to enter. In R. v THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION
OFFICER, HEATHROW AIRPORT AND ANOTHER an alien wife of a settled
person was excluded from entry because she did net have a visa.
The above then are the categories of all the citizens of
the U.K. and colonies who may enter and leave the U.K. freely. Pa¬
triality is, therefore, a very narrow "concept" and is not related
to citizenship with regard to the people it leaves out, although they
are also citizens of the U.K. and colonies and in that respect it
would seem to discriminate unfairly against them. Moreover, as the
analysis above reveals, the "concept" of patriality has a lot cf gaps
and for that reason it is uncertain, inconsistent and highly complex
in some cases. A useful general guide of those who may be patrials
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is found elsewhere.
Finally, it must be noted that for economic^, historical^
42
and geographical reasons the citizens of the Republic of Ireland
are, in practice, exempt from immigration control and are, therefore,




In Kenya a general law was passed in 1906 empowering the
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colonial government to keep out paupers, lunatics end sick people.
This remained in force until 1944 when the Government used its pow¬
ers to enact Defence (Admission of Male Persons) Regulations pro¬
hibiting the entry of every person, alien or British subject, ex¬
cept by permit. The Regulations ushered into the immigration .law
of Kenya the entry permit system which has since been followed. In
1949 the first Immigration Act was passed. The immediate effect of
the Act was to require every person wishing to come to Kenya to have
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a permit with the aim of reducing Asian immigration into Kenya.
In 1956 another Immigration Act was passed. Its preamble
stated that the future of immigration policy of the Government was
to be based on economic considerations and for this reason the Gov¬
ernment was to turn to the U.K. for expatriates. The Act created
several classes of entry permits and passes which have been carried
into the 1967 Immigration Agt with the: exception that immigrants
holding entry permits no longer have the right to reside in Kenya
for life.
Therefore entry and stay of immigrants into Kenya is now
governed by the 1967 Immigration Act. The point that must be con¬
sidered now is how an immigrant qualifies to enter Kenya freely.
We have seen that in the U.K. one has to be a patrial in order to
enter the country freely.
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In Kenya s. 4(1) of the Immigration Act 1967 provides
that:
"no person who is not a citizen of Kenya shall
enter Kenya unless he is in possession of a
valid entry permit or pass."
Accordingly, a person is free to enter Kenya and to remain therein
as of right only if he is a citizen of Kenya, and if he is not, then
his entry and stay in Kenya will be by leave of an immigration of-
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ficer only. It is necessary to look at who are citizens of Kenya,
therefore, in order to determine those who enjoy the right of free
entry and stay in the country.
In framing the provisions of the Constitution of Kenya in
connection with citizenship two problems were faced. In the first
place, what was to be the position of people living in Kenya or
having connections with Kenya at the time of independence? In the
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second place, what was to be the position of those people born in
Kenya after independence? Each of these two problems is catered
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for in the Constitution of Kenya 1969 which will be examined now.
In relation to the first category, a distinction was
drawn between those who became citizens automatically by the oper¬
ation of law and those who became citizens by registration. Y.P.
Ghai has pointed out, correctly, that this had the effect of
"ascribing different nationalities to differ¬
ent members of the same family."^
Those who became citizens automatically by the operation
of law were:
(i) all those people who were born in Kenya and who were
on the 11th of December 1963 citizens of the U.K. and colonies or
British Protected people. They became citizens automatically on
that date if, and only if, at least one of their parents was born
50
in Kenya." This group included almost all the indigenous people
and a good percentage of immigrant communities.
(ii) all those people who although they were born out¬
side Kenya were on 11th December 1963 citizens of the U.K. and co¬
lonies or British Protected persons if the father of the person be¬
came or would but for his death have become a citizen of Kenya by
virtue of (i) ebove on 11th December 1963."J" In other words, if
the father and at least one of the grandparents were born in Kenya
before 11th December 1963 then the person became a Kenyan citizen
automatically notwithstanding that he himself was born outside Ken¬
ya provided that he was a citizen of the U.K. and colonies or a
British Protected person.
The rest of the people having connections with Kenya be¬
come citizens by registration as follows:
(i) if they were born in Kenya, but neither of their pa¬
rents nor their grandparents was so born and on 11th December 1963
they were citizens of the U.K. and colonies or British Protected
people then they were entitled upon application before 12th December
521965 to be registered es Kenyan citizens as of right. But a per¬
son (other than a woman who is or has been married) who was below
the age of 21 years had to have an application for registration as
a citizen marie by the parent(s) or guardian(s).
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(ii) if they were citizens of the U.K. and colonies on 11th
December 1963, having become such citizens:
(a) under the British Nationality Act 1948 by virtue
of their having been naturalised in Kenya as British subjects before
the Act came into force, or
(b) by virtue of having been naturalised in Kenya un¬
der that Act, then they were entitled upon application before 12th
53
December 1965 to be registered as citizens of Kenya as of right.
(iii) any woman who on 11th December 1963 was or had been
married to a person who became a citizen of Kenya automatically by
operation of law or would have so become a citizen of Kenya but for
his death was entitled upon application to be registered as a citi-
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zen of Kenya. It must be noted at once that there is no time bar
as to the date of application and accordingly women once married to
men who became or would have become Kenyan citizens automatically
by the operation of law are still free to apply to be registered as
citizens of Kenya. This is perhaps a reflection of the weight attach¬
ed to the preservation of families of men who would have become ci¬
tizens automatically. The position of their wives is very secure
indeed. There is no time limit on their right to apply for Kenyan
citizenship.
Any woman who on 11th December 1963 was married to a person
who became or would hove(but for his death, become entitled to be re¬
gistered as a citizen of Kenya by virtue of paragraph (i) and (ii)
above, but whose marriage was terminated by death or dissolution
before 12th December 1963, or was so terminated on or after 12th
December 1963 but before that person exercised his right to be regis¬
tered as a citizen of Kenya under either of the paragraphs, was en¬
titled upon application before 12th December 1965 to be registered
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as a citizen of Kenya. " There is a provision made for any woman
whose marriage was dissolved before 12th December 1965 before the
husband exercised his right to be registered as a citizen of Kenya,
to apply to be registered at any time after the deadline date of 1955.
She must, however, apply for such citizenship during the lifetime of
the husband.wD It is amply implied by the Kenya Citizenship Act^
that if the woman re-marries during the lifetime of her former hus¬
band of her former marriage then the right to register as a Kenyan
citizen lapses automatically. However, if the husband of the former
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marriage re-married that right does not lapse if she, herself, re¬
mains unmarried.
(iv) In Kenya there is an additional category of people
who could register as Kenyan citizens. These are people who on 11th
December 1963 were citizens of the U.K. and colonies or of the Rep¬
ublic Of Ireland and who were ordinarily and lawfully resident in
Kenya (otherwise than by a pass issued under the Immigration Act of
1956""' as then in force and conferring on them the right to remain
in Kenya temporarily). On application they were entitled to be reg-
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istered as citizens of Kenya as of right. If the person (other
than a woman who is or has been married) was under the age of 21
years then the parents or guardians applied on his behalf. The con¬
stitutional provision is silent on the registration of wives of
people who qualified for registration as citizens under this head,
but died or had their marriages dissolved before their husbands
could exercise their right to be registered as citizens. It appears
that the wives of these people who qualified or could qualify are
deliberately left out and that being so they are not entitled to free
entry and stay in Kenya under the 1967 Immigration Act. Provision
should have been made for them to be registered as citizens.
A person who is registered as a Kenyan citizen must re¬
nounce his other nationalities and take an oath of allegiance where¬
as a person who becomes a citizen automatically is only required to
renounce his other nationalities. A person who cannot renounce his
nationalities by reason that his former country's law does not make
provision for renounciation of citizenship is merely required to
0|
make an appropriate declaration concerning his former nationalities.
As is clear from the above, most of the people who are re¬
quired to apply for registration as citizens of Kenya had until 12th
December 1965 to apply for the registration. By 1964 only 3,911 A-
6jL
sians and Europeans had registered as citizens. Midway through
the second year the number had risen to 9,018 out o£ which there
were 8,174 Asians and 844 Europeans. ~ During the closing months of
November and December 1965 there was an upsurge of applications to-
03
tailing more than 10,000 in number.
All that the law required of the people was no more than
sending in application forms for registration. If they did that
they were entitled by the constitution to be registered as citizens
31
as of right. It is now a matter of historical importance to note
that many of the applications took years to process. As late as
September 1970 the Vice President, Mr. D. Arap Moi, declared that
the granting and processing of citizenship applications had been
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halted while a review of citizenship policy was taking place.
This declaration followed allegations of corruption which was ge¬
nerated by the fact that those who applied for registration and did
not get it soon were employing all methods available to them to
have their applications processed. Their status in immigration law
will be looked at below.
Qg
(v) Finally, provision is made by the Citizenship Act
for registration as Kenya citizens of all those people of African
GS
descent who were not indigenous inhabitants of Kenya. On satisfy-
67
ing specified conditions and making a declaration in writing of
their willingness to renounce other nationalities and taking an oath
of allegiance they may be registered as Kenyan citizens. There is
no time bar in their case.
Under the independence constitution, special protection
was given to people who were non-citizens but who were ordinarily
and lawfully resident in Kenya. They were free to remain in Kenya
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for life. The provision protected the immigrants if they did not
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went to become citizens of Kenya. In 1965 the provision was amended
and the people were brought under the rigours of immigration law.
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Under the 1956 Immigration Act they had been entitled to claim a
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residents certificate with the right to stay in Kenya for life.
A person with,a residents certificate was free to come and stay in
Kenya and engage in any business, trade or profession, or to engage
in employment without the necessity of requiring leave from immigra¬
tion authorities. However, the 1957 Immigration Act changed this
position substantially.
Section 16(l) of that Act provides that subject to s. 19
of the Act any residents certificate granted or issued or deemed to
be issued or granted under the 1956 Immigration Act shall have ef¬
fect according to its term as if it had been issued under the 1967
Act. This provision, in effect, geve the immigration authorities
power to withdraw residents certificates already held or deemed to
be held.^2
Section 19 of the Act provides the method by which resi¬
dents certificates are brought to an end. It provides that the
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Minister may at any time require any person or class of persons
whose presence in Kenya would have been unlawful but for s. IB(l)
to apply to an immigration officer in the prescribed manner for an
entry permit or pass. The Minister so requires the residents cer¬
tificate holders to apply for entry permits or passes by notice in
the Gazette. After the expiration of three months from the date of
the notice in the Gazette, s. 18 above then ceases to have any ef¬
fect, that is, the residents certificates become void and of no
effect. The further stay or entry of a person whose resident certi¬
ficate becomes void in the above manner must be on the basis of his
or her entry permit or pass. In other words the person now quali¬
fies for entry or stay in Kenya under the immigration law to which
he or she is now fully subjected. However, if a residents certi¬
ficate has not been "called up" then its holder is still free to
enter and remain in Kenya free of immigration law and his position
is like that of a Kenyan citizen in relation to immigration
In the preceding paragraphs on examination was made of
the mode of acquiring citizenship on and after independence. All
the people who became citizens of Kenya under any of the above para¬
graphs or who held or were deemed to hold residents certificates
are free to enter and remain in Kenya without being subject to im¬
migration. It now remains to examine the mode of acquiring citizen¬
ship after independence which also puts a person beyond the reach
of immigration law.
(i) A person born in Kenya after 11th December 1963 be¬
comes a citizen of Kenya automatically by the operation of law un¬
less:
(a) neither of his parents is a citizen of Kenya and
his father posesses such immunity from suit and legal process as is
accorded to the envoy of a foreign sovereign power accredited to
Kenya, end
(b) his father is a citizen of a country with which
Kenya is at war and the birth occurs in a place then under enemy
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occupation by that country. Subsection (a) appears to discrimi¬
nate against women in that a woman posessing such immunity from
suit and legal process nnd who is married to a Kenyan citizen will
not confer her nationality on their child if it is born in Kenya
since the child will become a Kenyan citizen automatically. This is
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not clearly the case if the couple give birth to a child in Kenya
end the man is the one posessing the immunity from suit end legal
process while the women is a Kenyan citizen. It is irrelevant
that the child was born in Kenya. Many countries prectise this
kind of discrimination which seems to be based solely on sex.
Sub-section (b), unlike its U.K. counterpart, is clear and
precise and avoids the use of vague terms like "enemy aliens" which
appears commonly in the U.K. law. A child is a Kenyan citizen,
therefore, if he or she is born in any part of Kenya, unless the
father is a citizen of a country with which Kenya is at war and
notwithstanding that the birth of the child occurs in an area of
Kenya then under enemy occupation. This has never happened under
the U.K. law though. Further, the presence of the parents in an
enemy occupied area whether voluntary or involuntary has no effect
on the citizenship of the child born there provided the father is
not a citizen of the country engaged in war with Kenya. This again
is not the case in the U.K. as that lav/ takes into account whether
the parents were in the enemy occupied area voluntarily or involun¬
tarily.
Sub-section (b) has two other effects. Firstly, a child
born in an area of Kenya not under enemy occupation and whose fa¬
ther is a citizen of the country with which Kenya is at war will be
a citizen of Kenya automatically notwithstanding that the father is
himself engaged in the war against Kenya. Secondly, the child will
be a citizen of Kenya whether it is born in an enemy occupied area
of Kenya or not notwithstanding that his parents, although Ken¬
yan citizens, are nevertheless engaging in war against Kenya on the
side of the enemy.
Children become automatic citizens of Kenya by virtue of
their birth in Kenya in any of the above situations and they are
automatically free to enter and remain in Kenya without being sub¬
ject to immigration 1aw.^
The Kenyan law is more generous than the U.K. lav; in one
more respect. A child will be a citizen if born to a woman whether
or not out of v/edlock and in an enemy occupied area. The U.K. lav/
is more rigid in that it must be shown that the child would be state¬
less.
A child born in Kenya who becomes a citizen of Kenya in the
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above situations and who is at the same time a citizen of some other
country will automatically cease to be a citizen of Kenya unless
upon attaining the age of 21 he renounces the citizenship of that
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other country and takes an oath of allegiance. If he so ceases
to be a citizen of Kenya then he is automatically made subject to
the immigration law with the consequence that the right to enter
and remain in Kenya without being subject to immigration law lapses.
(ii) A person also becomes a citizen of Kenya if he is
born after the 11th of December 1963 and his father was a citizen of
Kenya at the date of his birth. This provision is intended for
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children born outside Kenya and whose fathers are Kenyan citizens.
This provision discriminates against women in spite of the exis¬
tence of a further provision that a person who is a citizen of Ken¬
ya does not lose the citizenship by reason of voluntary acquisition
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of another country's citizenship through marriage. However, such
children are free to enter and remain in Kenya without being subject
to immigration law unless at the age of 21 years they fail to re¬
nounce any other citizenship they may have, in which case they lose
their Kenyan citizenship automatically and become subject to im¬
migration law. They must take an oath of allegiance on the renun-
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ciation of other citizenships.
Under s. 2 of the Adoption Act of Kenya (Cap. 143) a fa¬
ther, in relation to on illegitimate child, means the natural fath¬
er. Since the term 'father' is not defined in the Constitution it
is arguable that an illegitimate child born outside Kenya of a Ken¬
yan father will automatically become a Kenyan citizen. This matter
has never been decided in Kenyan Courts, but should it arise, the
Kenyan Courts might take the English Courts' attitude enunciated in
Re M (an infant)(1955) 2 All £.R. 911 that the law does not recog¬
nise the natural father of an illegitimate child, but only the fa¬
ther of a legitimate child born in wedlock. If the Kenyan Courts
held otherwise then the child, although illegitimate, will be free
to enter and remain in Kenya without being subject to immigration
law unless the child fails to renounce the citizenship of that ci¬
ther country on attaining the age of 21 or fails to take the oath
of allegiance on the renunciation of the citizenship of that other
country.
(iii) A woman who has been married to a citizen of Kenya.
shall be entitled, upon making application, to be registered as a
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citizen of Kenya. This provision is less complicated than its
U.K. counterpart in that it does not make distinctions between citi¬
zens strictly so called, Commonwealth citizens end aliens in matters
relating to the entry and stay of women in Kenya as rhe U.K. Immi¬
gration Act 1971 does. It may, however, be criticised, like the
U.K. Immigration Act 1971, for requiring the women tern married to
citizens to have to register before they are allowed even the most
limited freedom of entry and stay in the country. Therefore, until
a woman married to a Kenyan citizen has been registered as a citizen
of Kenya she is subject to immigration law no matter how long she
remains in the country.
(iv) A Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of a specified
8Q
African country who has been ordinarily resident in Kenya for a
specified period, whether commencing before or after December 12th
1963, shall be eligible, upon application, to be registered as a Ken-
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yan citizen. To be ordinarily resident means that one has stayed
in Kenya with a degree of continuity apart from accidental or temp-
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orary absence. The distinction that one must have entered into
the country lawfully before he can be regarded resident, notwith¬
standing that he thereafter stays in breach of immigration lav;, has
not been made in Kenya as it has in the U.K.
A person who has been ordinarily resident in Kenya for a
period of 5 years immediately preceding the date of his application
for registration is eligible to be registered as a citizen of Kenya.
A person who holds an entry permit under the 1967 Immigration Act
and has been ordinarily resident in Kenya by reason of that entry
permit for 5 years or more is eligible to apply for registration as
a citizen of Kenya.
What is not clear is whether or not a person who entered
lawfully, but thereafter remains in the country in breach of immi¬
gration lav; is eligible to apply for registration as a citizen. In
the U.K. there is no doubt that such a person will be ordinarily
resident andUvill probably become a patrial by settlement after 5
years, notwithstanding that he is a"Commonwealth citizen'or an"alien
(v) A person shall be eligible to become a Kenyan citizen
by registration if at the date of his application for the citizen¬
ship one of his parents is a citizen of Kenya.^ If he has not
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attained the age of 21 (except for a woman who is married or has
been married) then the parents or guardians must apply on his or
her behalf.
The effect of this provision is that it confers citizen¬
ship rights through the maternal lineage if the child is born out¬
side Kenya after 12th December 1963. Provided that at the time of
birth the mother is still a Kenyan citizen, it is irrelevant for
the purpose of this section that the child was born legitimate or
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illegitimate. The Kenya Citizenship Act also mokes provision
for the renunciation of any citizenship of such children and the
taking of the oath of allegiance when they attain the age of 21
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years.
Before the child becomes a citizen it is, of course, sub¬
ject to immigration law as it will be on failing to renounce other
citizenships, if any, on attaining the age of 21 years. In the U.K.
the child, whether legitimate or not, born outside the U.K. to a
woman who is a patrial is entitled to the right of abode as of right.
It follows that the U.K. has'relaxed its laws in this area more than
Kenya, although the right of such a child to become a citizen of
the U.K. is just as narrow as Kenya, if not narrower.
(vi) The final method of becoming a Kenyan citizen after
12th December 1963 is by naturalisation. It is provided that any
person who:
(a) has attained the age of 21 years,
(b) has been ordinarily and lawfully resident in Ken¬
ya for a period of 12 months immediately preceding his application,
(c) has been ordinarily and lawfully resident in Ken¬
ya for a period or for periods amrrounting in aggregate to not less
than 4 years in the 7 years immediately preceding the said 12 months,
(d) satisfies the Minister that he is of good charac¬
ter,
(e) satisfies the Minister that he has an adequate
knowledge of the Swahili language and
(f) satisfies the Minister that he Intends, if nat¬
uralised as a citizen of Kenya, to continue to reside in Kenya
will, on application, be eligible to be naturalised as a citizen of
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Kenya. If he has become a citizen by naturalisation before members
of his family become citizens then it appears that in order for them
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to become citizens of Kenya they have to be registered as such, and
not naturalised on application. In that case, the wife falls under
head (iii) above and will be entitled to be registered as a citizen
BQ
as of right. If, however, she applies together with the husband
for citizenship, then it appears she will become eligible to be na¬
turalised as such. This is the case also with indigenous people of
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non-specified African countries.
It is important to note that there is no time limit for
registration after independence in the case of those who have to be
naturalised, whether or not they were in Kenya before, on or after
12th December 1963. Moreover, in terms of the periods of residence,
it is easier to become a citizen by naturalisation than by registra¬
tion. This is the opposite in the U.K., but to become a patrial by
settlement the period of residence is the same for aliens and Com¬
monwealth citizens.
The above categories of people are free to enter and stay
in Kenya without being subject to immigration law. However, two
problems arise; firstly, with those who are entitled to be regis¬
tered as citizens of Kenya on application and have not been so re¬
gistered, although in fact they have applied; and, secondly, with
those people who are adopted. These two problems will be examined
in turn.
In connection with those people who are entitled to be re¬
gistered as citizens, but have not been told anything since they
applied, the question to ask is whether or not they ore free of
immigration law. There is no question that the official policy is
that if an application for citizenship has not been finalised the
person retains his original citizenship. This would probably be
the case under international law since a stateless person is reckon¬
ed to hove, ultimately, the protection of the country of which he
was a citizen last. During the Uganda Asian exodus, Britain clear¬
ly accepted responsibility for the Asians whose applications for
citizenship had not been finalised or properly processed. However,
to leave the matter here would be to leave out the scale and the
complexity of the problem.
In June 1967 of more than 10,000 applications for citizen¬
ship by people who were entitled to become citizens only £00 had
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been processed." The processing was clearly very slow and even
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today there are people who have not heard anything about their ap¬
plications. They live in much anxiety day and night. What was
their entitlement to citizenship worth then?
The Kenyan Citizenship Act provides that the Minister shall
not be required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of any
application for registration as a citizen and his decision shall not
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be subject to appeal or review in any Court. The effect of this
provision is clearly that the Minister has an absolute discretion
that is not questionable, and has never been questioned, to grant
or refuse an application for the registration of any person as a ci¬
tizen. But if he refuses to register a person so entitled then he
is clearly acting in breach of the mandatory terms of the Constitu¬
tion. In MADHWA v CITY COUNCIL OF NAIROBI^ one of the issues that
arose was whether or not Asians whowere citizens of the U.K. and
colonies before 11th December 1963 and had applied to be registered
as Kenyan citizens prior to the deadline of 12th December 1555 un¬
der s. 2(l) of the independence Constitution were citizens of Kenya
since they were entitled to te so registered under the Constitution.
The Court did not find it necessary to decide this point, but noted
obiter that if the suit had been:
"instituted by the Government (not the City Council
of Nairobi) against persons of the plaintiffs and
depending for its success upon the fact that they
had not yet obtained certificates of registration
as citizens it might be a defence in the nature of
some form of estoppel, based upon the provisions
of s. 2(l) and the delay which has occurred in
dealing with a possibility of success."' _yo
It is regrettable that the Court did not make specific
findings on this very important issue. However, what it said is im¬
portant, for it appears from it that if the Government wants any
person who applied for citizenship, and that person was entitled to
be registered as such, to take an entry permit or a pass and thus
be subjected to immigration law, then that person can rely on the
grounds the Court stated when refusing to comply with the require¬
ment to take up an entry permit or pass.
As far as the Government practice is concerned, however,
all such people have to have entry permits and/or passes or resi¬
dents certificates if they had one previously and it has not been
called up. They are therefore subject to immigration law in practice.
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Coming to the second problem, the Constitution is totally
silent on the citizenship status of adopted children. Obviously,
before they became citizens of Kenya they are subject to immigration
control. This is different from the U.K. in that in the U.K. a child
who is adapted in the U.K. by a patrial automatically becomes a pa-
trial. In Kenya it is possible that an adopted child is eligible to
become a citizen by registration on application being made under s.
92(2) of the Constitution of Kenya examined in (v) above. If that
is so then an adopted child may apply to become a citizen by regis¬
tration whether the adopter is a male or a female person and whether
the adoption takes place outside or inside Kenya.
In Kenya it is necessary that at the time of adoption one
of the parents must have been Kenyan citizens. The Constitution does
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not define "parent" and so we are forced to look to the Adoption Act.
In that Act, the word "parent" is defined thus:
"(it)does not include the natural father of an
illegitimate infant.
However, "father" in relation to an illegitimate child means the ne-
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tural father. The clear effect of these definitions is that an
adapter is^under the Adoption Act, a parent. This definition must
be construed as necessarily applying to s. 92(2) of the Constitution.
If that is so, and it is so submitted, then it follows that, whether
an infant is adopted inside or outside Kenya will not be a hindrance
to his or her being registered as a citizen of Kenya. Although the
Adoption Act says that no adoption order shall be made unless the
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applicant and the infant reside in Kenya it does not mean that the
Act does not recognise adoptions made outside Kenya; there are spe¬
cific provisions made in s. 21 of the Act for adoptions made outside
Kenya by competent Courts of lav; of that country. It follows, there¬
fore, that infants adopted in Kenya or outside Kenya are eligible
to be registered as citizens on application and once they are so
registered they are automatically removed from the rigours of immi¬
gration law. If the child wishes, he or she can apply for natural¬
isation as a citizen of Kenya, but in that instance he or she must
be over 21 years old and comply with the requirements enumerated un-
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der head (vi) above.'' The contrast with the U.K. is all the more
glaring in that a child adopted by U.K. parents outside the U.K. and
Islands does not qualify as a patrial, and like children adapted
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who have not become citizens, in the case of Kenya, they are subject
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to immigration control.w
In a case based on the 1956 Immigration Act of Kenya"*"1"""1 re¬
ference was made to the effect that a person who is Hindu by reli¬
gion cannot be permitted under immigration law to adopt children
other than by the methods and to the extent allowed by his religion.
This clearly is the case still and the Constitution itself leaves
it open to the immigration officers to refuse entry to or leave to
stay in Kenya to children adopted contrary to the Hindu teachings
if the adoption was by a Hindu person unless the adoption was carried
out in accordance with any other written law.'*"1"1'*' This is clearly
the case in the U.K. where an adoption by a Hindu will not be re-
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cognised unless it has been carried in accordance with the law.
In Kenya, the Minister has a free hand to refuse registration or
naturalisation of a child adopted by a Hindu in contravention of
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their religious teachings or any other superior law.
The undesirable consequence of the case above is that Hin¬
dus are barred from adopting more children than their religious
teachings allow, whereas other people whose personal laws place no
limit on the number of children they may adopt are entirely free to
adopt as many children as they like.
In summary, the citizens of Kenya are entirely free of im¬
migration law as are patrials in the case of the U.K. The categor¬
ies of people who may Bnter into Kenya free of immigration law and
remain therein freely are clearcut in comparison to the patrials
who may enter the U.K. This may well be due to the imperial lega¬
cies of the U.K. In both countries there are people who have been
made to suffer hardships unnecessarily due to the policies of each
country. In Kenya these people are those who applied for citizenship
and who were entitled to be registered as such, but have never heard
anything further for a long time. Before they are finally register¬
ed they are, in effect, stateless and are subjected to immigration
in an apparent contravention of a constitutional protection. In the
U.K. the categories of people who suffer from the gaps in the law
relating to patrials are many and some of them are even unknown.
They include young Asians dodging Rhodesinn draft laws, the E. Afri¬
can Asians holding British passports and those citizens of the U.K.
and colonies who happen, through an accident of nature, to be born
outside the U.K. or the Islands or who are registered, naturalised
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or adopted outside the U.K. and in all cases have no or had no pa-
rent(s) or grandparent(s) born, registered, naturalised or adapted
in the U.K. or the Islands.
It is submitted that it is not only logical, but also con¬
stitutionally and in accordance with the U.N. Declaration on Human
Rights that immigration laws should be related to citizenship laws
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(ii) Immigration Rules and Regulations
In both the United Kingdom end Kenya immigration officers
act in accordance with instructions issued to them by the Secre¬
tary of State, or the Minister respectively. In the U.K. Article
30(2) of the Aliens Order 1953 required immigration officers to act
in accordance with the instructions. The instructions were general
rules, which were set out in "General Instructions", a loose-leaved
volume of about 400 pages which was under constant revision. The
instructions were not made public and they were always supplemented
by further rules of a temporary or local application. In addition,
special instructions were often issued about individuals, for example,
persons who had previously been deported or international criminals.
When the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1562 was passed the
U.K. Government decided, on the insistence of Parliament embodied
in s. 3(5) of the Act, to publish for the first time the Secretary
of State's instructions to immigration officers. The publication of
these instructions gave them a unique and new meaning in that they
not only became law in effect, but also were drafted in such a way
as to be flexible and easily changeable. The present Rules are
descendent from the 1962 ones, therefore.
In Kenya, the Immigration Act of 1956 (s. 3(4)) gave the
Minister power to issue general or special directions to be followed
by immigration officers when acting in pursuance of their powers
under the Act. These instructions were not published. The 1567 Im¬
migration Act (s. 10(2)) stipulates that immigration officers will
exercise their functions in accordance with the Minister's instruc¬
tions. Some of these instructions are not published, but some ere
published as Regulations. It is the latter that will be examined.
(A) Rules (U.K.)
The current rules that form the subject of discussion under this head
are:
(a) Commonwealth Citizens : Control on Entry H.C. 79
(1973);
(b) Commonwealth Citizens : Control after Entry H.C. 81
(1973);
(c) E.E.C. and Non-Commonwealth : Control on Entry H.C. 80
(1973) and,
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(d) E.E.C. and Non-Commonwealth Citizens : Control after
Entry H.C. 82 (1973)
There are also a series of amendments."'' As is evident from above
2
there are separate rules for Commonwealth citizens and aliens.
They derive their existence from s. 3(2) of the Immigration Act
which provides, as far as is relevant:
"S. 3(2): The Secretary of State shall from time
to time (and as soon as may be) lay before Parl¬
iament statements of the rules or of any changes
in the rules, laid down by him as to the practice
to be followed in the administration of the Act
fox" regulating the entry of persons required un¬
der this Act to have leave to enter, including any
rules as to the period for which leave is to be
given and the conditions to be attached in diff¬
erent circumstances..."
Further, s. 3(l) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act, where
a person is not a pafcrial:
(a) he shall not'enter the U.K. unless given leave
to do so in accordance with this Act;
(b) he may be given leave to enter the U.K. (or
when already there, leave to remain in the U.K.)
either 'for a limited or for an indefinite pe¬
riod;
(c) if he is given a limited leave to enter or re¬
main in the U.K. it may be given subject to
such conditions restricting his employment ol",
occupation in the U.K. or requiring him to re¬
gister with the police or both."
Read together the two sections reveal that Immigration
Rules are made for the control of aliens and Commonwealth citizens
not having a right of abode in the U.K.; (that is non-patrials)
both before and after entry into the U.K. The scope of these rules
is not all embracing for s. l(5) of the Act states that:
"The rules shall be so framed that Commonwealth ci¬
tizens settled in the U.K. at the coming into force
of this Act and their wives and children are not,
by virtue of anything in the rules, any less free
to come into and go from the U.K. than if this Act
had not been passed."
The rules express immigration policies to some extent a-
part from the fact that they are largely procedural in their nature
and cover anything from obtaining an entry clearance to deportation.
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They cover every range of activity that a non-patrial may do before
3
and after entering the U.K. As such they are by far the single
most important handle on the "immigration wheel" end the main hand¬
book for immigration officials.
Because these rules form such an important part of immi¬
gration law it is imperative that their scope must be very clear.
As it is some doubt as to their application has been expressed be¬
cause they, allegedly, give officials almost ca-rte blanche to act
as they will in nearly any situation. Richard Plender says that:
"the rules are open to criticism on the ground
that they represent an unwarranted delegation
of legislative power. Their unique status pre¬
sents problems of interpretation and applica¬
tion. Their terminology is sometimes vagus;
their structure complicates and does not sim¬
plify the lav;. They are (also) silent on impor¬
tant areas..
Macdonald also says that:
"the rules do not incorporate all that needs to
be known. First of all, they give no indica¬
tion of the full policy on immigration...Second¬
ly, the operation of immigration controls over
a very long period for aliens end over the last
ten years for Commonwealth citizens has inevi¬
tably led to the development of certain adminis¬
trative experience and practices within the immi¬
gration section of the Home Office. Even those
dealing daily with immigration cases are unable
fully to fathom...these practices. So much de¬
pends on the exercise of someone's discration,
either at an airport or within the Home Office
itself. The immigration rules (therefore) spell
out in the most general terms what these discre¬
tions are. People are still liable to be turned
back at e port or airport for the most bewilder¬
ing variety of reasons, when so far as they are
concerned they have complied with all the rules.
All these criticisms are indeed true. They underline the
marked looseness of the scope of the Rules. For example, in a case
already cited of R. v SECRETARY OF STATE EX PARTE PHANSOPKAR6 the
Court of Appeal vehemently condemned the practice of the Home Office
requiring a Commonwealth citizen married to a patrial man to obtain
her certificate of patriality in the country of her origin when in
low she was entitled to get it in the U.K. as well. Here is a lady
who had done all she was supposed to do under the Rules and yet when
she wanted a certificate of patriality she was told by the Home Of¬
fice to go back to Indie, and get her certificate there. This would
have involved her, as the Court noted, in an arduous process of wait¬
ing exceeding 18 months. The Court rightly rejected this and con¬
demned it. This is just sn instance illustrating an hitherto un¬
discovered and hardly discoverable rule of practice intimately re¬
lated to end applied under the umbrella of the Rules.
Robert Moore also argues that the Rules:
"have political functions derived from the way in
which (they) are put into use by officials exer¬
cising discretion and by the hidden implications
of the Rules themselves. One clear example of the
Rules embodying principles not actually found in
the legislation and therefore not debated...is
that anyone convicted of an extraditable offence
should be refused to enter.
These Rules are^y end large, arbitrary*, by reason of be¬
ing subject to negative checks^= have little, if any, Parliamen¬
tary supervision or control and are also vague. They leave unbridled
discretion to the immigration officers and the Secretary of State.
Some of the powers are, as will be seen later, illegal or of question¬
able legality. It is, therefore, not surprising that it is the Rules
that have been the subject of a vast amount of litigation under the
Q
Immigration Act." J.M. Evans has complained that in matters connect¬
ed with deportation the Rules:
"give no clear guide to the Government policy.
Apart from the fact that the Rules apply to non patrials
both before and after entry it is not otherwise clear what their con¬
tent is."'""'' This is largely because there are no clearcut end open
policy guidelines. According to Professor K.C. Davis there are se-
12 13
ven essential things for "structuring" discretionary powers such
as are given under the immigration Rules. These are:
"open plans, open rules, open policy, open state¬
ments, open reasons, open precedents, and fair
and informal procedures. Openness is a natural
enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the
fight against injustice. When plans and policies
are kept secret (as they are under the U.K. im¬
migration Rules)... private parties are prevented
from checking arbitrary or unintended departures
from the rules.
It is submitted, therefore, that if a clearcut open policy
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is pursued v;e shall start to witness a system of immigration Rules
that are structured and thoroughly well checked. Their scope will
be certain and clear. It is highly undesirable to have Rules that
make for no certainty of action or procedure to be followed in eny
given situation. Such rules will often be executed according to
the whim or caprice of the administration when and if it suits them.
In certain cases involving fundamental rights the Rules
do not provide any protection at all. For example, a passenger ar¬
riving at Heathrow Airport can be refused leave to enter or simply
put into detention as an immigration officer chooses. Yet, it is
known that freedom of movement is a fundamental right. It is par¬
ticularly disturbing since the courts have held that 'habeas corpus'
is not available to a person who is refused entry because We fc*s.s
l-anrisei, teohna.ca3.ly, i«. the-y*K. esfwl !>©©»««« "detention without
15
a charge is not unlawful". " This would be the case also where a
person enters into the U.K. illegally. He can be arrested and de¬
tained without having recourse to the protection of "habeas corpus'
for as long as he cannot pro've;prima facie/that his dentention is
illegal
(b) Regulations (Kenya)
The Regulations made under the 1967 Immigration Act have
a statutory force of law because it is delegated legislation. The
Minister's power to make regulations is limited by the Act to spe-
17
cific things. He has power, however, to prescribe penalties for
18
offences committed in respect of the regulations.
The most noticeable thing about the provisions is that the
Minister can make regulations almost with the same ease as the U.K.
Secretary of State. Most of the regulations made by the Minister
are now contained in Legal Notice No. 235 of 19S7 and other subse¬
quent ones. They are all subsidiary legislation and as such differ
from the U.K. Rules which are described and recognised by the Courts
simply as rules of practice. The Kenyan Regulations are no clearer
or more precise than their U.K. counterpart. For example, although
there is a clear definition of a dependant as a. person who, due to
his incapacity, is incapable of taking care of himself one is ob¬
viously left in doubt under precisely what circumstances one can be
said to be incapable of taking care of himself. It is, therefore,
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left to the immigration officers to interpret them, just like in
the U.K., to a certain extent.
As far as entry end stay of non-citizens into Kenya are
concerned, the immigration officers have unfettered discretion to de¬
cide as they wish, having regard to the provisions of the regula¬
tions end any instructions that may be given to them by the Minister.
As the instructions are not published they are secret in nature and
are circulated among the immigration officers only. This also hap¬
pens in the U.K. to some extent. A person may, therefore, qualify
for entry and stay in Kenya under the Regulations and yet find him¬
self refused entry due to the consideration of the Minister's in¬
structions. In R£ MARLES' APPLICATION"*"^ the Court held that an im¬
migration officer exercises his power solely upon policy and expe¬
diency as dictated to him by the Minister under whom he carries out
the functions of his office. It is, therefore, clear that the Minis¬
ter's instructions are very important and with no appeals system in
Kenya, it is possible that there are unchecked cases where the in¬
structions of the Minister have been allowed to override specific
statutory provisions. This might, in any case, fit in with the as¬
sumption the Courts made in the above case that immigration is a
privilege and accordingly a person may be refused entry and stay
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(iii) The Immigration Appeals System
In Kenya, no formal appeal, either to a tribunal or to
the Courts, exists. There is a right under s. 5(3) of the 1967
Immigration Act to make representations to the Minister, but it is
not an apoeal in the sense that the rights of immigrants under the
r.^UfS of •
immigration system in the U.K. are^ It is, therefore proposed to
examine only the U.K. appeals system here and to defer representa¬
tions to the Minister (Kenya) to a later stage.
In 1969 a system of Immigration Appeals from decisions
of immigration officers was set up after the recommendations of the
Wilson Committee.'*' The system has been continued under the Immi-
2
gration Act of 1971 by v/irtue of Part II of the Act. The system
is commendable and it is the single most important method of check¬
ing the discretion of immigration authorities. What is the scope
of the appeals allowed to be made under the system? There are two
sides to this question:
(I) the categories of appeals open to the applicants and
(ii) the applicants to whom it is open.
(X) The categories of appeals open to applicants are, relatively
speaking, quite detailed and their scope generally clearcut, largely
3
because of the work of the Wilson Committee. There is a two-tier
system of appeals. Appeals are generally initially made to an adju¬
dicator. There are a number of adjudicators all of whom are appoint¬
ed by the Secretary of State. From adjudicators appeals go to the
Appeal Tribunal with or without its leave. Members of the Tribunal
are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. "With so many adjudicators
all spread over the various parts of the country, the Tribunal ob¬
viously links them and guides their decisions, thus providing an es¬
sential element of uniform law. In some cases appeals are made
straight to the Tribunal. An appeal is to be allowed if the aopellete
body thinks that the immigration officer or, for that matter, the
Secretary of State exercised a discretion not in accordance with the
law or if for any reason it is thought a discretion should have
been exercised differently. In all other cases the appeal must be
4
dismissed. However, a refusal to depart from the Immigration Rules
5
is not to be treated as an exercise of discretion. In the case of
HOME ScCRETARY v GLEAN^ thejrespondent was a Commonwealth student who
was allowed into the U.K. for the purpose of training as a nurse.
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Ho was allowed in in 1967. His leave to stay was renewed twice. In
196Q his wife was allowed in with no conditions imposed. In 1969 '
Gloan gave up his training and, in breach of his conditions, entered
full time employment. In 1970 he applied unsuccessfully for per¬
mission to remain in the U.K. in employment.
On appeal to an adjudicator Glean's appeal was allowed on
the ground that it would be contrary to the principles of natural
justice to compel him to return to Trinidad if his wife elected to
remain in the U.K. with her two children as she was entitled to do.
On a further appeal by the Home Secretary to the Tribunal it was
held that:
"to urge that for reasons of natural justice those
immigration rules should not be applied was to say
that the Secretary of State ought, at Glean's re-
uest, to have departed from the rules, and since
he refused to do so and his decision was in accor¬
dance with the Immigration Rules the Adjudicator
had no discretion to allow the appeal on consider¬
ations of natural justice."^
This dictfcNis still good law by virtue of s. 19(2) of the Act.
When an adjudicator is making a determination under s. 19(2)
there arises, in effect, a problem of whether or not he hears the
case rie novo. In HOME SECRETARY v PURUSHOTHAMAN8 the Tribunal was
asked to make a ruling on whether or not the adjudicator was entitled
to hear an appeal de novo under s. 8(l) of the Immigration Appeals
Act 1969.^ The Tribunal ruled that:
"the original decision appealed egainst is the start¬
ing point for consideration by the Adjudicator.
The task of the Adjudicator is to decide whether
or not that decision is in accordance with the law
or any immigration rules applicable to the case..,.
In carrying out that task the Adjudicator must
take into account all the evidence before him and
for that purpose he may review any determination
of a question of fact on which the original decision
was based. . .
It follows from the above dicta that although an adjudica¬
tor cannot make his mind up as if he were an immigration officer his
function in this aspect greatly overlaps with that of an immigration
officer and the line dividing their functions is a very fine one.
For this reason it is hard to define the exact extent of the adjud¬
icator's power when deciding cases. All that is clear is that:
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"evidence of subsequent facts which if before
the immigration officer might have influenced
his decision by indicating some change in the
appellant's original circumstances will nor¬
mally form the basis of e new application..."
and will accordingly be referred to the immigration officer. It
was so held in the case of ENTRY CERTIFICATE OFFICER, LAHORE v AB¬
DULLAH .But the holding of the case has exceptions. In ENTRY
CERTIFICATE CFFICER, BOMBAY v THAKERAR 5 ANOTHER12 the respondents
had been refused leave to enter into the U.K. on the ground that
they were not dependent on their sponsor in the U.K. under paragraph
13
42 of Cmnd 4298. The respondents appealed and one of the grounds
was that until recently the remittances sent to them from East A-
frica had ceased to come due to political changes there. It is be¬
cause of the receipt of these remittances that the entry certifi¬
cate officer felt constrained to consider them not despondent on
their sponsor in the U.K. The remittances came from rental income
of a family company that they had in East Africa. All family rent
earning properties were in Uganda and due to a change of political
climate in Uganda the remittances had ceased to come and the appel¬
lants automatically became dependent on their U.K. sponsor. This
ground had not formed part of their reasons in support of an entry
clearance. Evidence was given at the appeal in support of the ground
and of the fact that at the time the respondents made their applica¬
tion to the entry certificate officer they were not receiving sub¬
stantial remittances. In the circumstances the Tribunal ruled that
the holding in the Abdullah case above did not apply to this situa¬
tion. In its words:
"Since it has been shown that at all material
times Mrs. Thakerar was dependent on money ob¬
tained from her son in East Africa and since that
dependency, through new circumstances, has to
be met by changed arrangements, we do not think
that this is a case in which the normal proce¬
dure of new application should be followed..
It is not at all clear from the case of Thakerar whether
a case will be referred to the immigration officer or entry certifi¬
cate officer, as the case may be, at the time the application for
the entry clearance was made. In other words, does a case come un¬
der the purview of the dicta of the Thakererjcass only if the new
uu
evidence was not in existence at the time an application for an en¬
try clearance was made? It is not clear from the case end in the
circumstances it is not possible to stats with precision the cate¬
gories of situations falling under the Thekerarrule. It is submitted,
however, that each case should be looked at individually and since
in most cases referring a case back to immigration officers or entry
clearance officers will be hermful to the appellants the rule in
Thakerar should be applied liberally.
Under the Immigration Act of 1S71 appeals may be made in
the following cases:
15
(i) against refusal of entry,
16
(ii) against most refusals of an entry clearance,
17
(iii) against refusals of certificates of patriality,
(iv) against conditions of admission and variations of
length of stay or refusal to vary,
IB
(v) against most decisions to make a deportation order,
IS
(vi) against most refusals to revoke a deportation order,
(vii) against directions for removal by illegal immigrants,
certain deportees, seamen and aircrew,^ and
21(viii) against removal to a particular destination.
As noted above an appeal is made either to the adjudicator
or, in certain cases, to the Tribunal. Before looking at the appeals
in detail one might find it helpful to look at a table of the appeals
22
system found in the New Law Journal.
Refusal of Entry:
Under s. 13(l) of the Act a person who is refused leave to
enter the U.K. may appeal to the adjudicator against the decision
that he requires leave or against the refusal. However, a person
may not appeal against refusal of leave to enter so long as he is in
the U.K., unless he was refused the leave at a port of entry at a
time he held a current entry clearance or was named in a current
23
work permit. It has been suggested that this is a recognition of:
"the expectation of admission aroused in a person
to whom en entry clearance or work permit has
been issued..."^
It is further argued that:
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"because of the legalistic distinction between
interests in remaining and entering may not in
individual cases, in fact, represent greater
or lesser degrees of hardship, the right of
appeal should only ever be excluded on the nar¬
rower grounds applicable to decisions affecting
the interest in remaining.1'
Section 13(5) of the Act further provides that a person
cannot appeal against refusal of leave to enter if the Secretary of
State certifies that he has given directions for the person not to
be given entry into the U.K. on the ground that his exclusion is
conducive to the public good, or if the leave to enter or entry
clearance was refused/to "any^ sucH directions. Evidently, this sec¬
tion gives the Secretary of State room for power to exclude a person
on policy grounds. If this is so it is an aspect of the power to
deport a person on grounds of public good as being conducive to na¬
tional security. The fact that his decision leaves the affected
person with no protection is to be regretted. It appears that the
person will have no right to know the grounds for the certification,
no right to know the charges against him and no right to demand a
26
hearing. It may well be as J.M. Evans says that it is one of those
non-justiciable matters affecting the public mmti which only the exe¬
cutive is botlfoi- placed to judge or that it would be prejudicial to
the sources of intelligence to disclose the specific charges against
the person, but one must always be conscious that:
"the menace to the security of the country, be
it as great as it may, from the admission (of
a person so refused entry) is nothing compared
with the menace of free institutions inherent
in the procedures of this pattern."^
There is a case, therefore, for giving persons so excluded
a right of appeal, be it statutory or otherwise. This is a rudimen¬
tary right that no person should be denied. It is submitted that
the present appeals system is sufficiently well equipped to deal
with cases of this kind.
A person who has a right of appeal under s. 13(l) of the
Act may, if before he appeals, directions have been given for his
removal to any country or territory, or if, before or after he ap¬
peals, he is served with a notice that he will be removed to any spe¬
cified country or territory (or one of the several specified count¬
ries) object to being removed to such a place and claim that he ought
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to be removed, if at all, to a different country or territory which
28
he must specify. If a person so appeals (against refusal of leave
to enter) any removal directions given will cease to have effect and
29
no such removal directions may be given while the appeal is pending.
An appeal against refusal to enter shall be dismissed by
the adjudicator if he is satisfied that:
(a) the appellant was, at the time of refusal, an illegal
entrant and
(b) the appellant was, at the time of refusal, subject to
30
a deportation order. The effect of the provision above is to deny
any appeal favourable to people in the country without leave, for
example, illegal entrants. It also denies such an appeal to those,
who at the time of the appeal, were subject to a deportation order.
The time limit to be followed wfien appealing under s. 13(l)
is:
(a) if a person is appealing from outside the U.K.4after
his departure and not less than 28 days thereafter and
(b) if he is appealing from inside the U.K., before depart-
31
ure, but not later than 28 days.
Refusal of Certificates:
S. 13(2) of the Act provides that a person who applies for
a certificate of patriality or an entry clearance may generally appeal
to an adjudicator against the refusal to grant the same. S. 13(5)
of the Act further says that if the Secretary of State certifies that
he, personally, has given directions for the clearance certificate
to be refused in the case of any one pErson, then that person has no
right of appeal against such refusal and is not accordingly within
the purview of the appeals system.
A person not holding a certificate of patriality is not
entitled to an appeal on the ground that he is a patrial by virtue
of s. 2(l)(c) or (d) or s. 2(2) of the Act against a decision that
he requires leave to enter the U.K. unless in the case of a woman,
who is a citizen of the U.K. and colonies, the ground of appeal is
Op
that she is a patrial by virtue of s. 2(l)(c) or (d). The effect
of this is that rights of appeal are denied to the following classes
of people:
(a) U.K. and colonies' citizens who acquire patriality on-
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ly after 5 years ordinary residence in the U.K. or Islands,
(b) Citizens of a Commonwealth country who are patrials
only by virtue of their mother being born in the U.K. or the Islands,"
and
(c) Women who claim to be 'patrials' as a result of having
exercised their right as wives of U.K. citizens to register as U.K.
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citizens. This applies only to women who registered by virtue of
their marriage to a U.K. citizen before the passing of the Immigre-
3Q
tion Act 1971. That a U.K. citizen who has qualified for patriali¬
ty can be refused a right of appeal because of a lack of a certifi¬
cate of patriality without recourse to an adjudicator or the Tribunal
seems to be a negation of all principles of justice and a denial of
a person's liberty as a citizen. For patrials, a certificate of pa¬
triality is a necessity, however, and if they are refused entry be¬
cause they do not have it then their best option lies in applying
for the certificate from which there is an appeal if it is refused.
Macdonald has suggested that:
"someone refused entry and denied a right of
appeal under this section, should apply to the
High Court for habeas corpus or a declaration
that he is a patrial and therefore not subject
to the immigration control or detention by an
immigration officer."^
One hopes that the Courts will view this like that. This is a matter
of profound importance and must be viewed with the seriousness it
deserves. '
A woman who is a patrial by virtue of s. 2(2) of the Act
(apart from any reference therein to s. (l) (c) or (d)} is automati¬
cally entitled to get her certificate of patriality either in the
U.K. or from her country of origin. She cannot be required to obtain
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it only from her country of origin. She has a direct access to the
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High Court should she be so required. It would appear, a fortiori,
that a person who has no certificate of patriality end is denied one
although he is entitled to it has access to the Courts for a declara¬
tion that he is such a patrial and therefore entitled to such a
certificate.
A person who is refused an entry clearance and has a right
of appeal may do so only within 3 months and even then only if he is
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outside the U.K. On the other hand, a person who is refused a cer¬
tificate of patriality and has a right of appeal, that is persons
not falling within s. 13(3) of the Act above, may appeal either with¬
in or without the U.K., but in either case within 3 months if it
was refused by an entry certificate officer or within 14 days if re-
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fused by the Secretary of State. One is again confronted with a
ridiculous situation of being placed at the peril of losing such
substantial rights if an appeal is not made as stipulated.
Appeals Against Conditions:
Section 14(i) of the Act deals with appeals against condi¬
tions. It provides:
"s. 14(1) subject to the provisions of this part
of the Act, a person who has a limited leave un¬
der this Act to enter or remain may appeal to an
adjudicator against any variation of leave (whe¬
ther as regards duration or conditions), or a-
gainst any refusal to vary it, and a variation
shall not take effect so long as an appeal is
pending under this subsection against the varia¬
tion, nor shall an appellant be required to .
leave the U.K. by reason of the expiration of
of his leave so long as his appeal is pending un¬
der this subsection against a refusal to enlarge
or remove the limit on the duration of the leave."
A person who has limited leave to enter or remain in the U.K. may
therefore appeal to an adjudicator against any variation of leave or
against refusal to vary it. A variation doss not take effect so
long as an appeal is pending, or a further appeal is to be made or
until an appeal has been withdrawn. An applicant has the right to
withdraw/ his or her appeal unless this has been expressly prohibi¬
ted by a statute. Lord Goddard C.J., in the case of R. v HAMPSTEAD
& ST. PAMCRAS RENT TRIBUNAL, ex parte GOODMAN (1959) 1 All E.R. 170
at 172 thought that an application could be withdrawn up to any time
before the Tribunal gave its decision.
The right of appeal under this section is available to a
person only while the limited leave to enter or remain subsists.
This was the holding of the House of Lords in the case of SUTHENDRAN
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v It.'t'iGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL. In this case S., a citizen of Sri
Lanka, obtained a certificate giving him leave to enter and remain
for 12 months on condition that he did not enter any employment or
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engage in any business or profession. It was granted to enable hirn
to take a course in engineering at a technical college. He entered
on July 23, 1973 so unless the leave granted was extended, he ceased
to be entitled to be in the U.K. on July 23, 1974. He did not at¬
tend the college, but obtained employment and on June 2 1974 began
work as a nursing assistant ct a hospital. On July 23, 1974 the
hospital applied for a work permit for him, it was refused by the
Secretary of State. He appealed, but his appeals were refused.
On May 20, 1975, a week after his appeal to the adjudicator
had been dismissed, the hospital asked that he should stay to com¬
plete his training as a pupil nurse. On June 17 the Secretary of
State refused that application and notified hirn that he had one
month, until July 17, to wind up his affairs in the U.K. and leave.
The adjudicator allowed an appeal by S. on January 16, 1976, but on
June 4 the Tribunal allowed an appeal by the Secretary of State from
that decision on the ground that as the appellant's limited leave to
remain had expired on July 2J, 1974 he had no right to appeal to the
adjudicator. The Queen's Bench Divisional Court and the Court of
Appeal refused his applications for leave to apply for certiorari to
quash the Tribunal's decision. He appealed to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords said that a person who comes into the
U.K. with a limited leave to enter or remain must apply for an exten¬
sion of his stay while the limited leave is still subsisting. If he
is refused an extension by the Home Secretary during that period he
has a right of appeal under s. 14(l) of the Act and cannot be required
to leave until his appeal is determined. But if the Home Secretary's
refusal of an extension is only handed down after the limited leave
period has expired, albeit through administrative delays in the Home
Office, the right of appeal has gone and an extension of time to en¬
able one to appeal will be by courtesy of the Home Secretary and not
as of right under s. 14(l).
This holding's effect is that a person with limited leave
to enter or remain in the U.K. cannot be allowed to appeal against
a variation or a refusal to vary conditions at the time of the appeal
the period he was allowed to remain in the country has expired. The
Queen's Bench Divisional Court had similarly held in the case of R. v
IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL ex parts 5UBRAMANIAM. 42
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These decisions have the consequence of giving the Secre¬
tary of State power to effectively deprive a person the right of
appeal under this section simply by delaying a decision on the appli¬
cation until after the current leave to enter or remain has expired
notwithstanding that the application for an extension was made while
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the person was lawfully in the U.K. Such is the unfortunate, but
clear meaning of s. 14(l). It submitted, however, that if the delay
is such that it is grossly unfair,,. a person should be a allowed
to appeal notwithstanding the protection of s. 14(l) to the Home Sec¬
retary.
It follows from these cases that aperson who applies for
an extension of the leave to remain and receives an/ adverse answer
while he is lawfully present in the U.K. is the only one who may
not be required to leave while an appeal is pending. His appeal is
a matter of right. In all other cases one has the right of appeal
by courtesy of the Home Secretary. If he grants an extension, after
the limited leave has expired, then the applicant is automatically
brought within s. 14(l) of the Act. He can, therefore, appeal nor¬
mally and cannot be expected to leave while en appeal is pending.
It is not clear whether the Secretary of State will grant an exten¬
sion on the basis of former terms or whether he will grant it on the
basis that it is only for the purpose of appealing. It is hoped
that it will be on the basis of former terms. One can conceive of
situations where substantial interests may suffer should the Secre¬
tary of State grant an extension on the basis that it will only be
for the purpose of an appeal and that appeal succeeds.
Subject to the above and to any provision to the contrary
an appeal is regarded as pending from the time the appellant gives
notice of appeal to the time when the appeal is finally determined
or withdrawn and in any case within 14 days from the date of the re¬
fusal by the Home Secretary. However, an appeal to an adjudicator
is not treated as finally determined so long as further appeal to the
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Tribunal can be brought.
4^
In MEHTA v SECRETARY OF STATE the appellant M. came to
the U.K. as a student. She was given 12 months limited leave to re¬
main in the country. Before the year expired she applied for an
extension. She was given one month's extension only. She appealed
to the adjudicator against this and the adjudicator allowed her
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appeal on a technical point. The Home Office appealed to the Tri¬
bunal and the Tribunal allowed the appeal. She was accordingly re¬
fused en extension of the 5th of November, 1973. At the time the
appeal of the Home Secretary was allowed,one of the Home Office rep¬
resentatives indicated to her solicitors that a further application
would be sympathetically recieved. Thereupon her solicitors wrote
two letters to the Home Office applying for an extension on Novem¬
ber 12 and 27, 1973. By mistake the two letters were overlooked by
someone in the Home Office and a short note was received by the so¬
licitors later from the Home Office on December 4, 1973 saying that
they had had no further communication from them (the solicitors)
and that Miss Mehta had no further claim to remain in the U.K. and
must leave within 14 days. Her solicitors were perplexed by this
and they wrote back indicating that they had sent the two letters.
On January 2, 1974 the Home Office discovered the two letters and
wrote back apologising for the 'clerical error' and further said that
the application of November 27, 1973 was considered and had been
refused. The solicitors wrote on January 8, 1974 indicating that
the Home Office had given an assurance to consider the application
sympathetically and that since they were unlikely to revoke their
decision the solicitors were to lodge an appeal on her behalf. The
Home Office did not reply. The solicitors lodged an appeal on Jan¬
uary 23, 1974 after the 14 days allowed for appeal had expired.
The Home Office contended that the appeal was out of time
and must be dismissed. The question was whether rule 11(4) of the
Immigration Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1972 which provided that:
"the appellate authority shall not be required
to dismiss an appeal, but may allow it to pro¬
ceed if the authority is of the opinion that,
by reason of special circumstances, it is just
and right so to do..."
could be invoked in favour of the appellant.
It was held by the Court that the duty of an adjudicator
or a Tribunal was not limited solely to enquiring whether there are
special circumstances which prevented giving notice of appeal within
the permitted time (as the adjudicator and the Tribunal held) they
had a wider discretion to do what was just and right to prevent an
appellant from suffering unfairly, and rule 11(4) should be liberally
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interpreted. Accordingly, the substantive merits of the case and
the fact that failure to give notice in time was due to the appel¬
lant's solicitors were 'special circumstances' which the adjudicator
and the Tribunal had to take into account in determining whether it
was just and right to allow the appeal to proceed. The Tribunal's
refusal to take into account the merits of the pppellants case or
so to treat as a'special circumstance' the mistake of the solicit¬
ors in omitting to lodge the notice of appeal in time were errors
of law on the face of the record and certiorari would issue to
quash the Tribunal's decision.
An appeal against exclusion under this section may, there¬
fore, be heard out of time under rule ll(4) above if special circum¬
stances exist. This decision has extended the amplitude of the
scope of the appeals under Part III of the Act.
A person cannot appeal under s. 14(l) above if:
(a) the Secretary of State certifies that the appellant's
departure from the U.K. would be conducive to the public good as be¬
ing in the interests of national security or of relations between
the U.K. and any other country or for reasons of a political nature
or if the decision questioned by the appeal was taken on that ground
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by the Secretary of State or
(b) the appeal is mads against any variation mads by stat¬
utory instrument or against any refusal of the Secretary of State to
47
make a statutory instrument.
The only question that arises from the above exceptions is
why a Minister's decision should be so sacrosanct as to be put out¬
side the appeals system.
The above provisions together with the case of SUTHSNDRAN
seem to render the options open to an appellant under s. 14(lj nil.
The same result is arrived at under s. 14(2) of the Act in which it
is provided that a person who has a limited leave to remain in the
46
U.K. on ceasing to be entitled to exemption from control on entry
or on ceasing to be a patrial whilst in the U.K. may appeal to an
adjudicator against any provision limiting the duration of leave at¬
taching a condition to it.
An urgent amendment to s. 14(l) is called for.
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Appeals Aaainst Deportations:
Section 15(l)(a) of the Act provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Pert of the
Act, o person may appeal to an adjudicator a-
gainst:
(a) a decision of the Secreatary of State to
make a deportation order egainst him by
virtue of s. 3(5) above."
Section 3(5) of the Act itself provides that:
"A person who is not a patrial shall be liable
to deportation from the U.K.
(a) if, having a limited leave to enter or re¬
main, he does not observe a condition at¬
tached to the leave or remains beyond the
time limited by the leave, or
(b) if the Secretary of State deems his deport¬
ation to be conducive to the public good, or
(c) if another person whose family he belongs is
or has been ordered to be deported."
There are three kinds of deportation under this section;
that is, a person deported for breach of conditions to enter or re-
49
main in the UK, deportation by the Secretary of State on grounds
50
of public good, and deportation made against a person as a member
51
of the family of the deportee. An appeal against deportation for
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breach of conditions to enter or remain in the U.K. lies to an ad¬
judicator within 2 weeks. Notice of the decision to deport must be
53
given to the person who may then appeal within the time." However,
no deportation order may be made by the Home Secretary so long as
the person can appeal, that is, while there is time to appeal; and
if the appeal has been lodged, until it is finally determined. A
deportation order of this kind will not issue egainst a Commonwealth
citizen or a national of the Republic of Ireland who was such a ci¬
tizen at the coming into force of the Immigration Act 1971 and at
the time of the deportation he or she had been ordinarily resident
in the U.K."^
66
In AHMET D0G0U UEhf/ET ex parte HOME SECRETARY it was held
that provided the decision to deport is taken within five years of
the man's ordinary residence starting in the U.K., a deportation or¬
der which is made after the expiration of the five years is valid.
In that case, Mehmet, a Commonwealth citizen, come to Britain on
December 27, 1970. He was given leave to enter for six months.
The leave was subsequently varied to enable him to be a full time
student until October 1972. When that leave expired he went under¬
ground. On June 30, 1975, before his five years were up, the Sec¬
retary of State decided to make a deportation order against him.
As M.'s whereabouts were not known, notice of the decision to de¬
port was left at his last known address.
In March 1975 after the end of five years residence M.'s
solicitors applied for a regularization of his stay. He came above
ground. On July 23, 1975 the Secretary of State made a deportation
order against him under s. 3(5)(a). M. applied for a certiorari to
quash it arguing that the Secretary of State had no right to make it
after five years had expired. It is on these facts that the above
decision was delivered by the Court of Appeal.
As Scarman L.J. remarked in that case, the Court draws a
distinction between a deportation order and a decision by the Secre¬
tary of State to deport. The decision guards against the abuse of
s. 7(l)(a) and (b), but it is doubtful whether the Act intended the
creation of the distinction drawn by the Court since the Act refers
only to a deportation order made within five years and not a decision
to deport made within five years. In fact, s. 7(2) of the Act pro¬
vides that a person shall not cease to be ordinarily resident by rea¬
son only of his having remained in the U.K. or the Islands in breach
of the immigration laws. One would have thought, therefore, that
the intention of the Act is to indicate to the Courts to construe
liberally provisions affecting people ordinarily resident in the U.K.
and accordingly a mere decision by the Secretary of State to deport
made within five years residence without a deportation order should
not have sufficed in this case. The Court did not decide what kind
of decision of the Secretary of State to deport is a decision within
the meaning of the case. Is it by notice only, as in the case, or
could it be a mere oral declaration of intention? Such a power to
the Secretary of State is wide and may be easily abused. It is not,
either, in accordance with the attitude that on immigrant ordinarily
settled must be disturbed as little as possible. It is not clear
what the effect of this decision is on people who were ordinarily
resident, albeit against immigration law, in the U.K. at the coming
into force of the Act.
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The date a decision to deport a person is made is, there¬
fore, clearly crucial. If it is made within the five years of or¬
dinary residence commencing a deportation order may be made later
notwithstanding that it is made after the five years statutory pe¬
riod. The decision above has narrowed the scope of s. 15(l)(a) and
placed in danger all immigrants now underground waiting for the five
years to run out before they come above ground.
The Secretary of State may deport a person if he deems
that person's deportation to be conducive to the public good. If the
deportation is not certified by the Secretary of State as:
"conducive to the public good as being in the
interests of national security or of the re¬
lations between the U.K. and any other country
or for other reasons of a political nature...1'
oo
then an appeal lies, in the first instance, to the Tribunal. In this
case, the Secretary of State has no power to make a deportation order
while there is time to appeal, or, if the appeal has been lodged, un¬
til it is finally determined. He has no power either to deport a
Commonwealth or Irish citizen who, since the coming into force of
the Immigration Act, has been ordinarily resident in the U.K. with-
i 57out a break for the lost five years. An appeal under this section
must be made within two weeks.
If, however, the Secretary of State certifies a deportation
order to be conducive to the public good as being in the national in¬
terests and so on, then no appeal is possible under the Immigration
Act. This provision was recently invoked in the deportation of two
£8
American journalists working in the U.K. The scope of this power
knows no limit. If and when the Secretary of State chooses to ex¬
ercise the power then his decision is placed beyond the reach of the
immigration appeals system. The only option open to such a deportee
is to appeal to the Home Office Advisory Panel, an "independent body"
within the Department of the Home Office. Its decision does not
bind the Secretary of State and its role is purely advisory. Although
the deportation of the two Americans is the second under this section
it is the first to be referred to the Panel. Its decision will be
of much interest. It must be noted, however, that an appellant is
not allowed legal representation at the Panel, but he may be assisted
by a friend who may be a lawyer. The panel has no power to reveal
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the details of the case against the deportee and it cannot, either,
reveal any evidence or sources of evidence that might lead to dis-
59
closure of evidence. This means that the appellant has virtually
no way of rebutting the charges against him. His appeal to the Pa-
60
nel must be made within 14 days.
Macdonald has said that the distinction between a deport¬
ation order made on grounds of public good and a deportation made on
grounds of public good as being in the interests of national secu¬
rity and so on stems from the:
"distinction between deportation because of sus¬
pected, but not necessarily proven, criminal ac¬
tivities and deportation because of political
activities or affiliations.1'
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There may be other grounds for distinguishing the two kinds of de¬
portations.
The Secretary of State has power, under s. 3(5)(c) of the
Act to deport another person whose family he belongs to is or has
been ordered to be deported.. If a man is deported his wife and chil-
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dren under the age of 18 may be deported, and if a woman is deport-
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ed, her children under the age of 18. The proviso to s. 5(4)(a)
and (b) of the Act says that:
"for the purposes of (the) subsection an edopted
child, whether legally adopted or not may be
treated as the child of the adopter and if le¬
gally adapted, shall be regarded as the child
only of the adopter, (and) an illegitimate child
...shall be regarded as the child of the mother..."
A family deportation cannot be made by the S cretary of
State if more than 8 weeks have elapsed since the other person deport¬
ed left the U.K. after a deportation order against him or her
Neither can a person be deported under this section if at the time
of the deportation he has ceased to be a member of the family of the
person deported. f.'acdonald says that this may:
"happen in the case of a wife, if her marriage
is dissolved, end in the case of children if
they reech the age of 18...
A woman separated from her husband will probably be considered part
of the family of a deported husband under this section.
If the Secretary of State decided to deport a person as a
73
member of the family of a deportee he must notify the member and, if
more than one, each individually. The person then has two weeks with-
in which to appeal to the Tribunal in the first instance.
A deportation order cannot be made against such a person
so long es he has a right of appeal, and if he has appealed, until
67
the appeal is finally determined. That period of appeal is not
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counted in calculating the 8 weeks limit imposed by s. 5(3) above.
On an appeal under the family deportation section an appel¬
lant cannot be allowed to dispute the truth of a statement with a •
view to obtaining leave for the appellant to enter or remain in the
U.K.^ unless:
(a) the statement was made by ra person who wes not an agent
and the appellant did not know of it arid
(b) in the case of a child over the age of 18 years old if
the age was understated, in which case he will be allowed to prove
his true age.
It is doubtful if ;this section covers children over the
age of 18 years and under the age of 21 years who are entirely depen¬
dent on the deported persons. It is also possible to foresee Courts
arguing that if the Secretary of State decides to deport a family
whose "head" has been deported and serves a deportation notice before
the expiry of the 8 weeks he would be duly entitled to deport them
anytime after the 8 weeks. This would be in the general spirit of
A.D. f.'EHi.'.ET ex parte HCf.'E SECRETARY, the case above. If this
becomes the case, as it might well do, the protection offered by s.
5(3) of the Act to the members of the family will be virtually eroded
away. The same is true of s. 7(l)(2) end (3) of the Act v/hich re¬
late to a Commonv/ealth citizen or a citizen of the Irish Republic
who has been ordinarily resident in the U.K. for five years when the
Secretary of State makes a deportation and who was such a citizen
at the coming into force of the 1971 Immigration Act. It seems pos¬
sible that before the five years are over the Secretary of State can
serve a deportation notice on him and if he does so, he can wait un¬
til the five years are over to make a deportation order. He cannot
be barred then by the fact that the person has been ordinarily resi¬
dent in the U.K. for the last five years and that he is a citizen of
a Commonwealth country or the Republic of Ireland as he was at the
coming into force of the 1971 Immigration Act.
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A person who is not a potrial shall not have a right of
appeal if after he has attained the age of 17 years he is convicted
of an offence for which he is punishable by imprisonment and on his
conviction is recommended for a deportation by a Court empowered
70
with that jurisdiction. Under this section the right to appeal
is in accordance with the normal procedure of the Courts. The right
of appeal under the immigration appeals system exists only against
the country to which he is to be deported and the onus is on the a-
ppellant to show that that country to which he wishes to go, if he
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appeals, has accepted him. Both the Immigration Act and the rules
are silent on the point of to whom an appeal against the country of
deportation may be made and within what time. But it appears from
the cases that adjudicators hear the appeal in the first instance
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with a right of further appeal to the Tribunal.
Appeals Against Revocation;
An appellant has a right of appeal to an adjudicator in the
first instance against the refusal of the Secretary of State to re-
73
voke a deportation order made against him. The right of appeal is
limited to the extent that he cannot appeal against such refusal to
revoke a deportation order if the Secretary of State certifies that
the appellant's exclusion from the U.K. is conducive to public good
04
or if revocation was refused by the Secretary of State personally.
Further, a person may not appeal against a refusal to revoke a de¬
portation order either, so long as he is in the U.K., or if he has
failed to comply with the requirement to leave or he contravened a
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prohibition of entry into the country.
An appeal against refusal to revoke a deportation order
can therefore be made only from outside the U.K. and it must be made
within 23 days following the refusal by the Secretary of State.
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When the appeal is before an adjudicator, as it should be, and a
related appeal is brought, that is, an appeal by a person belonging
to the family of the deportee, then the adjudicator must transfer
the case to the tribunal which will take the appeal up as an appeal
77
to it in the first instance.
Appeals Against Removals;
Where directions are given under the Act for a person's
75
removal from the U.K. either on the ground that he is an illegal
entrant or on the ground that he has entered the U.K. in breach of
a deportation order then the person against whom the directions are
issued may appeal to an adjudicator against those directions on the
ground that on the facts of the case there was in law no power to
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give them on the ground on which they were given. Such a person
cannot appeal against such directions so long as he is in the U.K.
except where directions were given by virtue of a deportation order
and he is appealing on the ground that he is not the person named in
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the order.
An appeal in the above cases lies to an adjudicator in the
first instnace and must be made within 28 days if the appeal is made
from outside the U.K. but in all other cases it must be made before
or after departure from the U.K. but not later than 28 days. While
the appeal Ides, directions for removal are suspended until the op-
peal has finally been disposed of.^
Macdonald has submitted, rightly, that the right of appeal
above to a person is virtually valueless because if:
"it is alleged that there is a deportation order
against him and he is disputing that he is the
person named in the order...what is in issue is
the legality of his removal ie. whether the auth¬
orities are entitled in law to remove him."
Since the immigration authorities cannot remove him unless he is an
illegal entrant within the meaning of the Act, to refuse him an ap-
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peal while in the country to test "the legality of the order" seems
to be meaningless, to put it mildly.
However, there is nothing in the Act to stop a person de¬
tained as an illegal entrant pending removal from applying to the
Court for habeas corpus by which means the legality of his impending
removal may be tested. A habeas corpus is granted if the appellant
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can show, prima facie, that his detention is illegal. It is estab¬
lished that the onus of proof on the appellant is not displaced in
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most cases. This makes the right of appeal above all the more va¬
lueless. Moreover, an illegal entrant has no right of appeal against
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the country or territory to which he is being removed. But the
right to object to the destination will arise where such an illegal
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entrant defies a deportation order against him. A person who has
entered or is trying to enter the country in breach of a deportation
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cannot be ellowecJ to question the validity of the original deporta¬
tion order, however.
Directions may also be given under the Act and in parti¬
cular under the special powers conferred by schedule 2 to the Act
for the removal of members of the crew of a ship or aircraft or per¬
sons coming to the U.K. to join a ship or aircraft as a member of
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the crew. Any of these people served with a removal direction may
appeal to an adjudicator against that direction on the ground that
on the facts of the case there was in law no power to give the direc¬
tion on the ground it was given. Where the direction was made by
way of deportation he can only appeal on the ground that he is not
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the person named in the order. An appeal under this section a-
gainst directions for removal shall be dismissed by the adjudicator,
notwithstanding that the ground of appeal may be made out, if he is
satisfied that there was no power to give the directions on the ground
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that he was an illegal entrant. In any case, such an appeal must
be made if from outside the U.K. within 28 days after departure, and
in all other cases before or after departure, but not later than 28
days.
No appeal of the kind above will lie, against the country
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or territory to which the person is being removed." The right of
appeal is much curtailed and largely illusory.
Appeals Against Destination:
Section 17 of the Act is generally referred to above. It
must be noted, however, that where directions are given for a person's
removal from the U.K. either
(a) on his being refused leave to enter or
(b) on a deportation order being made against him or
(c) on his having entered the U.K. in breach of a deporta¬
tion order; he may appeal to an adjudicator against the directions
on the ground that he ought to be removed, if at all, to a different
91
country or territory specified by him. . In ALI v IMMIGRATION APPEALS
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ADJUDICATOR it was held that in such an appeal the appellant's well-
founded fear of persecution if he is sent back to his own country is
not a point to be taken into account although nothing will prevent
him from representating the fears to the Secretary of State before
he makes a deportation order. It was also decisively ruled in HOME
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SECRETARY v FARDY that where a deportation order has been made on
the recommendation of a Court the immigration appeals system does
not provide scope for an appeal on the ground that the appellant
has a well-founded fear of persecution„
A person cannot, either, appeal against any directions given
following a refusal of leave to enter the UoKo unless he is at the
same time appealing a.gainst the refusal of leave to enter or unless
he was refused leave to enter when he held a current entry clearance
9k
or was named in a current work permito
There is no appeal of any kind either to an adjudicator or the
Tribunal against the method of allocating special vouchers to British
passport holders of East African Asians or against the refusal of the
Department of Employment to issue work permits or approve training
schemes, or against the removal or exclusion of a person under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1976 except that one may appeal to an
independent panel -under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1976.
If one sees immigration law as a tool of economic regulation
then one must accept the necessity of linking immigration closely to
95
the labour market demands of a country„ In such circumstances
it is probably right that the Government as the "managing director"
of the economy should be the sole judge of the number and classes
96of work permitso
Immigration means a lot more than the economic regulation of
the labour force and accordingly it is questionable if it is right
for the executive to control the issue of work permits without any
appeal allowed to an affected individual.
(II) Finally, when the Wilson Committee on Immigration Appeals
was set up its terms of reference were to look into appeals open:
"to aliens and to Commonwealth citizens who are refused
admission to, or are required to leave the country0"9'7
The Committee did not, therefore, have in mind the citizens of the
U.Ko and colonies. The 1969 Immigration Appeals Act did not contemplate
them eithero The effect of the wholesale incorporation of the 1969
Immigration Appeals Act into the 1971 Immigration Act together with
the introduction of the terra 'patriality' has been to widen the
scope of the appeals system to citizens of the U.K. and colonies •sat&
78
who do not qualify as patrials. It is , in fact, arguable that the
citizens of the U.K. and colonies who are not patrials are entitled
to a direct appeal to the Courts. This is because the Immigration
Act 1571 simply provides that the:
"Immigration Appeal Tribunal and adjudicators
provided for by the Immigration Appeals Act
1969 shall continue"
and, as we know, the 1969 Act was based on the recommendations of
the Wilson Committee whose terms of reference did not cover the citi¬
zens of the U.K. and colonies. In practice, however, citizens of the
U.K. and colonies who are not at the same patrials are placed on the
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(iv) Deportations and Removals
In both the United Kingdom and Kenya provisions have been
made for the deportation of certain categories of:
(A) non-patrials, in the case of the U.K., and
(B) generally speaking non-citizens in the case of Kenya.
This part is an examination of the people who are liable to be de¬
ported and the reasons or grounds for which they may be deported.
(A) U.K.:
In the U.K. a non-patrial may be deported from the country
nothwithstanding that he has en indefinite leave to stay:
(1) by the exercise of prerogative powers4in the case of aliens^
(2) if he is in breach of conditions of stay,
(3) if it is recommended by a court of law,
(4) following a deportation of a member of a family, and
(5) on grounds of the public good.
Removal of a non-patrial from the U.K. may also be effected
by means of:
(6) a mental patient being recommended to leave under the Mental
Health Acts, and
(7) repatriation, i.e. voluntary return.
These last two grounds are not^technically, deportations, but they
will also be examined.
There is one exception that must be noted. Commonwealth
and Irish citizens who are not patrials may not be deported if they
were ordinarily resident in the U.K. since the coming into force of
the 1971 Immigration Act if the ground of deportation is that the
2
Home Secretary deems it conducive to the public good. However,
they can be deported on other grounds, for example, for being in
breach of conditions of stay or for being members of a family of a
deported person. The Home Secretary's power to deport on other
grounds such Commonwealth and Irish citizens ceases once the citi¬
zens have been resident in the U.K. for the last five years from
the time he, the Home Secretary, makes his decision to deport, pro¬
vided also the people were ordinarily resident in the country on
3the coming into force of the 1971 Immigration Act.
It was noted elsewhere that a person can be ordinarily
resident in the U.K. and Islands nothwithstanding that he remains
85
in the country in breach of immigration laws. Accordingly Common¬
wealth and Irish citizens may, in some cases, find themselves pro¬
tected against deportation on grounds other than public good, although
they have remained in breach of the law. The Home Secretary may,
however, deport such Commonwealth or Irish citizens on grounds other
than the public good after five years ordinary residence if he, the
Home Secretary, decides to deport before the expiry of the five
4 5
years* ordinary residence. In AZAM v HCAIE SECRETARY the House of
Lords, in interpreting s. 33(2) of the Immigration Act lS71,which
says that a person is not to be treated as ordinarily resident in
the U.K. at a time he is there in breach of immigration laws, said
that s. 33(2) applied to people who entered the U.K. illegally ori¬
ginally. An illegal entrant cannot, therefore, cease to be ordinari¬
ly resident within the meaning of s. 7(2) of the 1971 Act if he has
never so been in the first place. In other words, an illegal entrant
cannot be ordinarily resident. Accordingly, illegal entrants are
liable to be deported on any ground nothwithstanding that they were
Commonwealth or Irish citizens who had been in the U.K. for more
than five years. This was the case until 1974 when Mr. Roy Jenkins,
Home Secretary, as he then was, announced a pat^ial amnesty for il¬
legal entrants. It provided that Commonwealth citizens who entered
the U.K. before January 1, 1973, and who were On that date immune
from prosecution and deportation for illegal entry had leave to re-
0
main indefinitely. Their wives and children would be allowed to
join them on obtaining entry clearances.
The purpose of the amnesty above was to neutralise the re¬
troactive effects of s. 33(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Therefore,
Commonwealth and Irish citizens who entered the U.K. clandestinely
before January 1, 1973 became immune from deportation on the ground
of the public good if they had been "ordinarily resident" in the
U.K. for more than five years before the Home Secretary decided to
deport them on the ground of public good. This may be viewed as an
extension of the protection from deportation given to Commonwealth
and Irish citizens if they have been ordinarily resident in the U.K.
for the last five years from the date of their entry into the U.K.
The amnesty does not apply to such Commonwealth and Irish citizens
who have entered the U.K. after January 1, 1973. The amnesty does
not, either, apply to aliens. This is a surprising thing because
07
it is inconsistent with the efforet of assimilating the immigration
laws of the aliens and British subjects and because there is no ap¬
parent logical reason for their ommission. One must note, however,
that the amnesty did apply to Pakistani citizens, but at that time
they were Commonwealth citizens and not aliens as they are now.
Prerogative Powers
As was noted elsewhere, probably the British Crown has al¬
ways had the power to order the removal of aliens from the U.K. S. 33
(5) of the 1971 Act provides:
"This Act shall not be taken to supersede or im¬
pair any power exercisable by Her Majesty in re¬
lation to aliens by virtue of her prerogative."
It follows from the provision above that the Crown still
has power to order the removal of.aliens from the U.K. An alien who
seeks entry into the U.K. can be served with|a deportation order no¬
tice before entry by virtue of the Crown prerogative. In SCHMIDT v
7
HOME SECRETARY Widgery L.J., as he then was, held that:
"When an alien, approaching this country, is re¬
fused leave to land he has no right capable of
being infringed...In such a situation the alien's
desire can be rejected for good reason or for
bad, for sensible reason or fanciful or for no
reason at all."
The Crown has, as the above case shows,always had the prerogative
power to refuse entry to an alien. What has never been clear is
whether the Crown can deport on alien already in the country by vir-
Q
tue of her prerogative powers. The power to deport an alien already
in the country has never been exercised and although it may be an in¬
dication of the restraint with which the Crown exercises the pre¬
rogative power to deport, it may equally be an indication of the un¬
certainty surrounding the existence of the power.
The prerogative power to refuse entry to an alien is ob¬
viously unlimited in scope. If the power to deport an alien already
in the country does exist, it is submitted that it is also of unli¬
mited scope and perhaps itf is a good thing in that case that they
have never been exercised.
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Breach of Conditions
As was noted previously, leave to enter the U.K. may be
given to a non-patrial for a limited period with some conditions re¬
stricting hirn to take employment and or requiring registration with
g
the police. Under the present immigration rules:
"deportation will normally be the proper course
where the person has persistently contravened
or failed to comply with a condition or has re¬
mained without authorisation (although)...
full account is to be taken of all the relevant
circumstances before a decision is reached.
The rule supplements a mandatory statutory enactment that
a non-patrial having only a limited time to enter or remain and who
does not observe a condition attached to the leave or remains be¬
yond the time limited by the leave shall be liable to deportation.
It follows from the above provisions that a person who remains be¬
yond the limited leave given to him is in breach of that condition
and can be deported. This is so, notwithstanding that the person
has been ordinarily resident in the U.K. for five years if the Home
Secretary decided to deport him during the subsistence of the five
IP
years. " A person can also be deported for being in breach of the
conditions of his stay, in particular, for overstaying, notwithstand¬
ing that at the time the deportation order was made, his application
13
for an extension of stay was being considered. hurther, a person
admitted with a work permit for a specific job can be liable to de¬
portation if he changes his job without the knowledge and authority
of the Home Office because that would amount tola breach of the con-
14
ditions of one's stay. What is not clear here is whether a person
with a work voucher who is admitted to a specific job but becomes re¬
dundant or for some other reason loses his job can be deported, if
he takes another job without the knowledge and authority of the Home
Office. On the strict interpretation of the provisions it would
seem legal for the Home Secretary to deport such a person if he takes
another job following his redundancy without first getting the auth¬
ority of the Home Office.
A person can overstay in spite of the fact that his appli¬
cation for an extension of leave to remain during the subsistence of
his leave to remain, but due to administrative delays or inefficien¬
cy the application is not considered before his leave to remain ex-
15
pires. That such a person is liable to deportation is fundamentally
es
wrong and offends against the sense of justice or fairness.
It is also becoming clear that the Home Secretary can de¬
port a non-patrial on the ground of refusal or failure to comply
with conditions of leave to remain although his main reason for the
deportation is to prevent such a non-patrial being immune to deport-
IS
ation by being ordinarily resident in the country for five years.
It is not deducible from the Act that such an action is available
to the Home Secretary and it may, therefore, in all probability, be
illegal.
The Home Secretary can only act as above when acting in
accordance with the immigration rules. The immigration rules under
which a non-patrial may be deported for breach of conditions are too
loosely worded that the Home Secretary has power to deport a non-
patrial mainly for reasons unconnected with the breach of conditions.
In HOME SECRETARY v AUJKCi"^ the tribunal held that in deciding whe¬
ther deportation was a proper course (under s. 3(5)(a) of the 1S71
Act) it was a relevant consideration that a person "ordinarily resi¬
dent" would after five years become exempt from deportation under
s. 7(l) of the Immigration Act 1S71. @. 3(5)(a) of the
Act gives the Home Secretary power to deport a non-patrial if he has
a limited leave to enter or remain and he fails to observe those con¬
ditions .
In the circumstances like those of the case above the scope
of the power of the Home Secretary to deport non-patrials on grounds
of breach of conditions of stay becomes extremely wide. The tribu¬
nal also seems to treat or take the immigration rules as an act of
faith and allows itself, consequently, to be bound by them. That
kind of attitude is a dangerous one because it apparently allows
the Home Secretary to be influenced by other considerations than the
breach of conditions of stay.
In LEE v HOME SECRETARY the appellant sought an extension
of his leave in order to pursue his studies. Admittedly he was in
breach of conditions of his stay because he had ignored the time li¬
mit and other conditions subject to which he was admitted. The ap¬
plication for an extension of stay was refused and on appeal to the
adjudicator, the adjudicator was constrained to refuse to allow the
appeal mainly on the ground that other students might think that
they could get away with breaking rules and that he might create a
so
mistaken belief in the leniency of the Home Office. On a further
appeal to the tribunal against the decision of the adjudicator for
taking extraneous considerations into account, ie. the breaking of
rules by other students and the creation of a false belief on the
leniency of the Home Office, the tribunal, dismissing the appeal by
Lee, ruled, that:
"it would, we think, have been wrong if he (ad¬
judicator) had dismissed the appellant's appeal,
regardless of the nature of and gravity of the
appellant's breach of the rules, solely because
other students' disregard of the rules should
be stamped on." _
±y
Having made that observation the tribunal further held that the ad¬
judicator did not err in taking into account the "irrelevant consi¬
derations", ie. breaking of the rules by other students and giving
a mistaken impression of the leniency of the Home Office. The rul¬
ing above also leaves the Home Secretary, the adjudicator and the
tribunal with unlimited discretion to deport a non-patrial mainly
on grounds that are extraneous, illegal or of doubtful legality.
Thus the scope of the power to deport a non-patrial on grounds of
failing to observe the conditions of stay is wide and for as long as
some kind of breach against the time limit or conditions has been
committed it is possible to deport that person on other grounds.
Notice of the deportation for breach of conditions of
20
leave to remain must be given to the person to be deported but if
the person cannot be found all that the Home Secretary has to do is
to post the notice of his decision to deport (as opposed to a deport-
21
ation order) to the last known address of the person. Where the
person is served with the notice of the decision of the Home Secret¬
ary to deport him the person has a right of appeal and, as noted
elsewhere, he cannot be deported, ie. removed from the U.K. so long
as he has a right of appeal or so long as the appeal is pending.
But if the person was not found all that the Home Secretary has to
• p cm°s
do is wait until the person from his hiding and moke a deportation
order for his removal from the U.K. In this case there is no right
of appeal against the deportation order.
a jl
Recommendation of Deportation by the Court
____________ __________
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The Secretory of State has statutory power to deport a
non-potrial who, having attained the age of seventeen, is convicted
of an offence for which he is punishable with imprisonment and on
his conviction is recommended for deportation by the Court. There
is no statutory obligation on the Secretary of State to deport some
one as a matter of course once a Court has recommended that deport¬
ation. If the person is sentenced to imprisonment as well the Sec¬
retary of State seems to have power to depart the person before the
imprisonment,during the continuance of the sentence or after the ex-
23
piration of the sentence.
The Secretary of State has power, on the other hand, to de¬
port a person convicted of a crime by a court of law although that
person has not been recommended to be deported.
The Rules provide that:
"in considering whether to give effect to a rec¬
ommendation for deportation made by a Court on
conviction the Secretary of.State will take in¬
to account every'relevant factor, including age,
length of residence in the U.K., personal hist¬
ory, including character, conduct and employment
record, domestic circumstances, the nature of
the offence of which the person was convicted,
previous criminal records, compassionate and any
representations received on the person's behalf."
Further still:
"where the Court has not recommended deportation
there may, nevertheless, be grounds in the light
of all the relevant information and subject to
the right of appeal, for curtailment of stay or
a refusal to extend stay followed, after depart¬
ure, by a prohibition on re-entry."^
That the Secretary of State has or should have that mass
of knowledge of an individual reminds one of the frightful world of
"Big Brother". Moreover, it is possible under the wide scope of the
rules above for the Secretary of State to deport anyone for any rea¬
son or for no reason so long as that person has been convicted leave
alone recommended to be deported. This power is very consider¬
able and may be a convenient instrument that could be used to expel
all convicts from the U.K. There is nothing in the Act itself to
suggest this. It is possible to infer from the fact that the Secretary
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of State is not under a duty to deport every person so recommended
that Parliament intended the power to be used selectively and, even
more important, did not want to give the Secretary of State such
draconian powers as he has arrogated to himself through the device
of the rules. Recent statistics show tliat the Secretary of State
has used his powers under the rules extensively in the deportation
25
of Commonwealth citizens.
There are other ways open to the Secretary of State for removing
people recommended by Courts to be deported. A person so recommended
may be asked to leave voluntarily or may be required to leave under
supervised departure with a prohibition placed on him against re-
26
entry into the U.K. J.M. Evans has submitted that the practical
27
effect of a supervised departure is the same as deportation.
This is true only insofar as removal from the U.K. is concerned.
The effect is not the same from the point of view of the country
to which the person is going to be removed to. In CSENYI v HOME
2q """I"™""" 11111,1"1 1
SECRETARY supervised departure was preferred to deportation
because the former enabled the Secretary of State to send the
appellant to Germany when, in fact, he wanted to go to Spaino
The scope of the power of the Secretary of State to deport
people who have been recommended for deportation is, therefore,
very wide. All he needs, normally, to justify Ms actions is a
conviction of a person by a Court of law. A court recommends
deportation only when a convicted person has been given at least
seven days notice in writing stating that he is not liable to
30
deportation if he is a patrial.
No appeal lies to the immigration appeals system from the
31
recommendation for deportation by a Court. A recommendation is
treated as a sentence for the purpose of appeal in England and Wales,




A person who is not a patrial is liable to deportation from
the U.K. if another person to whose family he belongs is or has been
33ordered to be deported. Detailsed provisions of what the Secretary
of State may take into account before making such a deportation are
in the rules. Generally speaking, before the Secretary of State
will deport the wife or child under 18 of a person so deported he
will consider their length of stay in the U.K., their connection
with the country, their ability to maintain themselves without re¬
course to public funds, compassionate circumstances and any other
35
representations they may make. °
It is apparent from the rules that the power to deport a
member of a family is very considerable. However, the Act is restrict-
ively worded and accordingly probably excludes dependents other than
^0
the wife and children of a deported husband or wife. This may be
a reflection of the concept of a "family" in the U.K. as being the
>\uclear family unit. This would miss the fact that a lot of the
immigrant communities in the U.K. believe in extended family units.
It is submitted that the dependents of a deportee, other than the
wife and children, are not deportable under this head. However, the
Secretary of State may by deporting the breadwinners of such depen¬
dents cause them to leave the country voluntarily. This is in any
case the option open to the Secretary of State in the case of child¬
ren born to the family of such a deportee in the U.K. or the Islands.
This is so because the Secretary of State has not power to deport a
patrial even if he is below the age of 17 years.
The rules say that where the wife of a deported person has
qualified in her own "right" to stay in the U.K. she has a valid
37
claim of stay notwithsatnding the deportation of the husband. But
the rules are merely permissive, not mandatory, and a deportation
order against a non-patrial wife may probably be made in spite of
the fact that she has qualified for settlement in her own right. On
the other hand the Tribunal has ruled that where a deportee's wife
has not qualified for settlement, but she can maintain herself and
her children without recourse to public funds, she should not be de-
30 *
ported. But if suchja v/ife has not qualified for settlement in her
39
own right and cannot support herself she will bo deported.
The rules further state that where a wife has been living
apart from the principal deportee it will not normally be right to
40
deport her or any children living with her. This provision does
not state in any way what constitutes "living apart". Presumably it
means if they are divorced legally. Suppose they ore separated ei¬
ther by a Court order or voluntaily, would they be considered as li¬
ving apart? Or suppose that only a decree nisi for divorce has been
94
granted, would they be considered as "living apart"? In other words,
is the term "living apart" to be understood in the practical and phy¬
sical "living apart" sense or in' the legal sense? It is not clear
and there is no guide as to the scope of the power of the Secretary
of State in these circumstances.
When can it be said that children living with their mother
are living apart from the principal deportee? Suppose in fact that
the wife of a deportee has been awarded the custody of the children
by a Court, but the deportee is charged with the duty of their finan¬
cial welfare, eg. educating them, are the children to be considered
as part of the household of the wife or the deportee? It could be
in some cases that the wife cannot support herself and the children
of who she has custody (particularly when they are young), but it
is doubtful if the Secretary of State has power to deport them not¬
withstanding that she may be divorced from her husband and may not
have qualified for settlement in her own right.
There is also no indication anywhere of what the Secretary
*
of State's power is in relation to jointly adopted children where
the wife of the deportee has qualified for settlement in her own
right and she can support herself.
All the questions above reveal that the Secretary of State's
power, in relation to family deportations are anything but clear and
his discretion is presumably wide and unbridled in this area. Al¬
though he would consider each case individually it is clear that the
scope of his powers is wide, undefined and undefinable having regard
to various family situations.
The Act provides that where the person deported under this
section is a woman her family will be her children under the age of
41
18 years. "Child" is defined as her adopted child, whether legal-
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ly adopted or not and her illegitimate child. " This provision is,
unfortunately, vague. It appears to exclude the husband if the wo¬
man to be deported is married. If that is so, as it appears, then
the Act obviously discriminates against women. It will also be a-
gainst the interest of the children under the age of 17 years in
some coses if in all the circumstances where a married mother is de¬
ported, her children under the age of 17 years and who ore unmarried
have to leave the country with her. But there is an exception in
this section. The Secretary of State lias no power under the Act to
95
deport a child born in the U.K. although the child is less than 17
43
years old. Such children can remain and stay with the father if
the wife is deported.
On the other hand the Act also discriminates against men
in that it presumes them incapable of caring for children under the
age of 17 when the mother is a deportee. Such is the contradictory nat¬
ure of scope of this unusual section on family deportation. Its
scope is so wide that it even gives the Secretary of State power to
indirectly do what he cannot do directly. For example, if the wo¬
man to be deported has children who are citizens of the U.K. and
born in the U.K. they will often accompany the mother if they are
below 17 years of age with no means of supporting themselves not¬
withstanding that they are patrials. Thus the Secretary of State
achieves the removal of the children from the U.K. which he could
not do directly. The section thus gives the Secretary of State po¬
wer to deport family members either directly or indirectly for no
"crime" of their own. If th,ere is anything that cuts across the te¬
nets of human rights and the principles of fairness this is it.
The rules provide that the Secretary of State will take
into account, in the case of children under 17 years, the disrup¬
tive effect of their removal on their education and whether plans
for their care and maintenance in the U.K. are realistic and likely
44
to be effective. If they are deported they may qualify for re-
admission when they are 18 years and so will the wife if her marriage
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with the deported man is subsequently dissolved.
If the Secretary of State wishes to deport someone as a
member of a family of a deported person he must notify each of them
personally of his decision before eight weeks have elapsed from the
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date the deportee left the U.K. As has been noted elsewhere, if
the other members of the family cannot be found within the 8 weeks,
but the Secretary of State has decided to deport them it is surmised
that he can serve them with deportation orders after the eight weeks
have elapsed following the reasoning of the Court in AI-llET D. MEHMET
47
v HOME SECRETARY . Moreover, the Secretary of State will invariab¬
ly have made his mind up to deport the family if and when he decides
to deport a member of it. It follows that the 8 weeks grace period
is largely illusory. But a family deportation will cease to have
effect if in a rare case the Secretary of State does not deport the
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family within 8 weeks or if they cease to be members of the family
of the deported person or if the deportation order made against the
48 49
other person ceases to have effect, or if they become patrials.
An appeal against family deportation must be lodged within
two weeks from the date the Secretary of State notifies them of the
50
decision of deportation in writing and the Secretary of State can¬
not deport them then or while the appeal is pending.
Conducive to Public Good
A non-patrial con be deported from the U.K. if the Home
51
Secretary deems the deoortation to be conducive to public good.
His power under this section has been variously described as being
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"without limit or definition"" and as "giving him (the Home Secre-
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tary) almost unlimited power." The rules provide that:
"the cases in which deportation is justified
on the ground that it will be conducive to the
public good are likely to continue to be few
in number (and) judging from past experience,
most of the cases'in the category will be cases
in which a court has convicted the person but
has decided to leave the question of deportation
to the Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary of
State.
At the same time the Act itself provides that:
"a person shall not be allowed to appeal against
a decision to make a deportation order against
him if the ground of the decision was that his
deportation is conducive to the public good as
being in the interests of national security or
of the relations between the U.K. and any other
country or other reasons of a political nature."^
The provisions above together reveal two kinds of deporta¬
tion powers available to the Secretary of State although they are
under one head. They are deportation conducive to the public good
in general end deportation conducive to the public good on grounds
of security and so on. Each of them will be analysed separately,
(a) General Deportation: Deportation of grounds conducive to the
public good simpllciter gives the Secretary of State power to deport
non-patrials whenever he deems it necessary in the interest of the
public good. As the rules above state, the majority of the people
to be normally affected by the deportation are those who have been
convicted by a court without a recommendation for deportation. Va¬
rious cases show that the Secretary of State deports people on the
above ground notwithstanding that they are deportable ort other
56
grounds. In the case of CShNYI v HGMb. S-CRtiTARY the appellant-
was convicted of an offence and recommended for deportation by a
court of law having power to do so. The Secretary of State decided
to deport him under the "public good" ground notwithstanding that
he (the appellant) was deportable under "recommendation by a court"
clause and in contravention of the rules above which state, in short,
that the Secretary of State may exercise this power in cases in which
a court has convicted a person but has decided to leave the question
of deportation to the Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary of State le.
coses in which there was a conviction but in which no deportation
was recommended. The Tribunal upheld the decision without any com¬
ment.
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In LONG v HOPE SECRETARY a deportation order was made
under the conducive to public good ground because it came to light
that the deportee had previous convictions abroad. This is a case
in which no conviction by a court in the U.K. had been obtained.
These two cases illustrate that the Secretary of State can deport
a non-patrial under the public good ground when he chooses to da so.
This kind of tendency makes the other grounds of deportation more or
less superfluous particularly as the Tribunal will generally uphold
the decision of the Secretary of State. Probably most deportations
made on the public good ground are those in which a Court of law has
convicted,a person but left it to the Home Secretary to decide on •
the question of deportation. In this case the Home Secretary is not,
apparently, bound by the observations of the court. In HELIES v HCME
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SECRETARY the appellant was convicted of theft by the Court which
did not recommend his deportation because it considered that the of¬
fences were not serious enough to warrant such a recommendation and
that ha was unlikely to commit further offences. The Secretary of
State in fact decided to deport the appellant under the conducive to
the public good ground because he might commit further offences. The
Tribunal uphe d the Secretary of State's decision without any refer¬
ence to the Court's prior decision. It is right that if further new
evidence is made available to the Secretary of State and that evidence
was not before the Court then the Secretary of State should deport
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a person if he deems it necessary in the light of the new circum-
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stances, but where no such new evidence is available, it is sub¬
mitted that the Secretary of State should have no power to deport
when the Court specifically considered deportation and refused to re¬
commend it. If this is not so, that is, sf the Court's role is only
to return recommendations to deport then, the power to deport after
a recommendation by a Court of law is superfluous and might as well
be removed from the statute book. It is interesting in this respect
that the Wilson Committee recommended the abolition of deportations
following a recommendation by a court of law. Parliament decided,
however, to retain it. If the scope of the power of the Secretary
of State is as it appears to be irt the above cases, then the Courts
are in this regard a mere rubber stomp of convenience that is dis¬
pensed with as it suits the executive. It is submitted, however,
that the actions of the Secretary of State in cases of this kind are
probably illegal and they cannot stand the scrutiny of a court of
law. An affected person should apply to a court of law for a review
immediately as neither the Act nor the rules give him that power.
L. Grant and J. Constable have submitted that mitigating circumstan¬
ces proved at the trial of a person by a Court of law cannot be re¬
lied upon by the Tribunal unless they are proved afresh. Thus is
STOFTLE v HOME SECRETARY where a charge of murder was changed to
manslaughter, the Tribunal held that if the appellant's condition
was to be put forward as constituting compassionate circumstances,
it must be shown to be continuing at the time of the appeal. Under
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the rules the Tribunal, in considering whether deportation is the
right course on the merits, must balance public interest against any
compassionate circumstances of the case. If this rule is adhered
to strictly one can foresee injustice caused in individual cases.
An appeal against deportation on the ground of public good lies to
the tribunal. Its decision is binding on the Home Secretary. But
the Home Secretary's power to deport non-patrials on grounds of the
public good is considerable as can be seen from the analysis above.
In R,V' SRIXTON PRISON (GOVERNOR) ex parte SC3LEN Cl962] 3 All E.R.
641 the Court of Appeal said that in exceptional cases the Courts
might exercise some control over the power of the Home Secretary to
deport people on grounds of public good, if , for example, there was
a prima facie cose of unlawfulness. However, the Court was under no
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illusion that there ere great difficulties in proving that the pur¬
pose of the Home Secretary.in making a deportation on grounds of
public good is unlawful. It is submitted that in all probability the
courts power to exercise supervisory control over the Home Secretar¬
y's power of deportation on the ground of public good is more appa¬
rent than real.
(b) National Security: Deportation conducive to the public good as
being in the interests of national security and so on is a power
whose scope knows no limitation. The power under the 1971 Act was
first exercised in the Franco Caprino case, an Italian Marxist who
was resident in the U.K. in 1974. Public outcry was brought to bear
upon the Home Secretary, Mr. Roy Jenkins (as he then was), as a re¬
sult of which he revoked the order just before Caprino was due to
appear before a security panel. In recent months the Home Secretary,
Mr. Rees had exercised this power against two Americans, Mark Hosen-
ball and Philip Agee. The scope of the power of the Home Secretary
has been demostrated by the two cases to be considerable and in its
present form it is unquestionable. The Secretary of State is not
at all obliged to give reasons for a deportation under this head.
If he decides to give reasons he is not obliged to give
details. In the case of Mark Hosenball, the Secretary of State curt¬
ly notified him that he was to be deported for unspecified security
reasons, ie. that while he was resident in the U.K. in consort with
others he sought to obtain and had obtained for publication informa¬
tion harmful to the security of the U.K. and that this information
had included information prejudicial to the safety of Crown servants.
Philip Agee, on the other hand, was told:
"he had maintained regular contacts harmful to
the security of the U.K. with foreign intel¬
ligence officers; had continued to be involved
in disseminating information harmful to the
security of the U.K.; and had aided and counsel¬
ed others in obtaining information for publica¬
tion which could be harmful to the security of
the U.K."
Pressed to say what these allegations meant the Home Secretary simply
replied that because of the:
"security reasons involved I am not prepared to
go into (any) detail.
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A person deported in this manner under this head will ne¬
ver know the allegations made against him. The only option open to
him or her is an appeal to the Home Office Advisory Panel. The Pan¬
el is not a statutory body as such and accordingly the appeal is non¬
statutory. A person who appeals to the Panel is not allowed legal
representation, but to such an extent as the Panel sanctions, he or
she may be assissted by a friend and arrange for third parties to
testify on his behalf. The friend or third party may, of course, be
a lawyer. But the person cannot be given reasons for his deportation
by the Panel and he or she cannot cross-examine Government witnesses
who, in fact, do not appear before the Panel. The Panel sits in pri¬
vate and the Press is excluded from the hearings. Neither the sources
of evidence nor the evidence that might lead to disclosure of sources
of evidence may be disclosed.
During the hearing of the "appeal" of Mr. Philip Agee there
were confusions on the procedures to be followed and on whether or
not the Panel had the right to .give Agee details of the information
they had received from the Home Office and the Security Service. Two
former Home Office Ministers, Mrs. Judith Hart and Mr. Alex Lyon who
came to testify for Mr. Agee insisted that the Panel had the power
to do so, but the Chairman of the Panel said that the Home Secretary
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had decided against this. After further consultation with the Sec¬
retary of State it transpired that the Panel can only decide points
of procedure, such as who might attend the hearing but it was for the
Home Secretary to decide how much information could be given. If
this kind of procedure is followed it is doubtful whether the Panel
can itself come to a fair conclusion. The practicalities of a par¬
ticular case might demand the revelation of the very thing that the
Home Secretary has refused to be revealed. In such circumstances it
is impossible to testify on that point as the "deportee" is kept in
ignorance of the facts of that point. It is not surprising in such
circumstances that the Panel has been heard to complain that it was
65not satisfied with what it had been told before the hearing. It
is also a contradiction in terms to say that such a Panel is inde¬
pendent. Even its decisions do not and cannot bind the Home Secre¬
tary. What is its independence worth then?
Without objecting to the power to deport under this head,
if one is to be reassured that the Secretary of State's decision to
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deport is well founded, under the present system one cannot but to¬
tally agree with the submission that one must:
"assess the merits of the decision to deport...
by reference to grounds for so deciding, or...
must assume that judgement in such matters is
inherently infallible, so that the grounds for
deporting in the individual case are irrele¬
vant. Clearly, such an assumption is wholly
unacceptable..." _65
If an when the Secretary of State makes a deportation agaisnt
a person under this head the person may appeal against the country
specified in the removal directions on the ground that he sought to
67
be removed to a different country. This is a statutory right.
A person who is refused entry into the U.K. on the ground
that it is conducive to public good as being in the interests of na¬
tional security and so on has no option of appeal to the non-statu-
6B
tory Panel. He has no remedy.
It is submitted that the Secretary of State's power to de¬
port non-patrials on the ground of national security is unlimited in
scope. This may be compared with his power under the Immigration
Appeals Act 1969. The 1969 Act had set up a special tribunal to hear
cases of people deported on security grounds. In the DIJTSCHKE CASE
£l97l\ 34 M.L.R. 501 decided under the 1969 Act D. was not allowed
to know the case against him and neither was his legal representative
allowed to know the case against D. They were not allowed to cross —
examine the Government witnesses who had given evidence of sensitive
matters and their evidence was not included in the tribunal's report
with the consequence that there was no revelation of the precise
grounds of their decision. Therefore, the Secretary of State's power
was largely as wide as under the 1971 Act.
Removal of Mental Patients
Section 30 of the Immigration Act gives the Secretary of
State power to order the removal of non-patrials receiving treatment
for mental illness as in patients if it appears to him to be in the
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interests of the patient to be so removed. The only requirements
on the Secretary of State are that he must be satisfied that proper
arrangements for the removal of the patient to his country have been
made and that either he or one of his under-secretaries signs the
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removal order. The methods used to detain patients in mental
102
71
hospitals are all detailed in the Mental Health Act but it must be
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mentioned that the Act offers a wide scope far abuse of the powers
andj accordingly, the powers of the Secretary of State under this
head are considerable. There is no appeal against the removal pro¬
vided for by the Immigration Act.
Voluntary Return or Repatriation
The Secretary of State has power under the Immigration Act
to make payments of such amount as may be determined to meet or pro¬
vide for the expenses of non-patrials leaving the U.K. for a country
where they wish to reside permanently. The Secretary of State can
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only do so, however, with the approval of the Treasury. Further,
before the Secretary of State can so make the payments, it must be
shown that so far as is practicable it is in the interest of that per-
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son to leave the U.K. and that he wishes to do so.
Apart from the provisions above there is no guidance of hov;
the Secretary of State may exercise the power. How, for example,
does he satisfy himself that it is in the interest of the person to
leave the U.K., or how does he reach the conclusion that a person -
wants to leave the country voluntarily? It is submitted that people
seeking this kind of help will be incapable of supporting themselves
in the first place. It may well be that it will be in the interests
of this person to leave the U.K., but to say that a person in such
a desperate condition made his choice freely seems to beg the quest¬
ion. /
Suppose also that after the request for the help the person
changes his mind to leave. Will he or she be allowed to retract the
former decision? This is a virgin area and with no rules or prece¬
dents it is impossible to say the exact scope of the power of the
Secretary of State although it is thought to be considerable. It
must be noted that if the person who so wishes to leave and has a
family that wants to leave with him, the Home Secretary can also pay
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thera. w This may, in some cases, include patrial children.
It is stated that anyone who receives assistance from the
public funds towards the cost of leaving the U.K. will not be road-
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mitted. This seems to imply that a patrial child, for example,
will be deprived of the right of abode if he or she has his or her
expenses paid for by the stete to leave the U.K. because his or her
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parents want to leave the U.K. with him or her "voluntarily". It is
hoped that this implication will be eschewed as it will otherwise
have serious unlawful repercussions.
General Points
Af)
Before concluding^ deportations a few things must be noted.
Firstly, once the Secretary of State has taken a decision to deport
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he has power to make a detention order pending an appeal but sub¬
ject to a right of appeal to the appellate body to grnat bail pro¬
vided an appeal against the deportation order itself can and has been
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lodged. This provision is likely to work hardship to people de¬
ported on grounds conducive to public good as being in the interests
of national security and so on. If the Secretary of State decides
to detain them it means that they have no remedy under the Immigra¬
tion Act and they will be, thereby, prevented from preparing their
dossiers and organising their witnesses should they decide to appeal
to the Panel. This power must be exercised, if at all, with the ut¬
most reluctance.
Secondly, a deportation order will not be made against a
person if the only country to which he can be removed is one to which
he is unwilling to go owing to well-founded fears of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
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lar group or political opinion. In ALI v IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRI¬
BUNAL AND OTHERS"^ the court of Appeal ruled that:
"in all...cases the proper person to consider a
claim to political asylum is the Home Secretary.
If a man has well-founded fear of being per¬
secuted if he is sent back to his country, he
should make representations to the Minister and
the Minister will take that fear into account in
determining whether to make a deportation order.
It follows from the decision that only the Secretary of
State has the power to grant political asylum. That being so it al¬
so follows that he can overrule the decision of a court that recom¬
mends a deportation but makes a finding that the person is likely
to be perscuted if sent back to his country. -
n
Thirdly, the husband of a woman who is settled in the U.K.
or is on the same occasion being admitted for settlement is himself
to be admitted for the purpose of settlement if he holds a current
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entry clearance granted to him for that purpose. Such a man is
not free from deportation until he acquires the right of abode through
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naturalisation or registration as a U.K. citizen. In one case,
which is not a very good example, a man was refused an extension of
leave to stay by the Secretary of State. He then entered into a
marriage with a woman settled in the U.K. It was held that the mar¬
riage was a device to remain in the U.K. and accordingly he was de¬
ported.
Lastly, exemption from deportation does not of itself con¬
fer on people who have been ordinarily resident in the U.K. (eg. Com¬
monwealth or Irish citizens who are ordinarily resident) patriality
or settlement until they qualify as such. A Commonwealth or Irish
citizen who, therefore, has been ordinarily resident in the U.K.
qualifies as "settled" if there are no restrictions on the period
for which he may stay. If this restriction is not removed then he
is trapped in the U.K. in that if he were to leave he would have to
qualify for re-admission in the same manner as any other entrant.^
(B) KENYA:
In Kenya, the power to deport a person is generally vested
in the Minister for Home Affairs as in the U.K. In Kenya, however,
only non-citizens of the country may be deported unlike the U.K.
where a citizen of the U.K. and colonies may be deported jf he is
not a patrial. The power to deport a person in Kenya emanates entire-
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ly from the Immigration Act. This contrasts with the U.K. where
deportation under the 1971 Immigration Act exists side by side with
prerogative powers of deportation.
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Section 8 of the Immigration Act provides that:
"the Minister may, by an order in writing direct,
that any person whose presence in Kenya was,
immediately before the making of that order un¬
lawful shall be removed and stay out of Kenya
either indefinitely or for such period as may be
specified in the order."
A person is unlawfully present in Kenya if he is a prohi-
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bited immigrant or being a holder of a class K' or L entry permit
(discussed later) he fails to engage in the occupation, trade, busi¬
ness or profession for which the entry permit was issued within 14
days from its date of issue or entry into Kenya^whichever is the
L3 cj C?
later « Finally a person is unlawfully present in Kenya if his
entry into and stay in Kenya was without a valid entry permit or a
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valid pass. Each of these will now be examined.
Section 3 of the Immigration Act gives an exhaustive defi¬
nition of a prohibited immigrant. It is a person who is not a citi¬
zen of Kenya and who is:
(a) incapable of supporting himself and his dependants, if
any, in Kenya. At present there are no criteria of how an immigra¬
tion officer arrives at the decision on whether or not a person can
support himself and his dependents, if any. However, a person with
a work permit will generally fall outside the reach of this provision.
Since the entry and stay of a non-citizen in Kenya is at the discre¬
tion of an immigration officer it is arguable that the amount of mo¬
ney an immigration officer thinks sufficient before a person quali¬
fies as self-supporting is arbitrary.
In the U.K. a person who cannot support himself or his de¬
pendants may leave voluntarily although that does not exclude the
possibility of him being pressed to so leave by the Government.
(b) a mental defective or a person suffering from mental
disorder. This may be quite easy to establish medically.
(c) a person v/ho:
(i) refuses to submit to medical examination by a
medical practitioner after being required to do so or
(ii) is certified by a medical practitioner to be suf¬
fering from a disease which makes his presence in Kenya undesirable
on medical grounds.
The clause above if literally applied may have the effect
of enabling immigration authorities to require a person who refuses
to be examined on religious or other grounds to leave Kenya. The
clause should not, therefore, be applied loosely as it otherwise
endangers the loss of a person's freedom of movement by reason of
his beliefs which may be a greater loss than the danger it is intend¬
ed to prevent if he is required to leave the country.
Suppose a person who is examined is found to have a vene¬
real disease. 16 it proper that he be required to leave the country
on that account if, say, the disease itself is common in the country?
It is submitted that in its present form the clause can be used to
deport a non-citizen who is found to have any disease since it has
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not been clear which diseases are undesirable for immigration pur¬
poses and which are desirable for immigration purposes. It would
help, therefore, if a list of the undesirable diseases was made.
(d) a person who, not having received a free pardon, has
been convicted in any country, including Kenya, of murder or of any
offence for which a sentence of imprisonment has been passed for any
term and who by reason of such conviction is considered to be an un¬
desirable immigrant. This provision makes no distinction between
minor offences and serious offences and accordingly a person may
find himself deported from the country for a very minor offence.
The U.K. law is very clear on this particular point in that it not
only lists the typeiof offences, but in fact also excludes the wife
and children under 13 years of a person settled in the country from
the purview of the provision. In contrast the Kenyan law is silent
on the kind of offences that will qualify one as an undesirable im¬
migrant. It is also clearly silent on whether or not it applies to
all non-citizens irrespective of their connections with the country.
In that case, it may be argued that either it applies to all non-ci¬
tizens irrespective of their connections or that it is capable of
being manipulated so as to apply to all non-citizens.
(e) a prostitute or a person who is living on or receiving
or who before entering Kenya lived on or received the proceeds of
prostitution. This provision has the effect of barring from Kenya
people who practise prostitution or who live on its proceeds and
people who practised prostitution or lived on its proceeds in the
past. The fact that a non-citizen may have ceased to engage in pro¬
stitution or receiving proceeds of prostitution does not remove him
or her from the consequence of deportation from Kenya. Presumably
a finding that one is a prostitute or received the proceeds of pro¬
stitution is based on the elements of continuity and regularity with
a pattern of behaviour or deliberate course of conduct entered into
primarily for gain or for other considerations of material value as
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distinguished from the commission of casual and isolated acts. If
this is so it means that a woman who engages in occasional and iso¬
lated acts of prostitution does not come under the purview of this
provision.
(f) a person who in consequence of information received
from any government or from any other source considered by the Minister
to be reliable, is considered by the Minister to be an undesirable
immigrant. This power has been used on several occasions. For ex¬
ample, on July 5th, 1967 the Minister for Home- Affairs deported from
Kenya 5 Europeans and 7 Asians on the ground that they were unde-
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sirable immigrants. The Minister's power is comparable to that of
the U.K. Home Secretary to deport on grounds conducive to the public
good.
(g) a person or a member of a class of persons whose pre¬
sence in Kenya is declared to be contrary to the national interests.
This power contrasts with the one available to the U.K. Secretary of
State to deport a non-patrial on grounds conducive to the public
good as being in the interest of national security. It is obvious
that the power of the Minister is co-extensive with that of the Sec¬
retary of State save for the fact that in the U.K. the advice of the
non-statutory independent Panel is obtained first.
The power to declare a non-citizen a prohibited immigrant
is exercised by the Minister for clauses (d) to (g] above. An immi¬
gration officer may do so provided consent has been obtained from
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the Minister first. In this case an immigration officer's exer¬
cise of the power is no more than a piece of administrative machi¬
nery.
(h) a person who, upon entering or seeking to enter Kenya,
fails to produce a valid passport to an immigration officer on de¬
mand or within such time as that officer «iay allow. For the purposes
of a passport the production of a valid travel document or document
of identity issued to the person by an authority recognised by the
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Government of Kenya is sufficient.
(i) a person who was immediately before the commencement
of the Immigration Act 1967, a prohibited immigrant under the 1956
Immigration Act.
(j) a person whose presence or entry into Kenya is unlaw¬
ful under any written law other than the Immigration Act 1967.
(k) a person in respect of whom there is in force an order
made or deemed to be made under s. 8 of the Immigration Act 1967, di¬
recting that such person shall be removed from aniremain out of Ken¬
ya. S. 8 of the Act covers ell the above categories of prohibited
immigrants who have been served with notices by the Minister that
their presence in Kenya is unlawful. It also covers any person
against whom a recommendation has been made under the Kenyan Penal
Code, ie. any person who has been convicted and recommended to be de¬
ported by a court of law. This power is exactly like that available
to the U.K. Secretary of State and, accordingly, a recommendation for
deportation by the court doss not bind the Minister to act in accor¬
dance with it. He can ignore the recommendation or effect it, as he
thinks fit. This may well represent an aspect of the sovereignty of
state.
Finally, a member-of the family of any prohibited immigrant
is also a prohibited immigrant and can, accordingly, be deported by
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the Minister from Kenya." Although the power of the Minister to de¬
port a member of a family of a prohibited immigrant is like that of
the Secretary State to depart the wife and children under the age of
18 years of a deported person, it is submitted that the Kenyan Minis¬
ter has more power in that he can deport any dependant of the pro¬
hibited immigrant. For this reason it does not matter that the de¬
pendant is not the wife or or child under 18 years of the prohibited
immigrant. The important thing is that as long as any person is a
dependant of the prohibited immigrant, he or she is also a prohibited
immigrant and, therefore, deportable. A dependant is any person in
respect of whom a dependant's pass is issued by reason of:
(i) his or her dependence on the prohibited immigrant
for maintenance or
(ii) his or her age, disability or any incapacity and
is unable to maintain himself adequately or for some other reason re-
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lies on the prohibited immigrant for maintenance.
By the nature of the definition of a dependant it is, there¬
fore, open to the Minister to deport not only the wife and children
under the age of 18, but also any person who is dependent on the pro¬
hibited immigrant as above. This gives the Kenyan Minister more po¬
wer than the U.K. Secretary of State. If a deoendant also holds en
entry permit then it is possible that he or she does not come under
the purview of the provisions above although the person on whom he
or she is or was dependent becomes a prohibited immigrant.
The second category of persons who are considered unlaw¬
fully present in Kenya is in any case in which the holder of classes
K and L entry permits (discussed later) has failed to engage within
14 days from the date he got the entry permit or of his entry into
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Kenya, whichever is later, in his employment, occupation, trade, pro¬
fession or business without the permission of the immigration offi-
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cer. He will also be unlawfully present in Kenya if he deliberate¬
ly ceases to engage in that employment or occupation and so on with-
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out the permission of an immigration officer. In either case,
once he becomes unlawfully present in Kenya he is automatically li¬
able to be served with a notice for removal from the country.
Finally a person is unlawfully present in Kenya if his en¬
try and presence in Kenya is or was done without a valid entry per-
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mit or valid pass. In that case; he is also automatically liable
to be served with a removal order by the Minister.
Any person who is unlawfully present in Kenya and has been
served with a deportation or removal order from the Minister shall
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be removed to the country whence he come. In some cases, the per¬
son may, with the approval of the Minister, be removed to a place in
the country to which he belongs, ie. the country of which he is a na¬
tional, if he did not corne from there. He may also be removed to a
place to which he consents tb be removed provided the permission of
the Minister is obtained in the first place. In this case, he must,
however, show that the Government of the country to which he wishes
to go consents to receive him."^'"' The same discretions are available
to the U.K. Secretary of State also.
If the Minister so directs, a person who is subject to a
deportation order shall be kept in prison or in police custody until
his departure from Kenya is effected."^"*" However, while so kept he
102shall be deemed to be in lawful custody. These provisions exclude
the possibility of the availability of an habeas corpus and probably
bail. In contrast, in the U.K., a person so detained can seek bail
and, in some cases, habeas corpus.
A removal order remains in force until it has been revoked
by the Minister. A person who, therefore attempts to enter Kenya
while he is subject to a removal order that has not been revoked will
be prosecuted.^
The Minister reserves the discretion to revoke or vary a
removal or deportation order at any time anAin any way."^^
Immigration officers have power to order the removal of
a person who arrives in Kenya as a stov/away from the country.
Their power is absolute and cannot be questioned by any court of law.
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In all other cases it is only the Minister for Home Affairs who has
the power to order the removal of non-citizens from Kenya on the
ground that they are unlawfully present in Kenya for any of the rea¬
sons already discussed.
that
Finally, it must be submitted^the U.K. immigration lav/, al¬
though much criticised, gives far more protection to a non-patrial
from deportation than does the Kenyan immigration law to non-citizens.
One can hardly avoid the conclusion that the Kenyan Immigration Act
is an attempt to legitimise and entrench the extensive powers of de¬
portation in the hands of the Minister.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PURP05E OF IMMIGRATION LAWS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AMD KENYA
In this chapter a brief attempt will be made to analyse
the purposes of immigration laws in both countries. Although one may
disagree with the intent of the immigration laws discussed hereun¬
der, one cannot disagree with the fact that their effects have had
disturbing overtones. To talk of intent and effect is not to confuse
cause with effect. It is the assertion of this thesis that the root
of the immigration laws in both countries is the same. The differen¬
ces lie in the means adopted by both countries and the effects of
their respective immigration laws.
The United Kingdom
The enactment of the 1971 Immigration Act was the culmina¬
tion of a number of policies that successive British Governments had
pursued for some tinier The policies may be summed up in one word,
namely, restrictiveness, which itself reflected the transition of the
U.K. from a laissez-faire world power to a state in a world of states.
What was the purpose of adopting the restrictive measures?
(a) Numbers:
The 1952 Commonwealth Immigrants Act placed controls upon immigration
from Commonwealth countries by bringing under immigration control all
British subjects, citizens of the Republic of Ireland and British
protected persons unless they were both in the U.K. or unless they
were citizens of the U.K. and colonies who held U.K. passports.^"
Paul Foot traced the political origin of the 1962 Act to the politi¬
cal campaign mounted both outside and inside Parliament to restrict
2
numbers of non-white British subjects coming into the U.K. Although
the 1952 Act placed no limit on the number of immigrants to be allow¬
ed into the U.K. immigrants were to be admitted on one of the three
kinds of vouchers; that is to stay:
(i) Category A - it was for Commonwealth immigrants
with a specific job to come to; the employer had the mandate to is¬
sue the voucher,
(ii) Category B - these vouchers were issued by the
British High Commissions in Commonwealth countries to people with
skills or qualifications not available or not in sufficient numbers
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in the U.K. labour market, and
(iii) Category C - these vouchers were free for all
on a first come first served basis with priority to people who were
in the war service.^
The dependants of voucher holders were free to join their voucher-
holding family members in the U.K. The 15G2 Act suffered in one ba¬
sic respect. It did not keep an accurate record of the number of
immigrants that came to the U.K. Moore and Wallace have said that
"the 'take-up' rate (the ratio of vouchers used
to vouchers issued) varied from place to place
and according to political circumstances.
It is because of this lack of accurate checks on numbers of immigrants
entering into the U.K. that in 1565 the Prime Minister's office is¬
sued a White Paper on Immigration from the Commonwealth to restrict
the number of vouchers to Q500 a year (including 1000 for Malta);
to terminate the entry of unskilled persons (holders of Category C
vouchers) into the country; to apply stricter controls on students,
visitors and 16 to 18 year old dependent children; and to take more
5
effective measures to prevent illegal entrance. The fear of numbers
of immigrants from the Commonwealth countries was a cancerous night¬
mare that ate into the British public mind with great intensity. It
was so intense that in 1567 when the Kenyan Government clamped down
there
on non-citizen British Asians then resident in the country.was an
ominous cloud of a massive flow of these British citizens into the
U.K. The Labour Government spared no time in introducing the Common¬
wealth Immigrants Bill 1568 which was swiftly pushed through Parlia-
ment. The Act brought all the Commonwealth citizens, whether or not
they held U.K. passports if neither themselves nor one of their pa¬
rents or grandparents could claim birth in the United Kingdom, na¬
turalisation in the U.K. or citizenship by registration under the
British Nationality Acts of 1548 and 1564. Most of the East African
Asians, who were generally British passport holders, did not and
could not satisfy these onerous conditions which were deliberately
inserted to stop their influx into the United Kingdom. The Act
also limited the right of entry of children under 16 years to those
joining both parents or a surviving parent and withdrew the entry
rights of student's dependants. The East African Asians were to re¬
ceive an extra annual allocation of 1500 vouchers together with
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their dependants over and above those that were slotted to Common¬
wealth citizens.
The most significant effect of this 1968 Act was, accord¬
ing to J.M. Evans:
"that it removed the right of entry from citi¬
zens of the U.K. and colonies, even though
they had no other citizenship and had no legal
claim to remain where they were, because the
territory from (sic) the connection with which
their citizenship sprang had lost its colonial
status.1'
o
During the passing of the bill, Lord Gardner estimated that 2.4 mil¬
lion citizens of the U.K. and colonies were exempt from the 1962 Act
7
but would fall within the proposed measure. And as recentfly as in
1975 it was estimated that there are 45,000 U.K. passport holders
8
with no other citizenship in East Africa alone. It is, in fact,
the latter figure of the East African Asians from Kenya that galvan¬
ised the whole British thinking'on matters of immigration from aban¬
doning its legal obligations to its citizens abroad to imposing re¬
strictive measures to control their 'inflow* into the U.K. It may
well be, as Roy Jenkins said in 1967 in his capacity as the Home Sec¬
retary, that the policy was to
"contain the flow of immigrants within our econ¬
omic and social capacity to absorb them," y
but it has never been doubted that the Act was intended to abate the
increase of Commonwealth citizens into the U.K. in the first place.
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, of which
the U.K. is a member is set up a European Commission"1'^ with a pro¬
vision that member states are to recognise the right of individuals
to petition the Commission."1"^ In one of its deliberations it had
occasion to comment on the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act of the
12
U.K. A case had been brought by C.P. PATEL , a British passport
holding Asian from East Africa alleging the contravention of Article
14 of the convention which provided that the righis and freedoms set
forth in the convention are to be secured
"without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, poli¬
tical or other opinion, national or social o-
rigin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status."
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The Commission found as a faqt that the U.K. Government had:
"not disputed that the object of the 1958 Act was
to exclude more than a liraited number of East African
Asians from entering the U.K. and further that the Act
was directed against citizens of the U.K. and colonies
resident in East Africa o.o"13
Thus, the Immigration Acts leading up to the 1971 Immigration
Act were aimed at reducing the inflow of immigrants into the U.K.
The 1971 Immigration Act which is a codifying Act may be termed as
the high water mark of the crystallization of the restrictive policy
to keep numbers of immigrants into the U.KC low. By introducing
the terra 'patrial' the Act permanently brought down the inflow of
Commonwealth citizens and citizens of the U.K. and colonies born,
naturalised, registered or adopted outside the U.K. and without a
parent or a grandparent who was so born, naturalised, registered
or adopted under the immigration control.
The theme of numbers has been a recurring one over the years,
therefore. There is no doubt that it forms a major part of the
U.K. immigration policy. Recently, the Franks Committee was set
up to consider the possibility of a register of the dependants of
immigrants still abroad. The Committee was set up as a result of
open fears that the pool of the immigrants' dependants is infinite
and it was hoped that by preparing a register of dependants it would
be demonstrated that the number of dependants was, in fact, finite.
This would have put the public fear to an end. However, the Home
Secretary rejected the preparation of such a register saying that
it would be:
"impracticable and undesirable as a means of relieving
widespread anxieties about the numbers entitled to come
to Britain in the years ahead."
The problem of numbers is, therefore, a very live one and it will
remain for a long time.
One of the contradictory consequences of the introduction of the
term 'patrial' is that it gives the right of entry and stay in the
U.K. to millions of people from Australia, Canada, Rhodesia, and New
Zealand who did not have the right of free entry since 19o2. The
only thing that they imjst satisfy, if they are not citizens of the
U.K. and colonies is that at least one of their parents or
x<ic;
grandparents was a citizen of the U.K. and colonies by birth, re¬
gistration, nauralisation or adoption in the U.K.
Secondly, there is no restriction on the number of people
15
who come from the Republic of Ireland. Both of these form a large
number of people that are eligible to come into the U.K. although
they may not be citizens of the U.K. Accordingly, a large number
of U.K. nationals is, by the device of immigration law, prevented
from freely coming and settling in the U.K.
The concern with the numbers of immigrants coming into the
U.K. in the 1971 Act is in no way new. The 1905 Aliens Act was a res¬
ponse to the great number of East Europeans coming into the U.K.
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was, according to Lord Diplock:
"to enable the Secretary of State to limit the
numbers of CommonvJealth immigrants entering
(the) U.K. It was general public knowledge
in 1962 that the problem was one of numbers.1' _
ib
Indeed, it was only in line with the existing judicial attitude when
in 1974 the Master of the Rolls himself said:
"Take the class of persons with whom we are con¬
cerned - British protected persons. They are
said to be British nationals..they are not Bri¬
tish subjects. These number, or used to num¬
ber, many millions. . .Is it to be^iid that by
international law every one of them has a right
...to come into these small islands? Surely
not. This country would not have room for them.
It is not as if it was only one or two coming.
They come not in single files, but in battalions" „
(b) Racial Tension:
It has been said that racial feelings, albeit latent, have been a fea-
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ture of antiquity in Great Britain. It is not until 1958, however,
that these racial feelings came to the surface following the Notting¬
ham and Notting Hill racial disturbances. So when in 1962 the Common¬
wealth Immigrants Bill was introduced in Parliament one M.P. complain¬
ed that:
"The Bill's real purpose was to restrict the in¬
flux of coloured immigrants. We were reluctant
to say as much openly. So the restrictions were
applied to coloured...citizens in all Common¬
wealth countries - though everybody recognised
that immigration from Canada, Australia and New
Zealand formed no part of the problem."
JL kJ
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If the 1962 Act was not so open the 1968 Commonwealth Imm¬
igrants Act left no doubt in the minds of many that it was 'racist'
in its consequences if not in intent. It was argued with passionate
force that cities congested with coloured immigrants were going to
be breeding grounds of racial violence and tension and in order to
avoid this, effective curbs had to be brought into force before the
20
advent of racial violence. Also the European Commission on Human
Rights has found the U.K. guilty of discriminatory treatment against
21
the East African Asians on grounds of race.
If the previous 1962 and 1968 Acts were not openly expres¬
sive of their racial consequences then the 1971 Immigration Act left
no doubt about this at all. Moore and Wallace have asserted that:
"the 1971 Act extended and formalised the racial
basis of immigration legislation."
The introduction of the term 'patrial' was viewed as racist in that
citizens of certain Commonwealth countries, like Canada, Australia
and New Zealand could come and settle in the U.K. without any pro¬
blems because most of them had 'close connections' with the U.K.,
whereas coloured Commonwealth citizens automatically became non-
patrials with the consequence that their entry and stay in the U.K.
was subject to immigration control. Moreover, the Act deliberately
exempted citizens of the Republic of Ireland from control although
Ireland was not a Commonwealth member. This exemption carried ra¬
cial overtones in spite of the economic, historical and geographical
reasons that have already been looked at. The Government tried to
defend its stand that the 1971 Act was not racial. In a reply, Mr.
Maudling said that:
"it must be nonsense to say that because you
recognise a family connection and your family
happen to be the same race as you, you-are
being a racialist."^
But Mr. Powell shed more light on the Act when he said that:
"there is not the slightest doubt that the prac¬
tical effect of patriality is to distinguish
between persons holding the same citizenship
status on lines which happen to coincide with
what we roughly call 'race'."'
It may well be that that Act recognises 'blood connections'
and that does not necessarily make it racial. But this must not be
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confused with the clear intention of the Act which was to control
the immigration of coloured immigrants into the U.K., as a means of
improving racial relations or, in the words of Reginald Maudling,
25
"community relations".
The most significant issue touching all the 1962, 1968
and the 1971 Acts is that immigration law in the U.K. moved from the
'contractual* concept of citizenship to the 'organic' concept (ie.
recognising only blood relationship) of citizenship. The effect of
this movement has been to deny citizenship and immigration rights
of stay and entry into the U.K. to coloured people with a stake in
the country. The unfortunate consequence is that a wave of Racial
attitude in the Immigration Acts is felt increasingly each time.
(c) Traditional Purposes:
Immigration law has, from the early times, been concerned with the
control and discipline of immigrants and also with the concern that
immigrants must not come to the U.K. and depend on its social wel¬
fare benefits or if they are undesirable. For example, the 1905
Aliens Act placed control on certain undesirable classes and these
included prostitutes, persons living on the proceeds of prostitution,
persons who were likely to be a charge on public funds having no
visible or probable means of support and persons of notoriously bad
2o
character. The 1971 Immigration Act continues the same practices
although it has raised the status of immigrants in that there are
now substantial rights of appeal under it. The basic objection to
the 1971 Act, in this respect, is that it gives a discriminatory
presumption that coloured people belong to the undesirable classes
as a result of the use of the term patrial. The present Immigration
Rules provide that immigration officers shall do their work without
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour or religion and the
27Rules are themselves to be framed on this basis. I. Macdonald
rightly submits that:
"an amendment saying that rules are not to dis¬
criminate makes nonsense within the discrimina-
)
tory framework of the Act. But, obviously, it
might give the High Court or an Immigration Tri¬
bunal .^ic^psj^tile to the spirit of the
Actj^witn which to attack its basic assumptions
either...by declaring the rules ultra vires and
void or by admitting in a particular case some¬





The Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs, when introducing
the Second Reading of the 1567 Immigration Bill complained that the
Act then in force (1956 Act):
"did not give him power to control employment
of non-citizens once they have qualified for
a resident's certificate."g
Under the 1956 Immigration Act a person who qualified for a work per¬
mit could not be removed from his employment, occupation, trade or
profession and so on afterwards. With the mounting pressure for
'Africanisation' the Government sought to change all this by giving
the Minister of Home Affairs power to control the entry, stay and
removal of all immigrants (non-citizens) and thereby allowing the
Government to give skilled Kenyans jobs that were held by non-citi¬
zens. The 1967 Act was, therefore, specifically intended to faci¬
litate the Government's policy of 'Africanising® the economy.
'Africanisation' is not a legal term. It is capable of
30
many meanings but, the Courts have said that it applies to all
citizens of Kenya irrespective of their race or colour. In SHAH
DEVSHT v TRANSPORT LICENSING BOARD31 it was held that to refuse a
company a license on grounds that it has not 'Africanised' its staff
was discriminatory on grounds of race and contrary to the constitu¬
tion. In this case, members of staff of the Shali Devshi Company were
mostly of Asian'origin although they were Kenyan citizens. The Li¬
censing Board refused to renew the company's licenses because in its
view the company had not employed enough people of African descent.
This is not the legal meaning given to the term 'Africanisation' by
the Courts. The Court was, therefore, of the view that 'Africanisa¬
tion' must be afforded to all Kenyan citizens regardless of their
colour or race. This is absolutely right.
In an important constitutional ruling the Speaker of the
National Assembly said during a debate that:
"if Honourable members have not meant Kenya-
nisation (when talking of 'Africanisation)
then they were contrary to the Constitution"
In common legal parlance the word 'Africanisation' means
affording different treatment to non-citizens of Kenya vis-a-vis
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citizens regardless of their colour, origin or race.
Having seen the legal meaning of Africanisation, the es¬
sence and role of the policy must now be assessed in relation to im¬
migration law. In 1957 27^ of all posts in the public sector and
more than 47p of all posts in the private sector were held by non-
33
citizens. This was a particularly significant improvement com¬
pared with the 1964 period when more than 41% of all posts in the _
public sector and 53% of all posts in the private sector were held
by non-citizens.^ These high figures were disconcerting to the
public and embarrassing to the Government for which it often came
under severe criticisms inside and outside Parliament. This was un¬
derstandable in view of the fact that independence had been looked
35
upon as "implying a new emphasis upon African participation" in all
the sectors of the economy. There was, therefore, a general sense
of frustration in the pre-1967 period in the public mind with dire
36
repurcussions on the stability of the country. In the light of
this situation one may be inclined to agree with D. Rothchild that:
"•Africanisation is a logical and not a venge¬
ful policy."37
The combined effect of a large percentage of non-citizens
holding jobs in Kenya and the fact that once a non-citizen got a
resident's certificate he could not be removed from his job was to
force the Government, which was already under tremendous pressure,
to change its immigration policies. A complete overhaul of the pre¬
vious Immigration Act was, therefore, necessary. The 1967 Act made
it an offence for anyone who is not a citizen of Kenya to enter or
remain in Kenya without a valid entry permit or valid pass. An en¬
try permit is by its very nature a work permit. Twelve classes of
entry permits were created (they are now 13 classes) and all people
with resident's certificates were to remain in Kenya by virtue of
their previous certificates as long as the Minister had not exer¬
cised his discretion to cancel them.
It is not surprising that a large part of the Act is de¬
voted to stipulating the means and ways of bringing non-citizens un¬
der control in matters of employment.
Certain additional measures were taken to secure the pur¬
pose of the 1967 Act. For example, it became an offence to employ
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a non-citizen without a work permit. The appropriate section pro¬
vides that:
"any person who employs any person (whether or
not for reward) whom he knows or has reason¬
able cause to believe is committing an offence
by engaging in any employment, occupation, trade
business or profession whether or not for pro¬
fit or reward without being so authorised by an
entry permit or exempted from this provision by
regulations mode under this Act shall be guilty
of an offence." 0
oo
The Courts have given this provision an extremely wide meaning by
39
holding in the case of PRABHULAL v REPUBLIC that the fact that a
non-citizen is seen attending a customer, whatever that may mean,
40
justifies the inference that he is employed. The inference is,
of course, drawn against the person employing.
Further, the Government established a Kenyanisation of
Personnel Bureau at the same time. The Bureau was charged with the
task of evaluating whether jobs available or occupied by non-citi¬
zens can be taken over by Kenyan citizens. It runs a manpower regis¬
ter which is or can be used to give jobs to Kenyans as the jobs a-
rise. Moreover, it is compulsory for all employers to supply data
to the immigration authorities on all non-citizens employed by them.
The Bureau works in lioason with the Immigration Department to ensure
that skilled Kenyans are hired or employed before a work permit can
be issued.
Unlike the U.K. Act, the Kenyan Immigration Act is not
concerned with limiting the numbers of immigrants into Kenya. The
Kenyan Act is designed primarily to secure jobs for ^Kenyans irres¬
pective of their colour, race, origin or number. It is also impor¬
tant to note that the 1967 Kenyan Act is not, like its U.K. counter¬
part, a means of improving or checking local racial relations. There
is nothing in it in any way resembling the patriality principle in
the 1971 U.K. Act#' This is not to say that there are no racial pro-
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blems. In fact, on the 5th of July, 1967 the Kenyan Government
^p
deported 5 Europeans and 7 Asians accusing them of racialism. Al¬
though the deportations were made under the immigration law for
"racial" reasons it does not mean that the 1967 Act is intended to
regulate racial relations in the same was the U.K. Act does. Under
of non-citizen lSthe Kenyan law, entry, stay and removalj^oncblood connections like
in the U.K. with the inevitable racial connotations. For that mat¬
ter, a person, regardless of his race or colour, can be admitted
into the country and allowed to remain as long as he is permitted
so to do and in appropriate cases, will be deported. It is sub¬
mitted, however, that if the Government decided to deport people on
racial grounds it would be out of the reach of the law to help a
person so discriminated under the present 1967 Act.
The Immigration Act 1967 has come under fire of a promi¬
nent M.P.that:
"the economy...will not be Africanised whilst
, the Government continues to give chances to
' foreigners to continue exploiting the good
land of our country
which, presumably, means in the words of another former M.P. that
allowing 12 classes of entry prrmits to foreigners would "nullify
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the whole Bill". This attitude is obviously extreme and would be
probably counter, productive.
(b) Traditional Purposes:
The Kenyan Act of 1967 makes provision for keeping undesirable people
out of the country. It is interesting to note that there is nothing
express in the Act to prevent people coming into Kenya if, as in the
U.K., they are coming to be a social cost to the country. This ab¬
sence of control of people with no visible means of income is only
logical in Kenya where there is hardly anything like the British so¬
cial welfare system. But the Act does indirectly prevent such people
with no visible means of income from coming to Kenya. By creating
13 classes of entry permits this enables people only with substantial
incomes or skills to come to Kenya and then only if their presence
is or will be of bewafit to Kenya it literally obliterates any chance
of a man with no substantial income and/or skill from coming to the
country.
Conclusions
It was asserted at the beginning of this chapter that the
root of the enactment of restrictive immigration laws in the U.K. and
Kenya is the same. The critical factor in both countries was the
domestic public opinion. Both countries paid heavily in terms of
international opinion for adopting exclusicnist policies. In the U.K.
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successive governments have:
"viewed the domestic costs of an unpopular free entry
policy (of coloured immigrants) as outweighing all
other factorso"^
For example, immigration was considered to form the single most
US
important issue in the 1966 General Election#. In Kenya, as it
has been noted, the overwhelming drive behind the enactment of the
1967 Act was the Africanisation policy which was generated by the local
public objection to foreigners holding positions in the country that
Kenyans should be holding. The Government, which was often cautious
about africanising the economy rapidly, was by 196? forced to recognise
that economic equality was absolutely necessary if development was
to be achieved and disaster avoided. Thus, local opinions of the
immigrants and immigration was and probably has always been the main
force or influence behind immigration lav/ in the U.Ko and Kenya.
Ultimately, whether one is talking of numbers or colour of immigrants
or the intent of immigration laws, it appears that:
"the numbers of people coming into any country will be . _
regulated by the number of jobs available in that country"^'
which the local people cannot do or do not want to do0 Should this
the
be the case? Doesn't /view of the majority in that case overstep
and offend one's sense of justice and reason? Indeed, it does and
it is questionable that Governments should bow to pressures of this
kind. But should people exert these pressures on their chosen
Governments? One can only say in the words of one writer that if
people in any country sink to this depth and overstep the barriers of
justice and reason and flout vested political and legal rights and
interests of others:
"it is because, like individuals, they have passions and
they are prone to do what is wrong while they discern what is
right."k8
Further, having regard to the system of democratic party politics
electioneering and other political and economic realities in both
countries, governments of whatever might and influence are prone to
public pressure and could indeed, similarly, enact wrong laws while
discerning what is right.
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Immigration law also forms an important cornerstone of a
state's foreign policy and-sovereignty. Thus, it is used in the:
"conduct of a state's relations with other
countries as the admission or removal of an
individual may be influenced by the Govern¬
ment's desire for good relations with the
country of which ho is a national."^
An individual may be refused entry or may be removed from a country
because of his subversive political activities. This would represent
the state's assertion of its sovereignty. We find, therefore, that
in both the U.K. and Kenya a person may be deported or refused leave
to enter for reasons of national security. This is an important po¬
wer, expressive of the sovereignty of the state. Although the num¬
ber of people likely to be refused leave to enter or deported on
50
grounds of national security is small it is still a crucial safe¬
guard in that only one person of certain political inclinations, eg.
a Communist^can cause a lot of political upheaval in a country if he
was allowed to enter andremain there freely. So governments are con¬
scious of their duty to safeguard their sovereignty with the conse¬
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REGULATION AND CONTROL OF IMMIGRANTS
United Kingdom;
(i) Pre-Departure Regulations
A non-patrial wishing to enter the United Kingdom* is required to
2
obtain an entry clearance before leaving his country. An entry clearance
3
is obtainable from a British representative in his country on application.
There are two types of entry clearances, namely, Entry Certificates and
Visas. Entry Certificates are entry clearances given to Commonwealth
citizens and citizens of the U.K. and colonies born, adopted and
registered or naturalised outside the U.Ko and Islands. Visas, on the
other hand are entry clearances given to aliens of specified foreign
countries.^ There is a large number of aliens of foreign countries,
particularly from North America and Western Europe who are all exempted
from the necessity of having to obtain a visa before departure from their
5
country. The British representatives abroad are authorised to issue
entry clearances to non-patrials only if the non-patrial meets certain
requirements of the immigration rules and other instructions by the
Secretary of State.^ An entry clearance, therefore:
"indicates that the holder's application for entry to the
U.K. has passed a preliminary scrutiny by an official British
representative overseas"J
The broad purpose of an entry clearance, it is said, is eliminating, to
a great extent, the hardship which is created by a large number of non-
patrials arriving at a U.K. port of entry only to be excluded or deported.
It has, therefore, been thought desirable that:
"the eligibility for admission ... should, as far as practicable,
be decided before (a person) starts his journey instead of it g
being left to be decided when he arrives at the port of entry."
A detailed examination of entry certificates and visas is desirable.
Entry Certificates: A person who is charged with the responsibility of
t ocn-i-i ricr Pnfr»v r>pr»+Tf"ioQ + pc! -? c* on pr.trv r'prfi fnnn+.p nffi ppt> A -n
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entry certificate was .a facility introduced for voluntary use by
Commonwealth citizens which now also applies to non-pat'rial citizens
of the U.K. and colonies not born, adopted, naturalised or register¬
ed in the U.K. It is now mandatory for a passenger seeking admission
to the U.K. as the wife, child or other dependant of a person settled
in the U.K. or a person admitted for employment other than a season¬
al worker, or as the husband or fianc^ of such a person to hold a
g
current entry certificate issued for that purpose. Arrival at a
U.K. port without an entry certificate will almost certainly mean
exclusion from entry. This has also happened in cases related to vi¬
sas, which will be looked at later. In one case, a Mrs. Loonet Gra-
liara arrived at Heathrow Airport with her husband who was settled
in the U.K. He had married her while on holiday in India. Unfortu¬
nately, the wife did not have an entry certificate and on arrival
the husband, as a settled person, was allowed into the country, but
the wife, because she lacked the necessary entry certificate, was re¬
fused entry. She was held overnight in the immigrant detention camp
at Hamondsworth. She was eventually allowed admission on compassio-
A
nate grounds, but after paying a price representative only of bruta¬
lity. As she was about to be put in the homeward bound plane one of
the security guards was shown her baby's head emerging from the womb.
The baby died."*"^
An entry certificate has become by far the most powerful
and extremely subtle instrument of a highly selective method of ad¬
mitting people into the U.K. It may well be argued that it safe¬
guards an individual from reaching Heathrow, or any port of entry,
only to be told^that he is not eligible for admission and must be
excluded. As will be seen shortly, the possession of an entry certi¬
ficate is not a guarantee that one will be admitted into the U.K.
That being so, and when one bears in mind that the general practice
of immigration officers at ports of entry is to exclude anyone with¬
out an entry certificate, it becomes clear that the purpose for which
the U.K. authorities insist on an entry certificate is that it e-
nables them to control immigration into the U.K. at source. There
is less publicity given to the refusal of an entry certificate than
to that of a person who is turned away at the port of entry. Thus,
the authorities suffer less public ard international opprobrium by
using entry certificates ss a means of denying people entry into the
U.K. This may be the reason why it was inserted in the 1971 Immi¬
gration Act that a non-patrial who arrives at a port of entry with¬
out an entry certificate when he is required to have one cannot, if
refused admission into the country, appeal against the refusal of ad¬
mission while in the U.K. He must first of all leave the country.
As was noted above, nearly all categories of dependents are required
by the Rules to have an entry certificate prior to their departure
for the U.K. So, if they arrive without one they must toe refused
admission forthwith. On the other hand, a person other than a de¬
pendent who arrives without an entry certificate is suspected to have
intentions of staying permanently in the U.K. A person faced with
exclusion in the latter case may either go to the Courts or appeal to
the adjudicator against the exclusion. If he goes to the Courts, it
has been held in R. v HOME SECRETARY ex parte SAFTRA BEGUM12 that
the function of the Court is merely supervisory and the suit does
not form part of the immigration appeal procedure and, accordingly,
if the immigration officers act in good faith, then, if they are not
satisfied that the basis relied upon had been established^that is
the end of the matter. In other words the Courtis function is mere-
l^fco check whether or not the immigration officer made his decision
in good faith and beyond that it can't go. This means that the pro¬
tection afforded by the Courts to a person who arrives at at port of
entry without an entry certificate is minimal.
If, however, the person chooses to appeal to the adjudi¬
cator, then he must first of all leave the country. In either case,
the protection afforded a non-patrial without an entry certificate
when excluded is, in reality, illusory. It is obvious, therefore,
that the acquisition of an entry permit is necessary in reality and
this must be done at the country one intends to leave from for the
United Kingdom.
In deciding whether or not to grant an entry certificate,
an entry certificate officer must pay attention to all the Rules set
out in the Statement of Immigration Rules for control of entry -
] 3
Commonwealth citizens " - and any other fact that will be relevant
in determining the precise intention of every applicant wishing to
come to the U.K."''^ and each case will be decided on its own merits.
Moreover, having determined the intention of an applicant, an entry
certificate officer may also take into account any facts or evidence
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which will enable him to determine whether or not it is genuine and
for this reason he may consider such things as the local traditions
and family ties of the applicant, the cost to the family of a person
coming to the U.K.,^ whether or not the applicant is living in poor
17
conditions in Ms home country and whether or not an unmarried mother
18
is a widow. What an Entry Certificate Officer cannot do is to
give a reason not set out in the Act of 1971 or the Rules made there¬
under as Ms ground for refusing an entry certificate to an applicant.
In R. v IMMIGRATION APPEAL TIRBUNAL EX PART SHEZADA GUZ H. KHAN19 the
entry certificate officer refused an entry certificate to an applicant
on the ground that Ms intentions were not "realistic". Para. 19 of
H.C. 81 under wMch the entry certificate officer refused the entry
certificate, so far as material, provided:
"An applicant is to be refused an entry certificate as a
student if the officer is not satisfied that the applicant
is able, and intends, to follow a full-time course of study
and to leave the U.K. on completion of it."
The ground that Ms intentions were not "realistic" was not, therefore,
open to the entry certificate officer under the Rules and he could
not base Ms decision for refusal on it. Although he is free to
consult anyone and to take into account any evidence that establishes
or tends to establish the intentions of the applicant (and whether or
not such intentions are genuine or not) an entry certificate officer
can refuse any particular class of applicants an entry clearance for
reasons set out in the Act of. 1971 and the Rules made thereunder. If
he acts otherwise, then Ms decision is reviewable and will be upset
by the adjudicator on appeal. v
The system of entry certificates:
"has become r^igid because of the ... (preoccupation)
with the elimination of doubt about discrepancies
(of those interviewed by the officers) wMch may be
caused by genuine errors or the difficulty of translating
the facts of an actual situation in the village to the
different atomosphere of a High Commission Office many
miles and a whole culture away."20
There is also a practice of reqMring the applicants to prove what
they may be asked beyond reasonable doubt and in this connection, A. Lyon
remarks that:
"this (means) that if they (entry certificate
officers) had any doubt the application (is)
rejected."
He, A. Lyon, comes to the conclusion that the overwhelming y
"barrier is the concern of officials to keep
down the number of entrants.",^
Ultimately, the function of the system of entry certificates is to
keep numbers of entrants down and viewed from this point and only
from this point it makes sense to assert that an entry certificate
is for the benefit of the applicant. A person is better off excluded
at home rather than at the port of entry. The burden that has been
placed on the applicant for an entry certificate as a result of the
official's rigidity and concern with keeping numbers low is a very
heavy one. He has to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt if he
is tcjget an entry certificate.
Visas; Aliens of certain specified countries and stateless people
must be in possession of a visa before they leave for the United
22
Kingdom. Failure to get a visa in advance will mean automatic ex-
23
elusion from entry into the U.K. The rule is so fundamental that
in every case it has been held by the Courts that an alien who arrives
at a U.K. port without a visa when it is obligatory for him to have
one has no remedy. He must, therefore, go back. In R. v CHIEF IMMI¬
GRATION OFFICER, HEATHROW AIRPORT & ANOTHER24 the Court of Appeal
approved the decision of an immigration officer who excluded the wife
of a person settled in the U.K. because she did not, inter alia, have
25
a visa from Pakistan. In another case of R. v HOME Sr.CRe.TRRY"" the
appellant was similaraly refused leave to entEr because she was with¬
out a visa.
Holders of non-national documents are also required to have
p0
valid visas at the time of arrival at a British port of entry. How¬
ever, certain refugees from alien countries v/hose nationals are re¬
quired to have visas are exempted from the strict obligation to have
a valid visa at the time of arrival. Accordingly, they can come into
27the U.K. for up to three months without the need of a visa. Once
they are in the country they are free to apply for the visas from the
Home Office.
The mere possession of a valid visa does not guarantee that
one will be admitted. This rule is like that of a person in possession
of Q valid entry certificate who on arrival is excluded. It may be
inferred from this also that the use of visas in this respect is to
control the type of people who come into the U.K. at source. With
Commonwealth countries it seems that the use of an entry certificate
is to control the numbers of people coming to the U.K., but with aliens
it seems that a visa is to keep people of objectionable influence,
for example communists, from coming to the U.K.
An entry clearance is stamped in the passport and in the
majority of cases provides that it is valid for presentation at a
U.K. port within six months from the date of issue. In ANDRQNICOU v
CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON fHEATHROW) AIRPORT28 the appellant
Mrs. A. was given such an entry clearance. On August 18, 1973 she
presented it at a port of entry in the U.K. and she was given leave
to enter in the U.K. for one month. One September 9, 1973 she left
the country. On December 16 of the same year she sought to re-enter
the U.K. of the authority ofl the same entry certificate accompanied
by two children whose names had been added to her passport on Novem¬
ber 24, 1973. She was refused leave to enter on the ground that she
was not the holder of a current entry clearance. On appeal, it was
held that the validity of her entry clearance was terminated on its
presentation and use by her on the first visit. The adjudicator
found further that her second visit was:'
"something new and unconnected with the appli¬
cation whose grounds, after consideration and
approval by the entry clearance officer...ge¬
nerated on 9"o*73 the entry clearance which
was evidence of her eligibility for entry on
18'8*73."2g
The effect of this case is that an entry clearance is expressive both
of the number of visits that may be made and of the purpose of the
visit. Without both of these an entry clearance is clearly invalid
a-
and it cannot be relied upon as ^demonstration of a person's eligibi¬
lity to the United Kingdom. Mrs. A. was not allowed to appeal in the
U.K. against exclusion on her second "visit" because not having ob¬
tained a second entry clearance and the first entry clearance being
invalid for the purpose of her second "visit" she was clearly, in law,
without an entry clearance and accordingly she was dealt with like
a person without an entry clearance. She could not, therefore appeal
against refusal of admission while in the U.K.
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The Home Office sometimes issues entry clearances that en¬
title a person to go out and come into the U.K. for any number of
times within a given period of time, normally a year. An entry clea¬
rance of this kind may be said to be expressive of time only and
not of the purpose of the visit or number of visits made during the
given time.
The Secretary of State has power to depart from the Rules
and allow a person admission into the U.K. notwithstanding that the
30
person has not met the conditions laid down by the Rules. The 1971
Act provides that:
"the adjudicator may review any determination
of a question of fact on which the decision or
action was based...(but) no decision or ac¬
tion which is in accordance with the immigra¬
tion rules shall be treated as having involved
the exercise of a discretion by the Secretary
of State by reason only of the fact that he has
been requested by or on behalf of the appellant
to depart, or to authorise an officer to depart,
from the rules and he has refused to do so."^
3P
In T. KHAN v ENTRY CERTIFICATE OFFICER, DACCA there arose the pro¬
blem whether the appellant could appeal when refused an entry cer¬
tificate after consideration of his application on a discretionary
basis, that is, civil disturbances in Bangladesh. The appellant sub¬
mitted that if the Secretary of State considered sowa. of the cases
for entry certificates outside the Rules and allowed some of the ap¬
plicants to return end refused othErs, then those refused could appeal.
The Tribunal was of the view that whereas it could not say that
those refused cannot appeal such appeals to an adjudicator must (my
emphasis) fail because of the provisions of the Act s, 19(2) of the
1971 Immigration Act. The Tribunal drew a distinction that is nugatory
in that, if in all such cases an appeal must fail, then the right
of appeal is illusory. The proper view should be that since the 1971
Act gives the Secretary of State power to exercise the discretion of
admitting non-patrials into the U.K. outside the Rules, the right of
appeal, if any, lies to the Courts, since the adjudicator has no right
to hear such appeals. In all other cases there is no right of appeal
under the Immigration Act if a "right" is understood to entail protect¬
ed interests. It is doubtful if a non-patrial has a right of appeal
to the municipal courts, in international law, against the refusal by
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the Secretary of State to admit a non-patrial pursuant to his dis¬
cretion to admit outside the Rules. This is so because there is no
known legal relationship between a foreigner wanting to enter into
another country and that country he wants to enter. Moreover, the
power to admit, tolerate, restrict or prohibit a foreigner in any
country seems to be the "prerogative" of the executive and is an ex¬
pression of the sovereignty of any state in real terms. Governments
and Courts guard against inroads into the sovereignty of their coun¬
tries very jealously.
(ii) Ports of Entry
It has been noted already that having a valid entry clear¬
ance is no guarantee for admission into the U.K. Immigration officers
are fully entitled to refuse entry to any non-patrial in certain cases.
In this section we will examine the powers of immigration officials
to refuse such entry for the following reasons, namely:
(a) where there have been false representations or a con¬
cealment of materiel facts;
(b) where there has been a change of circumstances since
an entry clearance was issued;
(c) where a person is subject to restricted returnability;
(d) where there are medical grounds justifying the refusal
of entry;
(e) on grounds of a person's criminal record;
(f) because a person is subject to a deportation order and
(g) because exclusion would be conducive to the public good.
(a) False Representations end Concealment of Material Facts
An immigration officer is entitled by the Rules to refuse entry into
the U.K. to a non-patrial notwithstanding that he has a vaild and
current entry clearance if the non-oatrial employed false representa-
33
tions or concealed material facts, whether or not to his knowledge.
R. Moore and T. Wallace have succinctly summed up the effect of this
power. In their words;the effect of the power is to make:"
"the immigration officer... free to define the
facts that ere to be considered material and is
then to treat deliberate fraud in the same way
as innocent oversight or ignorance. This single
clause puts admission entirely at the discretion
of the immigration officer."^
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This is true in fact and in lav/. It is true in fact because there
is no limitation on what an immigration officer may consider a mate¬
rial fact. It is also true in law because the Courts have held them¬
selves unable to interfere with the decision of an immigration offi¬
cer in such cases unless there was an error of law on the face of a
35
decision or unless the officer failed to do his duty. Both the
negative and the positive aspects of the power of the immigration
officers are extensive and perhaps equally disturbing. Lord Widgery
has, for example, held that:
"there is no obligation on the officers to make
any inquiries on their own initiative... they
could merely stand at their bench and wait for
the intending entrant to say what he had to
say. They must act in good faith, but if they
v/ere not satisfied that the basis relied upon
had been established, that was the end of the
matter." _
This is an aspect of the negative nature of the power of immigration
officers under the immigration lav; which has serious implications.
On the positive aspect, the immigration officer may ask any questions
he considers material provided he does it in good faith. It now ap¬
pears that it is probably not possible, or at any rate not easy, for
an immigration officer to commit an error of lav/ when acting pursuant
to the above pov/er. This follows from the holding of Lord Widgery
that the powers and duties of immigration officers which are^
"specifically described...as rules of practice
...(are) not part of the Immigration Act 1971.
This implies that an error of law can be committed only if the error
contradicts a provision of the Immigration Act 1571. It need not be
said that the Immigration Act 1971 has not attempted to list the con¬
siderations an immigration officer may take into account in such
cases and that being so, it becomes hard to see how an immigration
officer can commit an error of law. The statements above were made
in a case of a non-patrial who arrived v/ithout a visa which she was
required to have under the Rules. There is no difference with a case
where an immigration officer has decided to refuse admission to a
non-patrial with a current entry clearance in pursuance of his power
under the Rules. The only "benefit" a non—patrial with a current en¬
try clearance has is that when admission to the U.K. depends on proof
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of facts entailing enquiries either in the U.K. or overseas the im¬
migration officer could confirm the truthfulness or otherwise of the
facts asserted by the non-petrial. But this "benefit" is of limited
use only since the inadvertent om/iission of facts either at the of¬
fice of the entry certificate officer overseas or at the port of en¬
try is enough to constitute sufficient reasons for exclusion no mat¬
ter how innocent the ommission was. This sometimes makes an arrival
without an entry clearance more attractive since an innocent ommis-
sion of facts is less likely to be used against him than if he had
uttered them before. But any real difference hardly exists. Part
of the reason for this problem is that the Rules do not form dele-
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gated legislation in the technical sense. This really is the
point from which problems arise. In HOME SECRETARY v PLRUSHOTHAMAN^
the GiUeen's Bench Division held that in an appeal by a non-patrial
to an adjudicator against the decision of an immigration officer the
adjudicator must take into account any question of fact on which
the original decision was based. An appeal to the Tribunal from an
adjudicator, where possible^ does not depend just on matters of law;
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it also depends on matters of fact. That being so it follows that
adjudicators and the Tribunal have extensive powers to assess the de¬
cision of immigration officers whether on points of fact or on points
of law. But according to Lord Widgery the Court has no power to so
review the decisions of immigration officers; presumably because a
decision of an immigration officer is not justiciable and because
the Courts do not form part of the appeals system under the Immigra¬
tion Act 1971. But it is clear on authority that an adjudicator who
refuses to apply his mind afresh to the facts in an appeal by a non-
patrial commjts an error of law on the face of the record and Courts
will invariably review his decision.^ Presumably this may be the
case with the Tribunal. What emerges from all this is that whereas
the Courts will not review the decision of an immigration officer
if he has acted in good faith, they will review the decision of ad¬
judicators and the Tribunal. In most cases adjudicators do accept
the decisions of immigration officers on the basis of the reasons
given by them. If a person appeals to an adjudicator against'refusal
of an immigration officer to admit him and the adjudicator disallows
the appeal on exactly the same grounds as those of the immigration
officer, then, it appears from the analysis of the above cases that
the Courts may review the decision. But it has no power to review
a decision of the immigration officer unless there has first been an
appeal to the adjudicator or Tribunal, as the case may be. Now,
that is absurd. It would appear that an appeal to an adjudicator
or the Tribunal vests an issue with justiciability thus enabling
the Courts to review their decisions. There is simply no magic a-
bout an appeal to adjudicators or the Tribunal. It is true, however,
that Parliament has provided an appeals system that as a general
policy anyone looking for a redress must follow it. The Courts are
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right to insist on that as indeed they have done. But that is a
different matter from saying that they have no power of review of
immigration officer's decisions - even in appropriate cases. There
is nothing to require them to do this in the Immigration Act. In a-
dopting this attitude, it seems that the Courts are themselves fett¬
ering their own discretion and detracting from the principle that
they have residual powers in all matters. It is also contradictory
and against the principle of judicial precedent to hold that the po¬
wers of immigration officers vis-a-vis the Courts are almost abso¬
lute and at the same time to hold that the same powers of the same
immigration officers must be assessed almost de novo vis-a-vis the
adjudicators and the Tribunal.
In all other cases where an immigration officer comes to
the conclusion, by whatever, means, that a non-patrial has misrepre¬
sented or concealed material facts (whatever that may mean) and whe¬
ther that is done deliberately or not he, the immigration officer,
must exclude that person from entry into the U.K. But should he ad¬
mit that person into the U.K. notwithstanding that it is against any
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one of the Rules then it is probably the end of the matter. Thus,
a non-patrial has been refused leave to enter at a port of entry by
on immigration officer because his entry clearance as a student had
been obtained by misrepresentation to and concealment of facts from
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the immigration officer. In another case, permission was refused
because on the facts before the immigration officer (including infor¬
mation from relatives named) and taking into account the background
of the appellant he was found not to be a genuine visitor arid from
this it was concluded that he must have obtained his entry clearance
A C
by misrepresentation. - In the case of IMMIGRATION OFFICER, RAMSGATE v
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COQRAY leave to enter was refused by an immigration officer in a
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formal notice worded as follows:
"You have asked for leave to enter the United
Kingdom as a visitor for 8 weeks, but as you
are penniless I am not satisfied that you can
support yourself for this period without work¬
ing. I, therefore, refuse you leave to enter."
The immigration officer refused leave to Mr. Cooray under para. 12
of H.C. 79 the material part of which provides:
"Entry certificates are issued in accordance
with the rules contained in this statement:
A passenger who holds an entry clearance
which was duly issued to him and is still
current is not to be refused leave to enter
unless the immigration officer is satisfied
that:
(a) false representations were employed or
material facts were concealed, whether or not
to the holder's knowledge, for the purpose of
obtaining the entry clearance.
(b) a change of circumstances since it was is¬
sued has removed the basis of the holder's
claim to admission."
On appeal to an adjudicator the adjudicator refused leave
to the immigration officer to amend the notice of refusal and ruled
that matters in issue in an appeal were confined to the grounds set
out in the notice of refusal and that there was no proviso which
would permit the amendment of that notice. The immigration officer
had refused entry also on the ground that there had been a "change
of circumstances" since the clearance was issued in as much aS Cooray
was penniless on arrival, but the adjudicator ruled that insuffi¬
ciency of funds was not a ground on which the holder of entry clea¬
rance could be refused leave to enter under para. 12 of H.C. 79.
He, therefore, reversed the decision of the immigration officer.
On appeal by the immigration officer the Tribunal held that there
was a concealment of material facts and a change in the circumstances
of Mr. Cooray. In allowing the appeal the Tribunal held that the ad¬
judicator should have taken into account all matters pertaining to
the decision appealed against and not confine himself to the grounds
given in the notice of refusal. It further held that refusal of
leave to enter is a civil matter, and in civil matters a Court
would allow an amendment if it could be mads as in this case, with¬
out any injustice to the other side. This latter holding is obiter
and it seems to be an oversimplification to call the immigration
appeals civil matters. As to the first holding, the Tribunal was
right since it has been held that it is the legal duty of an adjudi¬
cator as on appellate body to apply his mind to any appeal problem
afresh and to determine what in his judgement was the correct exer-
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cise of discretion.
A mere intention to do anything other that what an entry
clearance was given for constitutes a ground for an immigration offi-
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cer to refuse a person entry into the country. Such an intention
amounts to a concealment of or a misrepresentation of material facts.
The immigration officer or the adjudicator need not and probably will
not go behind the intention. For example, the fact that one has no
means of enabling him to put o. wish into effect need not be consi¬
dered. Thus, the face value of an intention is a sufficient ground.
It follows from this that immigration authorities, the adjudicators
and the Tribunal will refuse entry to a person as long as there has
been misrepresentation of material facts. They are not concerned
with whether the misrepresentation relates to ineligibility; for ex¬
ample, a showing that the misrepresentation, in order to be held ma¬
terial, concealed facts which might have resulted in a proper refusal
of an entry clearance. On the proper construction of the Act and the
rules made thereunder there is nothing to stop the immigration offi¬
cers, the adjudicators and the Tribunal from taking this attitude.
It is a harsh rule that says a mere misrepresentation per se and
without more constitutes a ground for refusal of entry. The practice
of refusing entry on "proof" of a misrepresentation per se is con¬
trary to the principles of good administration. This is undoubtedly
the case where the rules require, as they indeed do, that the misrep¬
resentation need not be intentional.
(b) Where There Has Been a Change of Circumstances
A change of circumstances since an entry clearance was issued which
removes the basis of a holder's claim to admission is a ground for
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the immigration officer to refuse one entry into the country. Any
change of circumstance would, it appears, constitute a ground for
refusal of entry by an immigration officer. This would not preclude
on adjudicator from considering the change of circumstances in an ap¬
propriate appeal and in that he may allow the person entry into the
U.K. notwithstanding the refusal of entry by an immigration officer
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an that basis." The import of this provision is clearly that an
entry certificate officer gives non-patrials an entry clearance only
if the latter satisfies certain conditions, particularly the rule$#
which he has to meet at the time of his application for admission at
a port of entry before an immigration officer. An entry clearance
being a prima facie satisfaction of the conditions is clearly invalid
if the purpose for which it was given has expired or changed. As was
noted earlier, the purpose is circumscribed both in time of and rea¬
sons for the visit. For this reason it would appear that an immigra¬
tion officer will be entitled to refuse entry to a child who, at the
time of entry is over 18 years old and who is not a dependent although
the child was under 18 years at the time he obtained his entry clea¬
rance.
In one case, the Tribunal has ruled that in an appeal a-
gainst refusal of an entry clearance by an entry certificate officer
an adjudicator may, in certain cases, consider a subsequent change
of circumstances of a non-patrial which would otherwise have formed
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a basis for a new application of an entry clearance. It is simi¬
larly submitted that adjudicators and the Tribunal have power to look
at each case and determine whether a subsequent change of circum¬
stances removes the former claim for admission is one in which to ex¬
ercise discretion in favour of a non-patrial nothwithstanding that
evidence of such subsequent change of circumstances was not before
the immigration officer because it was non-existant then. In a rec¬
ent case, the Tribunal ruled that it would not lay down a:
"hard and fast direction...since facts in ap¬
peals were infinitely variable.
go
In that case of HOME SECRETARY v THAKERAR the Secretary of State
appealed against the decision of the adjudicator who allowed the ap¬
peal of the respondent on grounds that were not before the Secretary
of State at the time of application for renewal of leave to stay by
the resoondent. Although the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the Sec¬
retary of State on other grounds, it held that since:
"immigration appeals arise from facts which are
infinitely variable..."
it would not be possible to lay down a hard end fast rule. For that
reason it was clear to the Tribunal that:
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"a pragmatic approach to the problem involv¬
ing questions of expediency is necessary if
as much justice as possible is to be done
between the parties (and) the application
of legal precedents in vacuo could obviously
lead to unjust results.
The Tribunal gave a liberal interpretation to the rule but in the
case of ENTRY CERTIFICATE OFFICER, LAHORE v ABDULLAH it has been
ruled that such a liberal interpretation must not be applied in every
case. In other words, a departure from the rules must not be 15ght-
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ly made. In the case of Abdullah above it was held that evidence
of subsequent facts which if before the immigration officer might
have influenced his decision by indicating some change in the appli¬
cant's original circumstances should normally form the basis of a
further application. Although this rule of practice must not be de¬
parted from lightly it must loot, on the other hand, be applied in¬
flexibly. Thus, the Tribunal has held that an adjudicator should
have admitted "new" evidence in a case in which evidence relevant
to an application for entry as a visitor arose during the period of
two years between the date of the application and the appeal hearing
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before the adjudicator. To have required him to make a fresh ap¬
plication would have been unduly onerous having regard to the parti¬
cular circumstances of the case.
Where, however, new evidence is before an immigration of¬
ficer and that evidence has arisen since the issue of an entry clea¬
rance then the immigration officer is duly entitled to refuse entry
on the ground that the subsequent circumstances since it was issued
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have removed the basis of the holder's claim fotr admission." In
this case it is a matter of straightforward appeal to an adjudicator
who shall look at the whole issue afresh.
Refusal for Restricted Returnability
Immigration officers may also refuse entry into the United Kingdom
to holders of a current entry clearance on grounds of restricted
returnability unless such holder is being admitted into the U.K. for
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settlement. If his permission to enter into another country has
to be exercised before a given date, the length of his stay in the
U.K. should be restricted so as to terminate at least two months be-
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fore that date. It is not clear what will happen if the person so
admitted overstays in the country beyond the time allowed to him to
exercise his right to return. Overstaying constitutes a criminal
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offence , but on the other hand, the person overstaying is regard¬
ed as ordinarily resident and may, in certain circumstances, confer
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settlement rights on the person. If the passport or travel docu¬
ment of the person is endorsed with a restriction on the period for
which he may remain outside his country of normal residence, his
stay in the U.K. should be limited so as not to extend beyond the
period of authorised absence. The holder of a travel document issued
by the Home Office should not be given leave to enter for a period
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exceeding beyond the validity of the document.
(d) Refusal on Medical Grounds
This ground has been invoked in several cases. Except for EEC nation¬
als there are no diseases or medical grounds listed as constituting
health hazards to the community. It is, therefore, left to the med¬
ical inspector to determine whether in his view a person is medical¬
ly undesirable to come into the U.K. As a rule, a passenger who in¬
tends to remain in the U.K. for more than six months should normally
be referred to the medical inspector for examination, as should any
passenger who mentions health or medical treatment as his reason for
his visit, nnd any person who appears mentally or physically abnor-
66
mal. An immigration officer has a general discretion to refer any-
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one person for medical examination. The rules are the only indica¬
tion we have of the fact that a person may be ineligible for entry
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on medical grounds and on physical or mental grounds. Presumably
these include people suffering from feeble-mindedness, narcotic drug
addicts, insanity, psychopathic personalities and dangerous diseases.
If, on examination of a passenger, the medical inspector is satisfied
that the person is unfit for medical reasons to be admitted into the
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U.K. then he must give a certification of that fact. In AL-TU'.VAIDJT
v CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON (HEATHROW1 AIRPORT70 the Tri¬
bunal held that in the absence of "strong, compassionate reasons"
the certificate of the medical inspector refusing admission is bind¬
ing on an immigration officer who cannot depart from it. The medi¬
cal certificate must, to be binding on an immigration officer, state
specifically that:
"I have medically examined the above-named en¬
trant and I consider he is suffering from...
I hereby certify that it is undesirable for
medical reasons to admit the entrant.
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Thus, where a medical inspector, after an examination, gave a certificate
saying that:
"in view of heart disease, candidate is medically unfit.
Entry not recommended 0.."
it was held by the Tribunal that an immigration officer was not bound
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by the medical inspector's recommendation. It was recognised by
the Tribunal that the medical inspector's powers to deprive a person
of his power of qualification to enter the U.K. is wide and because
of this his power must be confined to the strict letter of the
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immigration rule.
It is submitted that in view of the wording of the rules that:
"where the medical inspector advises for medical
reasons it is undesirable to admit the passenger ..."
a passenger may not be refused entry if at the date of entry the
passenger's defect or disease, mental or physical, has been permanently
cured or arrested. But even here there are doubts as well. For
Example, a person who suffered from tuberculosis which is now cured
may be suffering from pulmonary fibrosis, a physical defect occurring
from the attack of tuberculosis which might interfere with the ability
to earn a living. Such a person could, conceivably, be excluded from
entry on medical grounds0 The categories of defects and diseases
are largely unlimited and for this reason it appears that the power
of a medical inspector to exclude a person on medical grounds would
almost make an immigration officer's mouth watere
A person who refuses to submit to medical examination will be
7)
refused leave to enter0 There will be occasions when this
provision will contravene a person's rights. For example, a person
may object, conscientiously, to medical examination on religious
grounds. Although this may not be kindly or even sympathetically
listened to one must accept or recognise that religious freedom
might entail a refusal to be medically examined0 As far as an
immigration officer is concerned, that fact of objection to medical
examination gives him the right to refuse entry and he is not expected •
and cannot probably be expected to be concerned with questions of
human rights0
Returning residents or wive3 and children under 18 of people
settled in the U.K. should not be refused leave to enter on
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medical grounds. This exception is important Tor its recognition
of family ties end state responsibility towards people it has a res¬
ponsibility for.
The most important provision in the area of refusal of en¬
try on medical grounds is that an immigration officer has a discre¬
tion to admit a person into the country contrary to the order of a
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medical inspector if there are strong compassionate reasons. A
passenger can, therefore, appeal on the ground that there are strong
compassionate circumstances, but he cannot appeal on the ground that
the medical inspector's advice was not warranted on the medical evi¬
dence where the medical inspector's advice is imperative and not a
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mere recommendation. What then constitutes a compassionate rea¬
son?
What will constitute a compassionate reason will vary from
case to case, depending on the particular circumstances of each such
case. Thus, in LTBERTO v IMMIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON (HEATHROWV ATR-
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PORT it was held by the Tribunal that it did not constitute com¬
passionate reasons to seek entry merely because one has commenced
civil proceedings in the U.K. and the cost of taking evidence on
commission abroad would be costly matter - the person was not poor —
and that a witness should appear before a judge and enable an impres¬
sion to be formed as to whether he was a reliable or an unreliable
witness. Civil proceedings do not, therefore, amount to "strong, com¬
passionate reasons".
In ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER, BOMBAY v 5AZHA79 the respondent
who was 30 years old was severely retarded mentally. It was agreed
that she was in need of care and attention, but an entry certificate
was refused on the recommendation of an official medical referee and
on the view of the entry certificate officer that strong compassionate
reasons did not exist. She appealed against the decision on the
ground that her half-brother in the U.K. who had agreed to take care
of her was thegiving relative who could care for her and that thereA
were strong compassionate reasons for her admission. In India where
she came from she had lived with her cousin who was a paid, but an
unwilling custodian. There were no problems of accomodation in the
U.K. and she was not coming to take employment. In the circumstances
the half-brother was the only person who could care for her. On the
basis of that evidence, it was held by the adjudicator and the Tribunal
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that there existed sufficient strong compassionate reasons and she
had to be granted an entry certificate.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these two cases is
that to constitute strong compassionate reasons one must have com¬
pelling grounds. The Tribunal itself, in an attempt to define strong
compassionate reasons described it as reasons which are "totally
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exceptional and of a compelling nature". The standard is, there¬
fore, very high and it follows that it is only in a few cases - so
far only one - that an immigration officer will admit a passenger
into the country contrary to an imperative certificate of a medical
inspector on grounds of compassionate reasons.
(e) Refusal on Grounds of a Criminal Record
A passenger with a criminal record may be refused admission
by an immigration officer notwithstanding that he (the passenger)
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has a valid and current entry certificate. The miles provide
specifically that a passenger, other than the wife or child under 18
of a person settled in the U.K. who has been convicted in amy country,
including the U.K., of an offence included in the list of extradition
crimes contained in the 1st Schedule to the Extradition Act 1870
(as amended by subsequent enactments) should be refused leave to
enter unless the immigration officer considers admission justified
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for strong, compassionate reasons. The word 'should' has been
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interpreted as being mandatory and, accordingly, in the absence of
8ii
reasons that are ... "totally exceptional and of a compelling nature"
the immigration officer has no discretion but to refuse admission.
The problem, however, places an intolerable task on an immigration
officer because there are a lot of legal technicalities and problems
involved in it. Normally there is no problem where a person has
been convicted of a crime forming one of the many crimes listed in
8q
the Extradition Act 1870-1935 of the U.K. In that case, all
the immigration officer does (assuming, of course, he knows ofthe
criminal record of the passenger) is refuse admission in the absence
of strong compassionate reasons. Equals, there is no problem where
a passenger has been convicted of a crime abroad which does not
form part of the crimes listed by the Extradition Acts. In that
case, the immigration officer cannot consider it under this provision
and he cannot, therefore, refuse admission by virtue of or under
the provision. In all cases where the person has been previously
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convicted in the U.K. for committing a crime forming part of the list
of those listed, the immigration officer must also refuse admission
in the absence of strong, compassionate reasons. But in all these
cases an immigration officer should, if he is to do his duties ade¬
quately, look.at the offences for which a person is or has been con¬
victed of and satisfy himself that the offences have all the essential
elements (in law) of a crime listed in the Extradition Acts. This
is a formidable task for which an immigration officer will normally
lack the skill. The problem of "essential elements" arises from the
fact that under the Extradition Acts, a crime is extraditable if it
would constitute one or more of the offences listed if it were com-
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mitted in England or within the English jurisdiction.
It is not clear what the word "conviction", as used in the
rule above, means. Presumably the meaning ascribed to it under the
Extradition Acts applies to it. In that case:
"conviction or convicted do not include or
refer to a conviction which under foreign
law is a conviction for contumacy..."g^
but unlike the Extradition Acts, it does not include an accused per¬
son. However, conviction extends to a conviction contrary to natural
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justice and, accordingly, a passenger convicted of any of the of¬
fences listed, but in absentia will fall within the purview of the
power of an immigration officer for exclusion from admission. But
the immigration officer must satisfy himself that the essential ele¬
ments of the offence for which he was so convicted are the same as
those of English law. It appears also that the immigration officer
is to restrict himself to the elements of an offence under English
law and cannot, for example, consider the essential elements of the
offence under Scottish law, if any.
Reference to the list of offences under the Extradition
Act 1B7Q (and amending Acts) would seem to impose on an immigration
officer a duty to consider whether or not the conviction of an alleg¬
ed offence was of a political character or not. An immigration of¬
ficer is obviously ill-equipped to deal with this kind of problem.
The rules do, in this respect, also impose a formidable task on him.
The rule above is also totally silent as to whether or not
a passenger, who has been convicted of an offence, under the Extra¬
dition Acts, but has been pardoned by a competent authority, will be
155
excluded from admission. A pardon granted before or during prose¬
cution, but before conviction, would probably remove a passenger
from the scope of the rule. But if he is pardoned after convection
he will probably be ineligible for admission under the rule. Pass¬
engers who are convicted of crimes in the Extradition Acts, but
whose sentences have been suspended will, probably, not be eligible
for admission under the rule.
The rule is also totally silent on whether or not juvenile
offenders who are convicted of any of the listed crimes are ineligible
for admission under the rule. If a "literal" meaning is attached to
the definition of the word "conviction" above, it would appear that
convicted juvenile offenders must be excluded under the rule in the
absence of strong, compassionate reasons.
In LANGRIDGE v HOME SECRETARY89 the appellant, a school
teacher, was convicted in Hong Kong of a drug offence which was an
extraditable offence under the Extradition Acts. When she was releas¬
ed from prison, she came to the U.K. with a valid Department of Employ¬
ment voucher, but on arrival she was refused leave to enter on the
ground of her criminal record. On appeal, she pleaded for admission
on compassionate grounds, that is, that before she applied for an em¬
ployment voucher she had been assured by the British High Commission
Office that such an offence would not prohibit the issue of a voucher;
that she wished to marry a U.K. citizen in England (there was no con¬
tract of marriage, but it might have been imminent); and that she had
close connections with the U.K. It was held that those reasons did
not constitute sufficient compassionate grounds under the rule. The
Tribunal took other things into account, for example, the likely ef¬
fect on pupils and their parents.
It is interesting to note that in the above case the Tri¬
bunal considered the lil^Lihood of the appellant not ever committing
the offence in the future , although it declined to make a ruling on
it. The rule of excluding passengers with criminal records is based
pgit son
on the fact that an offence was committed for which a was convicted.
As long as those two elements are present, one is not required to
look at the future conduct of the passenger. The rule presumes all
non-patrials who have committed the specified offences and have been
convicted irrebutably "guilty" and to consider their likely future
conduct would not only be speculative, but a negation of the rule.
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(0 Refusal on Deportation Grounds
A passenger who is currently subject to a deportation order is to.be
refused leave to enter although he has a valid and current entry clas-
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ranee." If he wishes to make representations, he should be advised
that on return to his own country it will be open to him to apply for
revocation of the order and, where appropriate, that he will have a
SI
right of appeal if revocation is refused. ' An appeal against a re¬
fusal to enter shall be dismissed by the adjudicator if he is satis¬
fied that the appellant was at the time of the refusal subject to a
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deportation order. The effect of this is that a person subject to
a deportation order must be refused admission into the country and
he has no right of appeal. Moreover, such a person has no right of
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appeal against refusal of an entry clearance" and it follows, there¬
fore, that he will generally have no chance of entry under the law.
He may, however, apply for a revocation of a deportation order to
which he is subject by the Home Secretary. If revocation is refused
he has a right of appeal." In most cases the Home Secretary will
refuse the revocation of such a deportation order if the person has
a criminal record or he has disobeyed immigration regulations to
which he may be or may have been subject. Thus, the Home Secretary
has refused revocation of a deportation order where a person gained
entry into the country by false pretences and overstayed for a con-
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siderable time knowingly in contravention of the law. The fact
that he was separatedfrom his wife and two children for one year be¬
fore he sought a revocation did not constitute compassionate reasons.
In another case, the Home Secretary refused to revoke an order made
a few weeks after a deportation was made following a failure to cam-
ply with conditions of stay."7 The appellant also left his wife
and three children in the U.K. By the time the appeal got to the
Tribunal he had been out of the country for three years. The Tribu¬
nal upheld the decision of the Secretary of State, but stated that
in view of the appellant's anxiety as to the circumstances and where¬
abouts of his family in the U.K. the Secretary of State might consi¬
der it proper to review the orderj he is not bound to revoke the
order.
(g) Refusal on Grounds Conducive to the Public Good
Finally, a passenger may also be refused entry by an immigration officer
on grounds conducive to the public good. Any passenger except the
wife or child under 18 of a person settled in the U.K. may be re¬
fused leave to enter on the ground that his exclusion is conducive
to the public good where:
(i) the Secretary of State has personally directed
so, or
(ii) from the information available to the immigra¬
tion officer it seems right to refuse leave to enter on that ground
if, for example, in the light of the passenger's character, conduct
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or associations it is undesirable to give him leave to enter.
Where the Secretary of State personally certifies that he has given
directions for the passenger not to be given entry into the U.K. on
the ground that his exclusion is conducive to the public good then
that person must be excluded from entry and he has no right of appeal.
The possession of a valid and current entry clearance will be of
no assistance in this case as will be a plea of admission for com¬
passionate reasons.
The power exercisable by immigration officers under the a-
bove rule to refuse leave to enter on grounds conducive to the public
good must not be lightly used or in trivial circumstances, the Tri¬
bunal has so held."*"^ This probably means that the discretion of the
immigration officer must be used cautiously and with circumspection.
However, the possession of canabis, though small in amount by a pas¬
senger constitutes a ground that justifies a refusal of entry by an
immigration officer.^"* It is also recognised that the rule is design
ed to deal with "undesirables" wanting to enter the country and^ be¬
cause of that it is impassible to enumerate or to define the types
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of circumstances in which the power may be used.
There is no guide on whether an "undesirable" passenger re¬
fused entry by an immigration officer may be admitted if appropriate
compassionate or compelling reasons for admission exist. It is sub¬
mitted that in such cases there should be admission, otherwise the
rule would be an inflexible principle in vacuo and likely to inflict
considerable injustice in deserving cases.
The really difficult issues arise from words like conduct
and associations of a person. In the absence of a definition of the
words a passenger may find himself refused entry for his pas-^ conduct
or association, whatever that may mean. Does association with a
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prescribed organisation for the purposes of obtaining employment,
food rations or other essentials of living amount to a ground for
refusal of entry, though? How about membership of a trade union for
the purpose of retaining one's profession? It is submitted that the
rule is not intended to be used for wholesale exclusion of passengers
who have accidentally, artificially or unconciously or in aopearance
only been associated with what the Secretory of State or Immigration
Officers may, in their discretion , consider bad associations. As
far as possible, the rule should be restricted to people seeking en¬
try for the purpose of engaging in activities that would be prejudi¬
cial to the public interest or endanger the welfare, safety or sec¬
urity of the country. But even in this there should be exceptions.
There is a famous U.S.A. case in which an individual, who actively
professed pacifism and advocated all opposition to conscription, was
admitted into the country for the purpose of taking part in discussion
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groups on the subject. The unpopularity of the subject in the U.S.A.
was not ground in itself rendering the passenger ineligible. It
would follow that the ground for exclusion frdm entry must be engag¬
ing in prohibited activities on arrival in the country. Thus, mere-
Or"
iy because people do not like, say, a film on the sex life/Jesus
should not of itself be a ground for refusing entry of a person if
he is merely coming to discuss the subjectir-'In all the above cases
an immigration officer can, for the purpose of determining whether
to admit a non-patrial into the country or refusing the admission,
search a passenger and his baggage for any document he wishes to see
and can seize anything he finds. In one case, a Danish woman was re¬
fused leave to enter into the U.K. with three men in whose vehicle,
after a search, was found a large quantity of canabis resin.The
adjudicator took the view that the rule permitting exclusion on
grounds of public good was wide enough to cover those passengers a-
gainst whom strong and reasonable suspicion exists of criminal acti¬
vities or associations or moral turpitude or both. The aopellant
seemed to fit in this description because she hod left her child and
husband in Denmark and pursued an "informal life style" in Morocco
and after her money ran out, survived by begging and scrounging.
The Tribunal upheld the adjudicator's decision and rejected the argu¬
ment that it was necessary for the immigration officer to spell out
what part of the public good was being safeguarded by her exclusion.
Finally, it was decided in a recent case of R. v HOME SEC¬
RETARY EX PARTE 8ADAIKE (The T-Vrr-'S. May 4, 1977 at p. 10) that there
being no provision for what form "a notice in writing" giving leave
to enter as required by s. 4(l) of the 1971 Immigration Act had to
take the absence of anything fuller than the stamp in the passport
of a passenger did not invalidate the permission to enter. In other
words, a stamp in the passport of a passenger endorsed by an immigra¬
tion officer constituted a notice in writing giving leave to enter
the country as required by s. 4(l) of the Act.
We will now examine the categories of people who may enter
the U.K. for various purposes. Unfortunately, due to a limitation
on the number of words EEC nationals will not be examined in any sec¬
tion .
(iii) Coming for Temporary Purposes
There are three categories of passengers who may be class¬
ified as coming into the U.K. for temporary purposes end they are vi¬




A passenger - seeking entry into the U.K. as a visitor is to be ad¬
mitted if he satisfies the immigration officer that he is genuinely
(emphasis supplied) seeking entry for the period of the visit as
stated by him and can, without working, support himself and any de¬
pendents for the period and meet the cost of his return or onward
journey. Visitors coming to stay with relatives or friends are to
be admitted if the immigration officer is satisfied that no more
than a visit is intended and that the support available is adequate.
In all other cases, leave to enter should be refused if the immigra¬
tion officer is not so satisfied and, in particular, leave to enter
should be refused where there is reason to believe that the passen¬
ger's real purpose is to take employment or that he may become a
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charge on public funds if admitted.
As has been noted elsewhere, "should" is a mandatory
term. It follows, therefore, that a visitor whose real intention is
to take employment or become a charge on public funds or even settle
in the U.K. must be refused leave to enter. For this purpose if the
immigration officer is not satisfied for whatever reasons, that a
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visitor's intentions are Mub genuine, e.g. that he will take employment
once admitted he must refuse leave to enter to the passenger. A
visitor may be a tourist, a person visiting relatives, a person coming
for medical treatment, a businessman or a passenger in transit. Before
examining the methods of determining the intention of a visitor, some
general matters must be mentioned here0 A visitor who satisfies
an immigration officer that he is genuinely seeking entry for the
purpose of a visit, can support himself during his stay, does not
intend to take up employment and that he can meet the cost of his
return or onward journey (which, mainly,neans that the visitor must
have a return or onward transit ticket) should normally be admitted
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for six months. The period should not be restricted to less than
six months unless it is justified by special reasons, for example,
in cases of restricted returnability, or if the passenger is due to
leave the U.K. on a particular charter service, or in transit to
another country, or his case ought to be subject to early review by
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the Home Office. In one case, a passenger was given only three
months leave of stay on the ground that his original intention was
to visit his "relatives" for three months although he had later
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intentions of staying longer than that. A visitor who intends
to stay shorter than six months will, therefore, be permitted to
stay for that period he asks.
A visitor who has been granted leave to enter and remain in
/
the country for, say, six months may wish to stay for a longer time
than the time he is given leave to stay. In that case, the
immigration officer should readily allow that person leave to remain
in the country for a longer time if the former is satisfied that the
person is able to maintain himself and his dependants, if any, for
that longer time he asks.^^ However, it is rare for an immigration
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officer to grant, in that case, more than 12 months stay in the country.
Anyone wishing to stay longer than 12 months should, near the end
of that period, apply to the Home Office for an extension of his stay.
Usually, a condition prohibiting taking employment is imposed
on visitors. ^ No such restriction may be placed on the nationals
of EEC member states unless, in view of personal conduct, it is
112^
necessary to do so. For the purpose of determining who an EEC
national is, the rules provide that an
J.O!
"EEC national means a national of one of the
other member countries of the community....
except that a passenger, who is:
(a) a national of the Netherlands solely by
birth in or other connection with Surinam or
the Antilles or
(b) a national of France solely by birth or
other connection with one of the French Over¬
seas dependent territories,
is not on that account to be regarded as an
EEC national.c115
Dutch and French black African citizens are, by this rule, not EEC
nationals and should, accordingly, have a prohibition barring them
from taking employment if and when admitted into the U.K.
Even if no prohibition is imposed, non-EEC nationals can¬
not take employment for which a work permit is required, but there
appears to he nothing to stop a Commonwealth citizen from taking such
an employment in the circumstances.
The rules are equally restrictive on people coming to stay
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with relatives. An immigration officer must be satisfied that
no more than a visit is intended and that the support available is
adequate. In the final analysis, whether a visitor is coming to stay
with his relatives or is going to be self-supporting, the immigration
officer must, in addition to the above conditions, be satisfied that
the visitor intends to leave the U.K. at the end of his stay. If a
visitor, during his stay in the U.K., wishes to remain there in some
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other temporrary capacity , eg. as a student or "au pair" girl, he
or she must request permission from the immigration authorities.
Provided the requirements for the new capacity are satisfied, the
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change of capacity will be granted as requested. A person who
wants to change his capacity, thus, runs the risk of getting a refu¬
sal on the ground that he had the desire or intention of changing
his capacity before he came to the U.K. and, accordingly, his ori¬
ginal entry was based on deception of the immigration officers. The
Tribunal has ruled that:
"the immigration rules were not designed to al¬
low persons, whose real ourpose in coming to
this country (U.K.) was to study, to enter un¬
der the false pretence that they came for no
purpose other than a short visit. Such persons
could not reasonably exoect that, having pres¬
ented the Home Office with the fait accompli
of compliance with the formal requirements for
students, they had a right to stay on in that
capacity."121
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The unfortunate girl in this case had complied with all the other
formal student requirements. Her only fault was that she came under
the guise of a visitor and then only because her formal letter of
admission to a Business Studies College of Technology had failed to
get to her in her own country in time. This is an example of the
strictness with which the authorities and appeals system interpret
the rules.
Visitors may also be admitted into the U.K. for the purpose
of private medical treatment at their own expense0 The immigration
officer should take into account the Medical Inspector's assessment
of the likely cost of treatment, including accommodation, in deciding
whether a passenger's means would be adequate0 The passenger should
be asked to produce evidence that arrangements have been made for
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consultation or treatmento The Tribunal has held in the case of
MOHAN SINGH v ENTRY CERTIFICATE OFFICER, HEW DELHI123 that the above
rule governing medical treatment must be read in conjunction with
the other paragraphs affecting the admission of visitors and accordingly
an applicant must, inter alia, satisfy an immigration officer that he
is genuinely seeking entry for the period of his visit as stated by
him<> Having satisfied the formal requirements, however, he cannot
be required to undergo any necessary treatment in his own country
if such treatment is available there before he comes to the U.K. for
the private treatment.1^
Where a visitor applies for an extension of stay to undergo or
continue private medical treatment, information should be obtained about
the progress made with the treatment, its likely duration and the
visitor's ability to meet the cost and depending on the outcome of the
enquiries an extension on stay may be granted.
Intention; Having stated the preliminary matters, attention
must now be turned to considering the methods of determination of
the intention of a visitor by an immigration officer. The only
guide available is the cases already decided. The analysis of how
immigration officers reach their decisions of the intention of an
applicant will, therefore, largely, be a study of case law.
In one of the earlier cases it was held by the Trib\mal that
where an Immigration officer felt or suspected, for given reasons,
that a passenger would seek employment whilst she was in the U.K.
then the immigration officer would be acting properly if he
163
refused the admission of the passenger oil the ground that she was not
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a genuine visitor. In that case, the assistant passport officer
had refused entry to the passenger for the reason statedo The
startling thing was that he arrived at that decision on the ground that
the passenger had not been employed since she left school at 16 (about
ten years previously) and that her parents had no savings or a car.
The officer did not, as the Tribunal appreciated, have any documentary
evidence for his suspicions as there had been in other cases. Yet,
it refused to say that the officer's suspicion was without foundation
or was not justified and this, notwithstanding that the passenger had
an assured and adequate accommodation and funds for her return journey.
The Tribunal was merely content to quote Lord Parker that:
"insofar a3 the ... officers were not satisfied or if
they felt, and I am dealing with onus of proof, that
she was likely to obtain a job during the period that
they allowed her to come in, notwithstanding that (her
expenses were to be met fully by friends and relatives)...
they would be entitled to refuse her entry."
The clearest import of this case is that if an immigration officer
suspects that a passenger is going to take employment during his
stay in the U.K. he will be fully justified to refuse that person
entry unless his suspicion is and can be shown to be manifestly
unfounded. That the passenger satisfies all the other conditions
of entry into the U.K. will be of little, if any, assistance. That
being so, a passenger's intentions will, accordingly, be considered
not genuine.
The above case summarises the methods used by immigration
officers to determine the intention of visitors. If for any reason
which can be brought properly within the purview of the rules any
doubt is raised in their minds as to the purpose of one's visit, then
more often than not, they simply refuse entry on the grounds that
passengers' intentions are not genuine. Thus, where a person asked
for entry when he was penniless, the immigration officer was justified
to refuse him entry on the ground that his intentions were not
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genuine. In this case, although in fact lack of money was not
one of the grounds for refusing entry into the country, the Tribunal
was satisfied that the immigration officer had exercised his discre¬
tion properly because he had regard to all the other cwircumstances,
eg. concealment of material facts when eoplying for entry clearance.
In all cases where there has been a misrepressntation or
concealment of material facts, an immigration officer will automa¬
tically refuse entry, normally on the gorund that the intentions of
IPS
the passenger ere not genuine.
In MANUOHANSINGH v ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER, ME',7 DELHI'129 it
was held by the Tribunal that when considering v.'hether an immigra¬
tion officer can be satisfied than an apolicant for a visitor's entry
clearance was a genuine visitor, he had to take into consideration
the circumstances of the person seeking entry, for example, when it
was oroposedas it was in this case, that a considerable sum of money
should be expended by a family with limited resources. In this case,
the Tribunal upheld
and on the basis of the above reasoning,/the decision of the immigra¬
tion officer to refuse entry to the aoplicant on the ground that he
was not a genuine visitor.
A person wishing to come to the U.K. as a visitor should
be allowed admission notwithstanding that he has previously contem-
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plated seeking entry for settlement or as a student. "" The person's
"intention^" is the essential issue to be rificided by the immigration
officer. The only requirement made of him is that he must make
full disclosure of his previous contemplations to seek entry. Were
it otherwise, once an applicant had disclosed a previous wish to
settle in the U.K., he would find it almost impossible to establish
himself as a bona fide visitor, the Tribunal has so ruled. The only
problem with this is that judging from the practise of the immigra¬
tion authorities, a person who declares his previous intentions to
come to the U.K. leaves the Home Office free to argue that his fu-
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ture intentions ere in doubt end on that basis refuse entry. In
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER, COLCf.'.BO v HANKS AND OTHERS132 one of the
applicants was refused an entry clearance fallowing her full dis¬
closure that she had previously wanted to come to the U.K. and settle
and also that she had tried to emigrate to Australia. Her applica¬
tion for an entry clearance at this particular time was simply to
come and visit her married sister settled in the U.K. The applicant
had a well paying job in Sri Lanka, too. To argue, therefore, as the
Tribunal did that full disclosure of previous attempts to come to the
U.K. together with e clear intention merely to visit should be e-
nough to enable a person to be admitted into the U.K. is to overlook
the way the minds of immigration authorities, and all of us, work.
It is an oversimplification. Full disclosure of previous attempts
to come to the U.K. neither confers extra benefits nor lessens the
disadvantages of non-disclosures.
If a person's circumstances at home, whether financial or
otherwise, are such that they do not, in the opinion of the immigra¬
tion authorities, represent an incentive for hirn (the person) to re¬
turn home, then his intention for coming to the U.K. will be suspect
and he will be refused entry on the ground that his intentions are
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not genuine. The fact that one has been unemployed for four years
or that one has wanted to emigrate to a different country in the past,
but has a job now in his country, have been considered as constitut-
134
ing disincentives for the applicant to return to their country. One
need hardly add that the range and list of things that could be con¬
sidered as constituting disincentives under this rule is inexhaustible.
This is, therefore, a dangerous, and it may be a venturous, exercise
of discretion. It is submitted it should be used most.rarely. Other¬
wise it may be doing indirectly what neither the Immigration Act 1971
nor the rules directly authorise. Intention will become a vague term
if it is so widely, sometimes loosely, used. It encompasses cases
of people coming to the U.K. for primarily certain unprohibited and
legal reasons, but with a secondary desire to do what is prohibited
by the rules. Thus, in one case, a person was refused entry on the
ground that his intentions were not genuine because he came with the
definite purpose of looking for employment, although such a purpose
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was secondary to his main purpose of visiting his close friend.
Family Reasons; Finally, mention must be made of people
coming to the U.K. as visitors for family reasons. In AFOAKWAH v
13S
HOME SECRETARY " the appellant was admitted into the U.K. for the
purpose of giving temporary help in the home, in Scotland, of her bro¬
ther and the latter's wife, both of whom were engaged on post-grad¬
uate studies which involved night work. They desired the appellant
to stay for a period to look after their children and they proposed
to support her during that period. She was allowed entry for that
reason and also for the reasons that the Tribunal was satisfied that
she was a bona fjde visitor;
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she would not be gainfully employed after her admission and on the
facts the appellant's brother was financially able to support her
during the period of her stay end also because the appellant's own
financial circumstances at home did not suggest that she was seek¬
ing entry in order to "letch on to some of the benefits of the wel¬
fare state". In another case a woman was allowed entry for a limit¬
ed period for the purpose of looking after the sponsor's of three
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children while she attended a teacher training college. ° But she
had to satisfy, as above, that she was a genuine visitor and had no
intention of working etc..« The latter case was decided when the
new rules under the 1E71 Immigration Act had come into force, although
the decision related to the former rule which provided:
"The need to imoose a control on immigration
for settlement in no way diminishes the Gov¬
ernment's desire to welcome Commonwealth ci¬
tizens coming to the U.K. on holiday or for
family, social, cultural or business reasons.
This rule is now superseded and the present rules do not
make any provision for people corning to the U.K. for family reasons.
Does this mean that people may not under the present rules, come to
the U.K. for family reasons? This question arose in the case of
1 6°
ENTRY CERTIFICATE OFFICER , ■ LAGOS v SHAfviONDA and the Tribunal up¬
held the submission that:
"the omission of any such specific provision in
the new rules does not mean that a visit for .
family reasons is necessarily outside the mean¬
ing and spirit governing visitors in (the new
rules)'.'i4Q
Thus, it is still possible for people from the Commonwealth to come
as visitors for family reasons. The above case has howvever narrowed
down the interpretation to be given to the expression "family reasons".
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Following another case the Tribunal accepted that there is a dis¬
tinction between an application to assist the mother of the children
to enable her to be gainfully emoloyed and where the real but
concealed reason for a member of a family coming to the U.K. is to
relieve another member of the household duties, and in fact, be em¬
ployed as a domestic, so as to enable that member of the family to
engage in or continue in remunerative employment in the future. In
the latter case, the person might more properly apply for a work per¬
mit rather than a visitor's entry permit.
It is not clear from the judgement of the above case how the Tribun¬
al came to the decision that it is possible for people to come into
the U.K. as visitors for family reasons when there is nothing in
the rules to authorise it. It appears that this reasoning was based
on the fact that coming for such a purpose can be read into piara.
15 of H.C. 79 which, as far as material, states that:
'
"a passenger seeking entry as a visitor is to
be admitted if he satisfies the immigration
officer that he is genuinely seeking entry
for the period of the visit stated by him and
can without working, support himself...and
meet the cost of the onward journey. Visi¬
tors coming to stay with relatives or friends
are also to be admitted if the immigration of¬
ficer is satisfied that no more than a visit
is intended and that the support available is
adequate."
It is arguable that people coming for family reasons to help their
relatives in domestic matters are not covered by the rule above and
that they must apply for a work permit or ask for the indulgence of
the Secretary of State to admit them into the country right outside
14
the rules. It seems rather terious to argue that a person coming for
such domestic reasons as helping to take care of children of a fa¬
mily member, whether paid or not, is the same as coming into the
country for no more than a visit as the rule above requires.
(b) Students
A passenger seeking entry to study in the U.K. should be admitted
if he presents a current entry clearance granted for that purpose.
An entry clearance will be granted if the applicant produces evi¬
dence which satisfies the entry clearance officer that he has been
accepted for a course of study at a bona fido educational institu¬
tion, that the course will occupy the whole or a substantial part
of his time, and that he can meet the cost of the course and of his
1 42
own maintenance and that of any dependents during the course.
These conditions must be satisfied to the immigration officer kt
the time of entry in order that he may grant leave to enter. There
is no requirement, however, that a student must have en entry clea¬
rance if he is to gain admission into the country for his studies.
It is always highly advisable to have one, though.
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Entry clearance and admission into the country should be refused
where the immigration authorities are not satisfied that the above
criteria have not been met or where the authorities are doubtful about
1 it 3
the student's ability to follow up the proposed study. Each of
the criteria will now be analysed.
Entry into the U.K. will be granted if the immigration authorities
are satisfied that the applicant has been accepted for a course of study
at a university or college of education or further education, an
1 )])|
independent school or any bona fide private educational institution.
Problems have arisen, particularly in respect of private andindependent
educational institutions, as to whether they are bona fide educational
1
institutions for the purpose of immigration law. In KP0I-1A v HOI-IE SECRETARY
the appellant applied for an extension of leave to stay in order to
continue attending "a day course in architectural draughtsmanship" at
the West End Drawing Office and a letter to that effect was duly produced
from the college. Relying on information had that, the West End Drawing
Office had been giving letters and certificates purporting that certain
students were following courses and attending at the "college" when it
was in fact known that they were in full time employment, the Secretary
of State refused the application for extension saying that the
certificates of attendance from that "college" were not acceptable
evidence of student status. The Tribunal, upholding the Secretary of
State's decision went further than that and said that the course as
the evidence showed, could be properly described as supplementary, as
students wishing to obtain diplomas or certificates must also attend
other colleges or educational establishments. It held further that
. .11|6
a course of study must (as the present rules provide) presuppose a
termination, whether academically successful or not, of such a course.
Study at West End College Drawing Office could apparently go on
indefinitely and, accordingly, courses taken there could not be properly
called study.
There was no serious effort made in the hearing to determine
whether the appellant actually attended the college. The Secretary
of State and the appellate authorities were content with simply deciding
that the "college" was, in actual fact, bogus and on that bssLs the
appellant was properly refused extension of stay.
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This case is an illustration of the doubts in the minds of
immigration authorities as to whether an educational institution
that has been allowed, legally, to operate in the country should
not, in their eyes, be 3uch an institution. Since it is known
that these "colleges" take students then it is incumbent upon
the immigration authorities to make sure that a student from
overseas proposing to join one has knowledge of the fact that a
particular institution is not approved for immigration purposes.
For this reason it appears reasonable that a list of all the
approved institutions should be published to enable students
wishing to come to the U.K. to know well in advance whether or
not they will be eligible for admission if they join any particular
institution of learning. This seems to be the best option if
the immigration authorities refuse to recognise certain "colleges".
One more thing must be mentioned here. A course of study,
according to decided cases and the present rules implies and must
be understood to mean, that one must leave when his studies are
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completed. If this is not the case then leave to enter or
remain for the purpose of study will be automatically refused
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on the ground that one does not intend to leave the U.K..
An applicant will be admitted for study if he can satisfy the
immigration authorities that his studies will occupy the wThole or a
149substantial part of his time. In other words, with the exception
of doctors and dentists, students coming for studies in the U.K. are
admitted only as fulltime students and accordingly they must have been
accepted for a fulltime course of study. This basically means that
entry is not to be granted unless the applicant proposes to spend not
less than 15 hours a week in organised day-time study of a single
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subject or of related subjects, or if he is taking a correspondence
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course. If the immigration officer is not so satisfied then he
must refuse entry to the applicantThus an applicant may be
granted entry or an extension of leave to stay if he produces evidence
which is verified on a check being made, that he will (inter aLia) be
giving or has been giving regular attendance at his fulltime course of
study, but if an application has been refused due to a failure in
giving regular attendance to a fulltime course of study an applicant
cannot succeed on an appeal against that ground of refusal by showing
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that his attendance since the refusal of his application has improved.
The 15 hours rule has been held not to be inflexible.
Exceptions are therefore envisaged in appropriate cases like the case
in which a journalist student was spending less than 1$ hours at his
1 <ii
school of journalism where he was enrolled as a fulltime student.
Accordingly each case will be decided on its own facts for the determin¬
ation of whether the 15 hours rule applies to it or not. This is a
rather arduous task and it would be more convenient and certain if
educational institutions were left to determine or/and certify that a
programme of study was a fulltime course of study. This presupposes,
also, a list of institutions approved by the immigration authorities as
institutions of education or learning. If this were done then cases
that might have to go to the appellate authorities on the 15 hours issue
would drop dramatically.
The 1$ hours rule is of course purely arbitrary. It is a hurdle
in the way of foreign students. It is not uncommon to find U.K.
nationals who are fulltime students spending less than 1$ hours a week
in organised day-time study of a single subject<> Why it should be
desired that foreign students should spend more than 15 hours a week
when home students spend less than 15 hours a week in the same subject
stw
is motivated by anything^than the desire to make foreign students to
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work harder or more. Such a rule makes the law seem biased and
shallow. It is submitted that the bast option is for the colleges
approved to be left free to certify whether a course of study is
fulltime or not. It is a short cut to arriving at the meaning and
rOE#if'" than
scope of the 15 hours rule/by exceptions and "undistinguishable
distinctions"0
A student coming to do a course of study by correspondence will
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be refused entry. The exact meaning of a correspondence course
is not clear but it has been held that a school run on a correspondence
course basis but with facilities available for tutorials on the school's
premises and part of the course consisted of outside assignments where
a student would be working on his own, falls outside the correspondence
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course rule. In the absence of a clear definition of what a
correspondence course is, it is feasible that the appellate authorities
are going to approach the issue, as in the above case, by distinctions
and exceptions. This is a problem that could not arise if there was
a list of approved institutions. It would save both parties expense
and time were such a list made. Above all, there would be a great deal
of certainty that a student would be eligible for admission once he has
been accepted to join an approved institution.
A student who can meet the cost of his course and of his own
maintenance and that of any dependants during the course should be
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admitted provided he has met other conditions. Actual documentary
evidence of the ability to meet the stipulated costs are needed as proof.
Thus mere statements of ability to meet the costs of a course and
158
maintenance are not enough. Even where a student can prove that
he has sufficient money, if he cannot also show that it is to be applied
159
for his course and maintenance he will be refused entry. Where it
can be shown that an applicant who was considered unable to finance
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his studies has now adequate means of supporting them, then he will
be admitted into the country.^® An'applicant will be refused entry
where (inter alia) he cannot show that he will be able to support and
maintain himself after completing his studies should he wish to stay
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for a longer period than his course takes.
A student must therefore show that he is in possession of
sufficient funds for his studies and maintenance (together with those
of his dependants if any) or show that other arrangements have been
made to provide for his expenses. Sufficient funds means that you
have enough money to enable you to coqiete your course of studies and
maintain yourself without resorting to employment to defray your expenses.
Ability: In all other cases the immigration authorities must refuse
entry if they are not satisfied that an applicant is able and intends
to follow a full time course of study and to leave the country at the
completion of it. In assessing the case the officer should consider
such points as whether the applicant's qualifications are adequate for
the course he proposes to follow and whether there is any evidence of
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sponsorship by his home government or any other official body. This
rule raises two fundamental issues, namely, the ability of the student
to follow his course of study and his intentions.
Ability, according to the rules, means his intellectual and financial
ability to pursue his studies. Finance has already been discussed
above. As to intellectual ability an immigration officer has power
to set himself up as a judge and can reject a student if he thinks
that his ability is wanting in any way. Thus in one case the entry
certificate officer refused an entry certificate to an Indian student
admitted to a course in cost and works accountancy at a London College
because of (inter alia) the student's halting English."^ Obviously,
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it is unacceptable that immigration officers should make such judgments
on educational standards of students, which is something they are not
trained for. This is one of those things that the educational
institutions themselves are best qualified to do.
The extent to which this rule on ability goes is illustrated by
the case of HOME SECRETARY v mPEE.1^ In that case Virdee had left
school without sitting her '0' levels in Kenya in 1969. In 1970 she
studied typing and book-keeping in Nairobi. In June 1971 she applied
for an entry certificate to enable her to attend a 16 weeks course in
computer programming at an institute operating commercially in the U.K.
She produced correspondence from the institute showing that she had
passed an aptitude test for the proposed course, but there was no
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evidence about the test itself. Her entry into the U.K. was refused
mainly on the ground that there was an obvious lack of correspondence
between her previous attainments and the ndure of the proposed course.
Therefore a lack of formal educational qualifications is sufficient
to justify a refusal of entry. It is obvious however, that possession
of formal educational qualifications is not a pre-requisite, leave alone
a condition, to a person following a new course0
It is also self-evident that a student who wants to come to the
U.K. to study English exclusively should not be expected to have any
credits or formal educational qualification in the language, and
should be, if he has satisfied the conditions, admitted.
Whether or not a student will leave the country on the completion
of his studies is tied up with the intention of the student. For
this reason many decisions on students have been on the intention of
the applicants. An applicant is expected to have a genuine intention,
and the only^intention, of pursuing his studies at the end of which he
m
must leave the U.K."1^ In various decisions immigration officers look
at the immediate as well as future intentions and the prospects of an
applicant both at this home country and in the U.K. If for any
reason connected with such plans an immigration officer comes to the
conclusion that an applicant's intentions are not genuine then he will
refuse entry. Intention is a question of fact; the mere fact that
an immigration officer entertains doubts about the true intentions of an
applicant does not constitute a sufficient reason upon which it can
rely in refusing entry. Thus the fact that an applicant had no plans
for subsequent employment in India, a country with a high percentage of
unemployment was not, without more, sufficient to support a refusal of
1 67
entry on the ground that the applicant's intentions were not genuine.
Also the fact that an applicant wishing to study in the U.K. has done
nothing during the 18 months following completion of 2 years of his
3 year diploma course and all the members of his family save one are
settled in the U.K. does not constitute, on its own, a ground for refusing
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entry based on a mere suspicion that his intentions are not genuine.
In another case it was held improper for the immigration officer to
refuse admission to an applicant on the ground that his intention was
not realistic because his English was indifferent and his prospect of
169
finding a job virtually nil.
All the above matters are indeed relevant and important in
determining whether an applicant's intention is both genuine and
realistic but they are not on their own and without other evidence
170
sufficient to justify a refusal of entry. Although the words
"genuine and realistic" when used in reference to intention do not
appear in the present rules it had been held that they nevertheless
must be read into the rules because, for any applicant to be admitted,
he must be genuine and the connection between genuineness and realism
was necessary because while one might genuinely wish the impossible, it
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was sensible that only those applicants whose wishes were capable of
fulfilment and intended to be fulfilled - i.e. realistic wishes - should
be admitted, and also because while an application might be realistic,
it could at the same time be a deceit simply to gain admission on a
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false pretence of study. This is clearly not the case now as it
has been held by the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench that since
there is no reference to any question that the applicant's intentions
should be "realistic" it is not a ground of refusal and it is not
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therefore open to any immigration officer to refuse entry upon it.
On the balance, the refusal of entry on the ground of intention
is less strict in the case of students than in the case of visitors.
That one's intention is not genuine or realistic is not a ground for
refusing entry to students now. However, as L. Grant and J. Constable
have noted, in a series of subsequent cases, the tribunal while holding
that "realism" is not a valid ground for refusal of entry into the
U.K. has refused entry to students on the ground that the intention
to study was not genuine because of the risk that the student would
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fail to leave at the end of his studies. Thus in two subsequent
cases it has been held that although "realism" was ruled out as a
ground of refusal, it was still open to an immigration officer in
assessing whether an application is genuine to take into account
factors which would also have to be considered when assessing whether
an application were realistic. In the words of the tribunal it is
open to the immigration officer "... to consider why the applicant
1 7) 1
wants to attend the course at all".
That an immigration officer should want to know why a person wants
to do any course at all not only brings, albeit indirectly, the
search for realism (which is unlawful) but also seems to be wrong in
principle. A person may want to do a course for reasons of securing
a certain job or for reasons of personal satisfaction or even self-
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aggrandisement. A person may also want to do a course because he
intends to change his career in the future. To require an applicant
to, for example, produce a letter from his present employers that a
particular course would be "acceptable" for employment with them would
in the circumstances seem wrong. Yet a person has been required to
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do just that as a test of his genuine intention.
Genuine Intentions; It is also firmly established that a student
whose intentions are not genuine and "realistic" will be refused entry
on the ground that he does not intend to leave the U.K. at the end of
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his studies. How is the fact that a student does not intend to
leave the U.K. on the completion of his studies determined?
Firstly, it has been held that to propose that a child of 8 years
is to start going to school in the U.K. and remain there until he has
done his 'A' levels is to propose that he should remain in the U.K.
permanently and that this is the only reasonable intention that can be
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inferred in the circumstances. In this case it was also held that
the intention of the child was that of those in charge or in control of
the child. This case read together with ISLAM v HOME SECRETARY"* in
which the 5 year rule was held to be a relevant consideration when
considering whether a student would return home on the completion of
his studies, would suggest that it is now no longer possible for a
student seeking entry to do a course lasting more than 5 years to be
admitted. It has been submitted by L. Grant and J. Constable that
there is nothing in the Immigration Act 1971 or the rules made thereunder
to show that the legislature intended to prohibit long term education,
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at least of that nature.
A student whose primary purpose and, in fact the only purpose, for
wishing to come to the U.KC is not to follow a fulltime course of study
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will be refused entry on that ground. In that case the student will
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be said not to intend to leave the country at the end of his studies
and accordingly his intentions are said not to be genuine. A mere
suspicion, however, that a fulltime course of study is not intended,
or is not the primary purpose, will not of itself without evidence be
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a sufficient ground for refusal of entry.
It has also been held that in an application to attend a computer
operator course the applicant's background, the enquiries he had made
about other suitable courses locally, and the employment prospects in
the computer field on his return home, might well be material factors
which an entry cleansqce officer would need to consider in deciding
whether he could be satisfied that the applicant intended to follow
<j Q2
a course and to leave the country on completion of it. Thus a
student has been refused entry on the ground (inter alia) that even if
she obtained any benefit from her course in the U.K. she would not be
in a position on her return to East Africa to obtain satisfactory
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employment in that field. That being so her intention for coming to
study in the U.KC can be anything but genuine.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if an immigration
officer wants to refuse a student entry it is effectively within his
power to do so by taking into account anything, for example any of the
above reasons, that shows a student's intentions are not genuine and
accordingly he does not intend to leave the country at the end of his
studies„ From the cases above and others it can be safely concluded
that the task of the appellate bodies in the area of "intention" is
simply to determine whether any fact relied on by the immigration
officers was or was not a relevant consideration.
There is one area where "realism" is still operative. A passenger
who satisfies an immigration officer that he has genuine and realistic
intentions of studying in the U.K. but cannot satisfy the preceding
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requirements may be admitted into the U0K0 for a short period. If
185
realism is defined as wishes which are capable of fulfillment then
it is true to say that the rule will be applied only in very few cases.
A person who so satisfies the immigration officer may be admitted
only for a short time (normally 3 months) with a prohibition on the
taking of employment and should be advised to apply to the Home Office
186
for further consideration of his case.
1 87
A person who holds an entry clearance that is current and fulfils
the above requirements may be admitted for a period of up to 12 months
depending on the length of his course of study and on his means, with
a condition restricting Iris freedom to take employment. Bona fide
students may be allowed to work in their spare time or during their
vacations but they must first of all seek the approval of the Department
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of Employment. Their wives are free to take employment at any
time and earnings accumulated from there are taken into account in
assessing the student's adequacy to finance his studies and maintain
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himself. The children of such bona fide students who are under the
age of 18 years should, like the wives, be given leave to enter for the
period of the authorised stay. Their freedom to take up employment
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should not be restricted either, but there is no mention that their
expected earnings may be taken into account in assessing the adequacy
of the means of the student to support himself. Since the earnings of
the wife are specifically so mentioned, it is submitted that that of a
child under 18 will not be taken into account for purposes of assessment
of the ability of the student to support himself. The reason for this
omission is dubious.
There is an assumption in the rules that a married student will
always be a male. Thus no provision is made for a wife who is accompanied
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by her husband to the U.K. for the pur-poses of study. It is
submitted that a man accompanying his wife in such circumstances
should be treated on the same basis as that of the wife accompanying a
husband coming to the U.K. to study.
Renewal of Stay For Students: Extensions of stay to students or would-be
students following admittance may be granted if the applicant continues
to satisfy the conditions upon which he was admitted. Thus when
applying for an extension of stay a student must show by evidence
that he is giving regular attendance at a fulltime course of day-time
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study. If an application has been properly refused due to the
applicant's unsatisfactory attendance record, he cannot succeed on an
appeal against that ground of refusal by showing that his attendance
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since the refusal of his application has improved. In other cases
applications for extension of stay have been refused because students
had taken employment without first getting the authority to take
I9I4.
employment and thus being in breach of their entry conditions.
An application for extension is a variation of the conditions of
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stay within the meaning of the rules and can only be given if strict
compliance with the conditions of admission has been made. Thus a
student must produce evidence, which is verified on a check being made,
that he is still enrolled for a fulltime course of day-time study which
meets the requirements for admission as a student, that he is giving
regular attendance and that he has adequate funds available for his
maintenance and that of any dependants. When an extension is granted
a student may be reminded that he vail be expected to leave at the
end of his studies. It has been decided in one case that when considering
an extension of stay fresh evidence of admission into another college
V
cannot be taken into account if it was not before the immigration officer.
However, this case does not lay a hard and fast rule on that issue and
the tribunal has clearly stated that each case will be considered
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197
individually according to its facts. In the case it was held that
the new course represented a project which materially altered his
original application and therefore formed a basis for a new application.
In the THE HOME SECRETARY v SIDIQUE^^ consideration was given by
the tribunal to the submission that the Home Secretary had, by granting
an extension of stay to a student, condoned a breach of the student's
conditions. The Home Secretary had in 1973 granted an extension of
stay for study purposes notwithstanding that the student applicant
had overstayed by 9 months his limited leave to enter for 12 months.
It was submitted for the student that when he was in breach again,
by overstaying 6 months, his first breach had been condoned, overcome
or forgiven, and in the present circumstances of his satisfactory
studies that earlier breach could no longer be held against him in a
new application for an extension of stay. The tribunal found no
difficulties in coming to the conclusion that the first extension that
was granted to the student amounted to no more than "... being given
another chance and in no way (meant) "that he was being given, so to
speak, a clean slate. The immigration rules do not provide for the
condonation, in the sense of full forgiveness, of the past immigration
offences, though if (the applicant) had not been in breach of the
immigration rules afresh, the Home Office would have had no reason to
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refer to the matter again." Thus students applying for an extension
cannot rely on the mistken belief that having been in breach of theA
immigration rules and got extensions notwithstanding, the Home Office
will not take into account their past conduct when they have been in
breach of the conditions of stay afresh0
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Note on Medical Students: Mention must be made of doctors, dentists,
midwives and nurses. They are admitted for training if they have
"student" entry clearances unless they have been obtained by mis¬
representation or concealment of material facts. Doctors and dentists
are admissible for fulltime postgraduate study even though they also
intend during their stay to seek employment in training posts related
to their studies.This class of medical personnel enjoys a rather
special exclusion of not having to satisfy an immigration officer that
they will not work during their training. The onus on them of showing
that they will be able to meet the costs of their training and maintenance
are less onerous than students simply because they are allowed
to work. In all other respects doctors and dentists coming for
postgraduate studies and nurses and midwives coming for training or
postgraduate studies, are required to satisfy the same requirements
as those that other students have to satisfy,. They are also subject
to the same conditions as other students in matters connected with
variations of their conditions of stay.
The miles state that "applications from students or would be
students for variation of their leave consist mainly (my emphasis) of
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applications for extension of stay as a student." It has been
held by the tribunal that in the absence of any word in the rule above
showing that applications for extension will not be considered, the
word "mainly" used in that rule provided a discretion whereby other
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applications by students might be considered. Thus a young
commonwealth citizen who was admitted to the U.K. in a student capacity
properly applied for a variation of his conditions of stay to enable
him to stay in the different capacity of a holiday worker provided
he ffitisfied the immigration officer that he intended to take only
203
employment which will be incidental to his holiday.
The above case is authority for a submission that a student may
182
apply for a variation of conditions of his stay both as to the length
of time of stay and as to any other capacity, e.g. visitor, holiday-
worker etc., for which no work permit is required.
(■a&O "Au pair" Girls
According to the immigration miles "au pair" is an arrangement
under which a girl of 17 and over may come to the U.K. to learn the




English-speaking family. An "au pair" arrangement must be distinguished
from fulltime domestic employment for which a work permit is required.
When an immigration officer is satisfied that an "au pair" arrangement
has been made he may admit the passenger for a period of up to
20&
12 months with a restriction on her freedom to take employment0
An "au pair" girl is first admitted for 12 months with a restriction on
207her freedom to take employmento If at the end of the 12 months
she goes home, she may return for a second term of 12 months of "au pair"
20Q
arrangement but no more0 There is provision for an "au pair" girl
to apply for an extension of her stay0 She will be granted an extension
of 12 more months if the immigration officer is satisfied that there
209
is a "satisfactory au pair arrangement" in being0 They cannot,
however, be allowed to stay longer than 2 years0 There is absolutely
no right or discretion under which an "au pair" girl may apply to vary
210
her status to a different capacity, e0g0 to that of a visitor or student0
A number of things call for comment. Firstly, a male person
cannot be admitted into the U.K0 on an "au pair" arrangement. It has
been held that the immigration rules make no provision upon which a
211
male applicant can be permitted to stay in the U.K. on an "au pair" basis.
This is therefore sexually discriminatory.
Secondly, it has been held that in order to comply with the rules
212
on "au pair" girls an applicant is impliedly required to show that
183
the proposed "au pair" arrangement is the sole purpose for which she
213
wishes to visit the U.K..
Thirdly, there is no definition of the term "... a resident English
214
speaking family". The U.K. has now become a multi-racial society in
which English is spoken by most "families". It is submitted, as a
principle that will contribute to racial harmony and integration, that
the term should mean any "family" in which at least one member speaks the
English language provided, of course, the "family" is resident in the U.K..
The term "family" must be liberally interpreted to include a single
215
person living alone or with others.
(i-v) Persons Coming for Employment, or Business or as Persons of
Independent Means
This category of non-patrials is comprised of quasi-workers
(i.e. trainees, Commonwealth citizens with U.K. ancestry, young
Commonwealth citizens and permit-free employees), workers, businessmen,
216
people of independent means and self employed passengers. Each of
these categories of people will be examined now.
(1) Quasi-workers;
(a) Trainees: A trainee must be in possession of a
valid work permit from the Department of Employment for training in
217
a specific job in some profession or employment. For non-
Commonwealth and non-E.E.C. nationals the "training" period may be used
218
to widen one 's knowledge of the English language. A trainee will be
admitted into the U.K. for 12 months or for the period of the training,
whichever is the shorter, if he has complied with all the other conditions.
Immigration officers must impose a condition restricting trainees to an
approved employment and transfers to ordinary employment will not be
220
allowed under any circumstances. A trainee who applies for an
184
extension of stay in order to complete his training for which he was
admitted will he granted the extension if the Department of Employment
report that he is continuing his training satisfactorily in the case
of a Commonwealth citizen, or in the case of non-Commonwealth and non-
E.E.C national, that there are exceptional circumstances and the
221
Department approves the proposed extension.
A number of problems, particularly on applications for extension
of stay have arisen in the past. In HOME SECRETARY v BMZHOHUH,222
B, was admitted to the U.K. for 12 months training in signwriting
approved by the Department of Employment. Before his leave of stay
expired he applied for an extension to enable him to continue his training
for a further 12 months with the same firm working for them as an
improver. The Secretary of State referred the matter to the Department
of Employment who reported that they did not regard the proposed employ¬
ment as training and accordingly did not recommend an extension of stay.
The Tribunal held that the Home Secretary had no discretion to grant
an extension of stay if the Department of Employment reported unfavour-
223
ably on the application concerned. This case is still a binding
authority although it was decided under the old laws. That being
so it follows that under the present immigration rules if the Department
of Employment report unfavourably on the training of a person then that
person's application for extension will not be approved. The corollary
of this is that if the Department of Employment rejects any "training on
the job" as being training for the purpose of immigration law then a
person who has applied to do that training in the U.K. will not be
allowed entry into the country. An earlier case sums up the effect of
the decision thus: "... it would appear that the Home Secretary has
reserved to itself the discretion to refuse an extension of stay
notwithstanding that the report of the Department of Employment is
185
favourable, but should the report be unfavourable the Home Office
224
has no discretion or power to question such a report". Clearly
therefore the Secretary of State has no discretion to consider an
application for an extension of stay from a trainee if the Department
of Employment reports unfavourably. But if the latter reports favourably
of the training and says that it is satisfactory then the Home Secretary
has discretion to extend or refuse to extend leave of the applicant,
having regard to all the circumstances.
An approval or refusal of training schemes in the above cases
is the prerogative of the Department of Employment and the decisions of
that Department cannot be called into question by the Home Department,
and they cannot be the subject of an appeal under the Immigration
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Appeals system. The Tribunal has ruled that this is the case under
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the present immigration rules. An appeal will invariably be
against the Home Department if it refuses an extension of stay but
no appeal will lie against the Department of Employment if it refuses to
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approve an extension of stay. It has been submitted that 1his
represents one of the most serious defects in the Immigration Appeals
228
system.
The case of AINOUSON v HOME SECRETARY.illustrates some of
the complexities that can arise from the requirement that the Home
Secretary should consult the Department of Employment for approval.
In that case A. entered into the U.K. as a trainee approved by the
Department of Employment for industrial training with a named firm.
Towards the end of his approved training the firm wrote to the Departmennt
of Employment that the appellant wished to remain permanently in their
employment and that they were anxious to retain him. The Department
informed the Home Office, and on the latter's reference back reported
that they did not recommend a further extension as a trainee and considered
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the appellant's post to be permanent employment. The Home
Secretary accordingly refused the extension of stay. On appeal to
the Tribunal it was argued that the Home Secretary should have made a
decision and could not shelter behind the decision of the Department of
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Employment. It was held by the Tribunal that the immigration rules
approved by the Legislature set out the way in which the discretion to
grant an extension of stay to a trainee may be exercised and the reference
by the Home Office to the Department of Employment was made in compliance
^7 4 ^7 <2
with the rules. This is 3till the law. This is an illustration
of the ease with which trainees can be refused an extension of leave
to remain in the U.K. for the purpose of training.
The discretion of the Home Office to extend leave to remain in the
U.K. to a student-employee (i.e. non-Commonwealth or non-E.E.C. national)
is narrower than that applicable to Commonwealth nationals in the U.K»
as trainees. If a student-employee's application for an extension has
been approved by the Department of Employment then the Home Office may
extend his leave to remain in the country for that purpose only in
233
"exceptional circumstances". The words exceptional circumstances
have not been defined by the appellate authorities but they are
certainly stronger than those applicable to Commonwealth trainees whose
leave to remain may be granted if "... the Department of Employment
report that he is continuing his training and that this is still
234
satisfactory ...". Foreign student-employees are, according to the
rules, engaged in a supernumerary capacity and, like Commonwealth trainees,
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will not be allowed to transfer to ordinary employment.
Visitors and students from the Commonwealth countries may be
granted extensions to stay as trainees if the Department of Employment
considers the offer of training to be satisfactory. Apparently
237
there is no scope for foreign non-E.E.C. students to do this.
187
A Commonwealth visitor or student will not, however, be granted an
extension of stay if,(having regard to all other circumstances and the
fact that on completion of his training he will have been in the U.K.
for more than 5 years with consequent difficulties of removal) the
238
Home Office think it "improper" to do so.
There remains the question of how one gets a work permit for the
purpose of undertaking a training or student-employee course as they must
An application must be made to the Department of Employment by the
"employer" and not the trainee or the student-employee. A permit is
restrictive of the "training" and the "employer" and accordingly it is
240
used for a specific "training" to a specific "employer". Their
admission into the country is strictly on the basis that they must not
take any employment.
There is no reference to the admission into the U.K. of the
dependants of people coming to do an on the job training or coming as
student-employees. However the rules do say that workers admitted for
241
seasonal employment are not allowed to bring dependants. It is
submitted that trainees and student-employees are basically seasonal
workers and accordingly their dependants will not be allowed into the
U.K. during their limited leave to stay in the U.K.
Foreign non-E.E.C. nationals doing a student-employee course may
242
be required to register with the police.
\
(b) Commonwealth Citizens with U.K. Ancestry: Upon proof
that one of his grandparents was born in the U.K. and Islands, an appli¬
cant who wishes to take or seek employment in the U.K. will be granted
an entry clearance for that purpose. If he has got his entry clearance
and is not ineligible to enter on grounds of concealment or misrepresen-
243
tation of material facts or other grounds outlined elsewhere, then he
is exempt from the necessity of having a work permit and will therefore
188
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be admitted into the U.K. indefinitely. The above has been strictly
applied in the case of C. (an Infant) v ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICE. HONG
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KOIIG. In that case C. was an illegitimate child, a citizen of the
U.K. snd Colonies born in Hong Kong. Her mother did not qualify as
a patrial under S.2(l)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 so as to confer
on the appellant a statutory right of appeal, but her natural father
had been born in the U.K. and his parents had been bom and married
there. It was submitted, inter alia, that although C. did not qualify
as a patrial she should be granted "indefinite leave to enter" under
the above rule because her paternal grandparents were born in the U.K..
The Tribunal quoting Denning L.J. said that "... the law does not
recognise the natural father at all. The only father it recognizes as
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having any rights is the father of a legitimate child born in wedlock."
On the basis of this dictum and on the basis that modern statutes will
provide that a "child" will include an "illegitimate child", whereas
the Immigration Act 1971 and rules made thereunder did not do that, the
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Tribunal was of the view that the rule above cannot be taken to
include the paternal grandparents of an illegitimate child.
An application by a commonwealth citizen with U.K. ancestry to
come into the U.K. under paragraph 27 of H.C. 79 above must be specifi¬
cally for taking or seeking employment. Thus the rule can have no
application where an appellant applies for an entry in order to take
248
or seek employment but specifically to come to the U.K. as a student.
Aliens, by their very status have no ancestry with the U.K. in the
eyes of the law and accordingly there is no provision made for them on
the same basis of U.K. ancestry.
The wife and children under 18 years of a Commonwealth citizen
with a U.K. ancestry given an indefinite leave to enter the U.K. in
249
order to take or seek employment should also be given leave to enter,
189
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Their freedom to take employment should not be limited, but he
must be prepared to support and accommodate them without recourse to
251
public funds. The wife and children under 18 years of such people
must be in possession of entry clearances before they can be admitted
252
into the U.K.
(c) Young Commonwealth Citizens on Extended Holidays:
Young Commonwealth citizens who come to the U.K. for extended holidays
of up to 5 years before settling down in their own countries who
satisfy the immigration officer that they intend to take only employ¬
ment which is incidental to their holiday, should be admitted for 12
months and should be advised that it will be open to them to apply for
253
extensions of stay within the maximum of 5 years allowed.
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In one case a young Commonwealth citizen from Australia was
admitted into the U.K. in 1967 for 12 months. Under Comnd. 4298
para. 29(d) of the old rules he did "... not require employment vouchers"
if he was (as he was) "... a person whose employment will be only
incidental to a holiday". He was, in other words, a holiday worker as
young Commonwealth citizens on an extended holiday are referred to.
Extensions of his stay were subsequently granted to the appellant, but
in August 1970 an application to extend her visitor's leave to stay was
refused on the ground that her stay in the U.K. had been in the nature
of a working holiday and the maximum period then allowed under the working-
holiday scheme was 3 years. The Tribunal upheld this.
The period of stay permissible now is a maximum of 5 years. It
follows from the holding above that no holidayworker will be allowed to
remain in the U.K. beyond that time.
It had been held under the old Rules that a person admitted as a
visitor could not be considered as a holidayworker as he was not
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admitted as such. This is no longer true^apart from the fact that
the Tribunal did not consider the rule providing that "... a visitor
who wishes to stay here (in the U.K.) in some other temporary capacity
e.g. as an "au pair" girl or as a student may be granted an extension
256
on request ..." , if the other requirements of stay are met." In
257
BAIJAL v HOME SECRETARY, it was held that in the light of the provision
that a visitor may be granted an extension of stay in some other
temporary capacity on request it would not be proper to construe
258
paragraph 11 of H.C. 80 as meaning that an extension of stay as a
working holidaymaker can be granted only to persons whose original
entry to the U.K. was in that capacity. That rule in paragraph 11 of
H.C. 80 must now be construed as applying to people who came into the
U.K. as holidayworkers initially and does not apply to other classes of
people admitted into the U.K. e.g. visitors and students. Thus it
I
has been held that a Commonwealth citizen who came to the U.K. in a
student capacity may properly apply for a variation of his conditions
of stay as a student to. enable him to stay on in the different capacity
259
of holiday-worker.
What is the meaning of the phrase "employment which will be
incidental to their holiday ..." in paragraph 28 of H.C. 79? A
person coming into the U.K. as a holidayworker must have as his primary
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purpose a holiday with employment only incidental to it. Accordingly
to be a genuine holidayworker a person must initially have some resources
with which to finance his holiday, augmenting such resources from time
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to time by taking employment, the Tribunal has so held. In
GUHATILAK5 v ENTRY CL3ARAUCS OFFICER, COLOMBO.262 it was held by the
Tribunal that to obtain a full-time employment for a period of 2 to
3 years, rather than to take a job or jobs that would be occasional
and subordinate to holiday-making, did not qualify a young Commonwealth
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citizen for entry into the U.K. as a working holiday-maker on an
extended holiday under the above, rule. The evidence against the
appellant was that he had given up his hotel job a month before his
intended visit to the U.K. and he was looking for any kind of job
during his stay in the U.K. for 2 to 3 years. It appears from
this case that a full-time job for the intended stay in the U.K.
cannot be considered as incidental to a holiday, a fallacy which
seems to imply that holiday work means either doing nothing but
spending money or an engagement for a series of jobs at different
times and probably in different places. It is submitted that a
full-time job is wholly consistent with a holiday and is not
inconsistent with the bringing of money from an "initial resource"
to finance one's holiday. If this is not so, as implied by the
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case above and others, then employment incidental to a holiday
may also mean a part-time job (as opposed to full-time). The
criterion must be, in the final analysis, the reason for which such
a person is here and on whether the job he is doing or intends to do
is a full-time one or not. A person can only be regarded as
being in full-time employment in the sense that he must have a work
permit if he stays beyond the limited period of 5 years.
Young Commonwealth citizens do not need work permits for the
264
jobs they will take when in the U.K.. The only problem remaining
is that there is no definition of the word "young" and this probably
must be construed from the point of view that on his return to his
home country the person is going to settle down. There is nothing
in the rule to suggest that it applies only to men. It is submitted
that there is nothing in this rule giving power to the immigration
officers or the appellate authorities power to look at the past
settled state of a person which no longer exists if he can satisfy
the other requirements.
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The Rules are, curiously, silent on whether a young Commonwealth
citizen who comes to the U.K. can bring his/her spouse with him/her
and their children tinder 18 years.* The key to this problem and the
preceding submission must surely hinge on the term "settle" as used
in the Rules. There is no comprehensive meaning of that word.
Under the Immigration Act 1971, it i3 defined in relation to the
U.K. and the Islands only and the definition will be irrelevant
in connection with other Commonwealth countries. The word may be
lacking from the vocabulary of some Commonwealth countries when
used in the sense that the Rules use it. The solution to the
problem would be to take the meaning of the term in common parlance.
According to the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the word
settle means, among other things, to set up, to establish or install
e.g. in residence, business, marriage, a parish, etc; and to take
up permanent abode. It is submitted that the latter meaning comes
nearest to the situation of a young Commonwealth holidaymaker
because the former meaning would imply that such a person has no
"... initial resources of income with which to augment his
/
holiday..." according to the Tribunal. Also the former meaning
would necessitate arbitrary and illogical distinctions, for example,
that a married man is settled but a man with a business from where
he gets money to augment his holiday is not settled.
If that submission is correct, then it is further submitted
that young Commonwealth citizens can by virtue of paragraphs 37 and
39 of H.C. 79 bring their spouses and children under the age of 18
p/T C"
years old if he/she can support and accommodate them. If the
above submissions are wrong then it follows that young Commonwealth
citizens doing jobs incidental to their holidays must be unmarried.
But if their spouses can come then unlike those coming for settlement
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it is not mandatory for them to have an entry clearance.
(d) "Permit-Free" Employment: There are eleven classes
of people who may come to work in the U.K. without a work permit.
They are admitted for an appropriate period not exceeding 12 months
if they hold a current entry clearance granted for that purpose or
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other documentary evidence that they do not require permits.
These classes of people are:
(1) Ministers of religion, missionaries and members of religious
orders coming to work as such, including those engaged in teaching.
It has been held that there is no provision in the Rules for persons
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admitted as visitors to be allowed to remain as priests. This
dicta was arrived at following the general provision of H.C. 79
paragraph 5 that people admitted as visitors or students or for
other temporary purposes have under the Rules no claim to stay in
employment. As priests, and for that matter all "permit-free"
people, are admissible into the U.K. if they hold a current entry
clearance granted for the purpose or other documentary evidence
that they do not require permits it followed that if H.C. 79 para¬
graph 5 above was to be given effect, a visitor into the U.K- could
not be granted leave to stay on as a priest. It is submitted that
the Tribunal's decision was made per incuriam because no reference
was made to paragraph 9 of H.C. 80 which provides that a "... visitor
who wishes to stay (in the U.K.) in some other temporary capacity ...
may be granted..." leave provided he has requested it and meets the
conditions of his new proposed capacity.
The provision on religious people is widely phrased and in its
present form it includes not only a Minister i.e. a person duly
authorised by a religious denomination to conduct religious worship
and perform other religious rites, but also a lay preacher, a nun,
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lay brother and cantor.
There is no requirement that any religious denomination must
be an organisation already established in the U.K. nor i3 there any
requirement that the person must have been practising his religious
vocation before coming to the U.K.. However, it is open to the
immigration authorities to refuse entry to a person coming to the
U.K. for such religious purposes if the religious organisation he is
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coming to or intends to start is considered socially harmful.
(2) Doctors and dentists coming to take up professional appoint¬
ments: These are admitted for 12 months and do not need work permits.
However, doctors who do not have a definite appointment to come to
may be allowed in for an initial period of 6 months if they are to
take attachments under the Department of health and Social Security
Scheme or, if they are exempt from it, they have come to take up
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hospital employment as doctors. Also dentists holding current
entry clearances issued to them with a view to their seeking employment
in or practising their profession in the U.K. should similarly be
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admitted for up to 6 months.
(3) Private servants of members of diplomatic servants;
(4) People coming for employment by an overseas Government or
in the employment of the United Nations or other international
organisation of which the U.K* is a member;
(5) Representatives of overseas firms which have no branch,
subsidiary or other representative in the U.K.$
(6) Representatives of overseas newspapers, news agencies and
broadcasting organisations, on longterm assignment in the U.K..
There is no definition of "longterm" but presumably it means a
195
representative who is in the U.K. on assignment for a period which
amounts to something more than a casual or temporary assignment;
(7) Teachers and language assistants coming to schools in the
U.K. under exchange schemes approved by the Education Departments
administered by the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges
or the League for the Exchange of Commonwealth Teachers;
(8) Seamen under contract to join a ship in British waters.
According to Immigration Act 1971, s.8(l) Seamen who are crew members
of a ship in British waters are to be freely admitted unless they
are subject to a deportation order, or they have been previously
refused leave to enter and have not since that time been given
leave to enter or remain in the country, or unless they are
required to submit to medical examination. The word "crew" is
defined as "... persons actually employed in the working or service
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of the ship It has been held that ajsrson listed in a
ship's articles as a stewardess but not actually involved in the
operation or service of the ship and whose sole purpose is to
accompany her husband for a round trip falls outside people for
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whom the above provisions were made.
It is submitted that services required in such ship must be taken
into consideration. Thus a beautician or saleswoman employed on
board a luxury liner or as an electrieian employed on board a cable
ship or a chemist employed on board a whale ship should be classified
as providing services to the ship and therefore crew members.
(9) Operational staff (but not other staff) of overseas-owned
airlines: these include only crew members of a plane, following the
definition of crew, which is "... persons actually employed in the
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working or service of ... (an) aircraft". It would follow that
a person not required for the normal operation or service of an
aircraft will not be allowed to come in freely;
(10) Persons coming for employment in a Government department,
who hold a special Employment Form from the Department of Employment;
and
(11) Seasonal workers at agricultural camps under approved
schemes. This scheme is not available to Commonwealth citizens
however.
Some general matters must now be noted. For any of the above
people to get an entry clearance enquiries must have been made in the
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U.K. as "... to the need for such an appointment and similar matters".
Should the enquiries be favourable the applicant will be issued with
an entry clearance.
Department of Employment: These are authorities indicating that where
a person subject to the immigration law in a capacity other than a
"permit-free" capacity, e.g. as a visitor or a student, wishes to take
a "permit-free" employment then the Secretary of State will be acting
in compliance with the immigration law if he refers the matter to the
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Department of Employment for approval of the employment. It is not
clear however whether or not the Secretary of State may under the
present rules legally refer on enquiry far employment of a person
seeking to come into the U.K. for that employment which is also a
"permit-free" one. If immigration law is considered, as it will
well be in this case, as an aspect of economic policy geared towards
filling specific gaps in manpower, then it appears right that the
Secretary of State should refer any question of employment to the
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Department of Employment for approval before authorising the
issue of an entry clearance to an applicant. That it seems right to
do so does not, of course, make it legal. If however it is referred
to the Department of Employment the effect of it would be that a
person looking for a "permit-free" employment if refused an entry
clearance following the refusal of the Department of Employment to
approve the employment will have no right of appeal under the appeals
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system. Where however refusal for a particular employment which
is categorised as "permit-free" is made without reference to the
Department of Employment, then a person affected by that refusal
may appeal normally against the refusal.
People admitted into the U.K. as visitors have no claim under
pr?p
the Rules to remain there in employment. It has been held that
it applies to a priest whose subsequent employment was a "permit-
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free" one. It has already been submitted that this decision is
wrong but while it remains in force it would appear that any person
who comes into the country in any temporary capacity will not be
allowed to take a "permit-free" employment unless there are "...
exceptional circumstances, such as strong personal and compassionate
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reasons or reasons involving an aspect of vital public interest".
This is a very heavy onus on the applicant and it i3 safe to assume
that most visitors will not be allowed to go into "permit-free" jobs.
The option therefore is to come in as a "permit-free" person.
Extensions of Leave: No provision for an extension of stay for
"permit-free" workers is made in the Rules. It has been held that
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the omission of the extensions is a deliberate act. That being
so it seems that "permit-free" workers are subject to paragraphs
5 of H.C. 80 and 82 which provide that in cases where people are
admitted with no condition imposed restricting employment and
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"... the Department of Employment is prepared in the particular
case to approve the proposed employment, an appropriate extension of
stay may be granted; if not an extension must be refused".
The effect of the above provision is that at the end of the 12
months for which a "permit-free" person is initially admitted into
the country he must apply to the Home Office for an extension of
stay. The Home Office must refer the matter to the Department of
Employment who will either approve or refuse the employment. If
it is refused that will be the end of the matter. If, however,
it is approved the Home Offfice has a discretion either to grant
the extension or refuse it. In the latter case the Home Office
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must give reasons for refusing to extend leave of stay and the
applicant has of course, a right to appeal tinder the immigration
appeals system.
A crewmember who has been given leave to enter to join a ship
or aircraft or who has been given leave to enter for hospital treat¬
ment, repatriation or transfer to another ship or aircraft in the
U.K. should be granted an extension to stay only when that is necessary
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to fulfil the purpose for which they were given leave to enter.
There may however be a removal of the time limit of stay in the U.K.
if he marries or comes to marry a woman settled in the U.K. as will
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be seen later. This applies to women as well as men.
Wives and Children: The wives and children under 18 years of a person
"admitted to seek employment" should be given leave to enter for
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the period of the applicant's authorised stay. It is submitted
that people "admitted to seek employment" include "permit-free"
workers and accordingly their dependants are admissible. Their
freedom to take employment should not be prohibited unless the
applicant is himself prohibited to take employment. The Rules refer
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to the "wives" of people admitted to seek employment. By this is
meant that the husband and children of a woman allowed to come into
the U.K. to seek employment will not be admissible to join her.
This is another aspect of sexual discrimination.
(2) Workers:
All other persons who wish to come and work in the U.K.
28*7
and have no right of abode must have a work permit issued by
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the Department of Employment before they can be allowed to work.
If such a person has not got a work permit leave to enter must be
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refused without more. A work permit is issued to an employer
on application by him and is only for a specific post with that
particular employer. The employer must show that he has made every
effort to find a suitable worker in the U.K. without any success
before his request can be granted.
There is a limited number of categories of employment for which
work permits may be issued e.g. professional, executive and skilled
craftsmen, workers in hospitals, and others "if in the opinion of
the Secretary of State for Employment their employment is in the
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national interest". Permits for skilled and semi-skilled
292
jobs are available to citizens of Malta and Dependent Territories.
In both categories a person must be between the ages of 18 and 54
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inclusive to be entitled to a work permit.
A work permit is not an entry clearance although it may enable
to do so
a person who is to appeal against a refusal of leave to enter/while
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he is in the U.K; just like a person with an entry clearance.
It is advisable for a person with a work permit to have an entry
clearance as well. In either or both cases the immigration officer
has a discretion to refuse him entry if the immigration officer's
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examination reveals some good reason for so doing e.g. where false
representations have been employed or material facts have been
concealed, whether or not to the applicant's knowledge, for the purpose
of obtaining the work permit or the entry clearance or both, or the
applicant's age puts him outside the limits for employment, or he
does not intend to take the employment specified or is not capable
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of doing so. Under this Rule immigration officers have consider¬
able discretionary powers to refuse entry but they must,in doing so,
confine themselves to the grounds that can be found in the Rules,
for there is no "good reason" if it is not in the Rules or any other
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directions given by the Secretary of State.
A person whose work permit's period of validity has expired on
his arrival may nevertheless be admitted into the country if the
immigration officer is satisfied that circumstances beyond his control
prevented his arrival before the permit expired and that the job is
297still open to him. This means, by necessary implication, that
if the job is no longer open to him he must be refused entry and
presumably he has no right of appeal against the refusal or if he
298has a right of appeal then he cannot appeal while he is in the U.K..
A person with a current work permit will normally be admitted for
a period of 12 months with a condition permitting him to take or
change employment only with the permission of the Department of
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Employment. At the end of that period an extension may be granted
if the applicant is still engaged in the employment specified in the
permit, or other employment approved by the Department of Employment,
and the employer confirms that he wishes to continue to employ him.
Unless there is any special reason to the contrary, the extension
should be granted for a further 3 years. Cases where the applicant
is no longer in approved employment should be considered in the light
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of the relevant circumstances. A number of things call for
analysis here. In the first place although the Immigration Act
1971 vests the power to admit non-patrial3 into the country and. to
vary conditions of such an admission in the Secretary of State and
immigration officers, it has been held that the Rules above
which provide that the Secretary of State shall consult the Department
of Employment are not ultra vires the Act because there is nothing to
"... preclude the Secretary of State from providing in the Rules he
lays before Parliament, for consultation with another Department
before exercising his powers under s.4(l) of the Immigration Act
1971 and it seems entirely appropriate for matters relating to
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employment to be referred to the Department of Employment".
In fact the Rules do "... not transfer or purport to transfer to
302
the Department the power to give leave to remain therai^ The
explanation for the above holdings is that the Secretary of State
has under s.3(2) of the Act power to" make the Rules. It would be
illegal if the Secretary of State made a Rule vesting a discretion
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vested in him by the Act of Parliament to another Department
and accordingly the Employment Department is not vested with the
discretion of varying a non-patrial's conditions of stay. All
that the Department of Employment is required to do is to approve
or disapprove any employment referred to it and no more. This is
quite a different matter from when the Department of Employment
refuses to approve employment referred to it and the Home Office and
appellate authorities in reliance of that refusal do not extend an
applicant's leave to stay in that employment.
Other Relevant Patters; There are two things which must be kept in
mind when dealing with the power of the Secretary of State to vary
conditions of stay. Firstly, there are people who come into the U.K.
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in temporary capacities like visitors and students and others like
trainees and the "permit-free" people who do not,strictly speaking,
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come into the country under the work permit scheme. There are
also people who must have a work permit before they can come into
the country and strictly speaking they form the work-permit category.
When the Secretary of State is exercising his discretion to vary
conditions of stay and the matter is referred to the Department of
Employment then different and distinct Rules apply and these have
not, from the reported cases, always been kept in mind.
For people who come into the U.K. for temporary reasons and
others, like the "permit-free" people, all of whom form the non-
work permit class, when the limited time for which they were
admitted into the country expires then they must apply for an
extension of their stay under paragraph 5 of H.G. 80 and
82.Under these Rules applications for employment
by people who were admitted into the country subject to a condition
prohibiting employment e.g. students, must be refused without
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reference to the Department of Employment. If the Secretary of
State refuses a variation without reference to the Department of
Employment one has a right of appeal to an adjudicator in the first
instance, and the adjudicator must, under s.19(2) of the Immigration
Act, consider whether on the facts of the case it was right not to
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refer the case as is "normal" and if not he must consider the
307
matter afresh. What the adjudicator seeks to do in reconsidering
the matter afresh is to see if there is anything in the circumstances
\
of the applicant's case which constitutes an abnormal situation so
as to take it out of paragraphs 5 and 5 of H.C. 80 and H.C. 82
308
respectively. Such abnormal or exceptional circumstances
include, for example, strong and personal compassionate reasons,
203
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or reasons involving an aspect of vital public interest.
Hie Secretary of State cannot simp]y refuse an application
for variation of conditions without giving reasons. If he fails to
give reasons then again the applicant has a right of appeal to an
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adjudicator, initially, who must apply his mind afresh to the issue.
In either case if the adjudicator finds that there aire abnormal circum¬
stances, then he must refer the question of employment to the
Department of Employment for consideration.
In cases where a condition prohibiting employment was not imposed
then if the Department of Employment (which must be consulted)
in any particular case approves the proposed employment, an appropri¬
ate extension may be granted but if the Department of Emplo\rment
refuses to approve the proposed employment then that will be the end
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o,f the matter. In any case where the Department approves the
proposed employment the Home Office has under the Rules a discretion
to refuse to extend leave to stay and in that case there is a right
of appeal to the adjudicator.
For people who came into the U.K. as work-permit holders and
are accordingly in the "work-permit category", an application for
extension of leave to stay and work is made under H.C. 80 and H.G. 82
paragraphs 19 and 17 respectively. Such a person who wishes to
apply for an extension of his stay may be granted the extension if
he is still engaged in the employment specified in the permit or
other employment approved by the Department of Employment, and the
employer confirms that he wishes to continue to employ him. Unless
there is any special reason to the contrary, the extension should be
for a further 3 years. Cases where the applicant is no longer
in approved employment should be considered in the light of all the
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relevant circumstances. In this Rule too there is no discretion
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vested in the Department of Employment by the Secretary of State.
All that the Department of Employment is required to do is to
approve any particular employment and then the discretion of
whether to refuse or extend leave of stay reverts to the Secretary
of State. Unlike cases of people who come into the U.K. in a
temporary capacity when, in the case of work-permit holding people,
the Department of Employment refuses to approve a job it does not
necessarily mark the end of the matter for paragraphs 19 and 17
above give the Secretary of State and the appellate authorities
discretion to consider the case "in the light of all the relevant .
circumstances". The Secretary of State and the appellate authorities
do not have this discretion in the case of people in the U.K. in a
temporary capacity who have applied to work and the Department of
Employment has refused to approve the employment. The Tribunal
has, however, refused to exercise the discretion in favour of an
applicant who was a work-permit holder and who was applying for
a variation of leave to do a job in a mental hospital; a job
which was of great value to the community and for which there were
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great difficulties in recruiting staff. The Tribunal was of the
view that the words "relevant circumstances" in paragraphs 19 and
17 above related to matters outside the question of employment,
such as the exercise of a discretion on compassionate grounds
affecting the applicant, and they had nothing to do with the nature
of the employment involved. The effect of this decision is that an
an applicant cannot appeal merely on the ground that the Secretary
I
of State has exercised his discretion unreasonably in refusing a
variation of conditions 'where the Department of Employment
has refused to approve a particular employment. An applicant can
only appeal on the ground that his particular circumstances are
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such that having regard to his exceptional circumstances he should
be considered for a variation of leave to stay. He has a right
of appeal to the appellate authorities should the Secretary of State
not be able to think, in that case, that the applicant has no special
or exceptional circumstances or strong personal compassionate reasons.
It follows from this also that the decision of the Department of
Employment to refuse to approve a particular employment remains
final and there is no appeal against it.
Wives and Children; The wife and children under the age of 13 years
of a person with a work permit admitted into the U.K. should be
given leave to enter for the period of his authorised stay and
their freedom to take employment should not be restricted unless
the head is himself restricted. In this case also the husband
and children of a woman admitted to come to the U.K. to work as
the holder of a work permit will presumably not be allowed. It
is submitted, however, that this should not be the case.
Seasonal Workers: Provision is made for unskilled seasonal workers
who must also have work permits. Their work permits will not be
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renewed beyond 31 October in any year. Workers admitted as




There are two clasees of businessmen i.e. those
who come into the country as visitors for the purpose of transacting
business (whether that is the primary purpose or whether it was
merely incidental to the visit) and people who come into the
317
country to establish themselves in business. The first category
of businessmen raises no problems as no impediments are placed in
318their way. They may however apply for the consent of the
Secretary of State to be allowed to establish themselves in business
whether on their own account or as partners in a new or existing
319
business. Each application is considered on its own merit and
at that stage the applicants automatically fall into the second
category of businessmen.
People who have obtained entry clearances or have applied to
the Secretary of State for a variation of their conditions of stay
for the purpose of establishing themselves in the U.K. in business
should be admitted for a period not exceeding 12 months with a
condition restricting their freedom to take employment. A person
320
without an entry clearance may be admitted for 2 months and
advised to present his case to the Home Secretary if he satisfies
321
the conditions relating to businessmen.
What conditions then must a person satisfy before he can
be allowed entry into the U.K. as a businessman? The Rules have
given a detailed guide of the conditions i.e.:
"...he will need to show, if joining an
established business, that he will be bringing
money of his own to put into the business;
that he will be able to bear his share of the
liabilities; that his share of the profits will
be sufficient to support him and his dependants;
that he will be actively concerned in the running
of the business; and that there is a genuine
need for his services and investment. The
audited accounts of the business for previous years
will require to be produced, in order to establish
the precise financial position"."If the
applicant wishes to establish a new business ...
on his own account he will need to show that
he will be bringing into the country sufficient
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funds to establish a business that can realis¬
tically be expected to support him and depen¬
dants without recourse to employment for which
a work permit is required".^23
Some of these conditions will now be looked at in detail in
accordance with decided cases. A person wishing to establish
himself in business either new or old and whether on his own
account or in partnership is required to show that he will "be
bringing into the country" sufficient money "of his own" to
put into the business. In SAMJI v HOKE SECRETARY.324 it
was held by the Tribunal that money paid into a U.K. account of
the applicant by his father who was resident in the U.K. does not
qualify as assets "brought into the country". In its own words
"the method employed, that is, of the father giving his son
substantial sums of money (in the U.K.) which were thereafter
claimed to the appellant's own assets, does not ... accord with
the intention and indeed the specific requirements of the ...
Rules". It follows that assets paid into the U.K. account of
an applicant by a person resident in the U.K. will not be considered
as assets brought into the country. It is submitted, however, that
it is within the Rules to pay money into a U.K. account of an
applicant if the money comes from outside the U.K.. Thus it is
not the residence of the payee in the U.K. that is the criterion
but the fact that the money came from outside the U.K..
"Own Assets"; The condition that has raised more problems is the
requirement that the applicant must bring "assets of his own".
In a case decided under the old laws requiring a person wishing
to establish himself in business in the U.K. to devote "assets
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of his own" to the business it was held by the Tribunal that
208
"assets of his own" could properly include monies freely given
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to the applicant by his wife. It was material in this respect
that the applicant had an unfettered control of the assets.
It has also been held that a person who refuses to disclose the
source of a substantial money in his possession will be refused
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permission to set up business. The money involved wa3
£5,000 and it was paid into the applicant's U.K' account from
outside the U.K.. It is important therefore to note that it
is not enough that the money came from outside the U.K.. One
must also show the source of that money.
The term "sufficient money" has not been defined but it will
of course, vary from case to case. Whatever the case may be, the
amount of money to be brought into the U.K. for the purpose of the
business must be such that the applicant will not need to
supplement the business activities by employment for which a
7pO
work permit is required. The matter does not simply rest
there. Where money is channeled from outside to bolster the
business and that money is not at the disposal of the applicant
in the sense that he has no fettered control of it and the source
is known then he will be refused leave to stay as a businessman
because he has not got sufficient money for the business.
The money must therefore be enough to set up a business "...
which would when established support the proprietor and at the
same time enable (him) to make reasonable provisions for holidays
and illness and to build up a reserve to meet the vicissitudes of
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trade" Accordingly assets that are not going to enable a
person to establish a business that will yield enough income to
330
meet those conditions is not enough. If the applicant is
devoting his own assets to an already established business he
209
must not only fulfil the above conditions but must also show
that the assets he is devoting to the business are proportional
to his interest in it. His interest in the business must be
such that it yields enough income to enable him to make reasonable
provision for his personal maintenance and that of his dependants
and to meet the vicissitudes of the business without any outside
331
help.
Although the conditions above sound, and indeed are, onerous
it has been held that a woman with a dressmaking business which
earned her £6 - £7 a week and with only £80 to live on would be
allowed to stay in the country in business because of, inter alia,
the "volume of work available in an apparently lucrative business"
and because it was "unlikely that (she) would need to supplement
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her activities by outside employment". The applicant in
this case was in receipt of an allowance from her father but
it was not considered serious. This case is to be treated as
an exception of the general rules above.
Other Conditions: A person must fulfil and meet all the conditions
above tesis and also comply with the general rules of admission.
Thus a person was refused leave to stay in the country as a
businessman because he practised deception to the immigration
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officer in collusion with his brother contrary to the rules.
In the particular case the applicant's conduct was enough to
justify his exclusion from the country under the Rules and he did
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not show enough candour.
Evidence of new and subsequent evidence will, in matters
relating to stay in the U.K. as a businessman, normally form the
335
basis of a new application. In other words unless there are
210
exceptional reasons evidence of new things e.g. improved financial
state etc., will form the basis of a new application and accordingly
the best thing is to apply straight away for leave to enter on
that new basis.
A person coming to join an established business in the U.K.
as a partner or director will be refused entry into the country
if his proposed partnership or directorship amounts to disguised
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employment. This provision has come up for interpretation in
a number of cases. In P. SINGH v HOME SECRETARY. 537 the
appellant applied to be allowed to stay in the U.K. ih a business
owing to his experience and investment in the business. He was
a director and secretary of the company on a salary and had
loaned money to the company. He held 15 £1 shares out of
the company's capital of £100. He, however, received no
interest on his loan nor dividend on his shareholding. Moreover
there was no agreement in writing as to his future in the company
and he could be removed from the board and from his secretarial
duties at any time by the majority shareholders. It was held
by the Tribunal that in the absence of any evidence as to the
continuity of his position in the company and as he did not
receive any share of the profits, the appellant was in reality no
more"than a paid employee of the company and would need an
employment permit to work.
It appears that where partnership is claimed there must be
articles of partnership regulating the future of the partners
and what they are entitled to. Y/hat is not clear from this is
whether the Tribunal can go behind a formally executed document
setting out all the matters required to be set out in it. It
is possible that they will do so in order to ensure actual
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compliance with the law but in doing so they will be treading
on the person's civil rights.
The Tribunal has been ready therefore to allow a person to
stay in the country as a businessman where it was shown that
he had been associated with the business for many years and
that he owned 2,100 shares out of the capital of the business of
15,000 shares, that that financial year he had been voted £1,500
in emoluments as a director and that he owned a 25/« share of a
property which was worth £15,000. In the circumstances it
was held that this was not a disguised employment but a partner¬
ship and it was apparent that there was a need for his investment
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and services.
In another case it wa3 held that a dressmaker with little
income and money to start her business would be allowed to stay
in the country to do business because it was demonstrated that
her business was a lucrative proposition and that she was competent
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and resourceful. To be admitted to go into business one must
be a partner or director in the true sense of the word therefore.
Businessmen from non-Commonwealth countries allowed to remain
V a r\
for more than 6 months are required to register with the police.
They are however allowed to bring in their wives and children
under the age of 18 but since the husbands as businessmen will
be prohibited to take employment it might follow that their
wives and children will also be prohibited from taking employment?^
A person admitted as a visitor who applies for a variation of
his leave to stay as a businessman and has satisfied the
Secretary of State that he qualifies as such under the rules above
will be granted an extension of stay of up to 12 months; where
the person was admitted initially as a businessman he will also
212
be granted an appropriate extension of stay if he still qualifies
342
as a businessman under the Rules.
(4) People of Independent Means:
A person of independent means is one who satisfies
the immigration authorities that he can live in the U.K.
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indefinitely without working. According to the Rules a
person may show that he is of independent means by producing
bank statements, or a statement of pension entitlement or
other evidence that he has means of support under his own control
and disposable in the U.K. and which are adequate not merely
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for a year or two but for the foreseeable future. Such
a person who also produces an entry clearance granted for that
purpose will be admitted into the U.K. for an initial period of
12 months but in other cases he will be admitted for 2 months
initially and advised to make further application to the Home
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Office.
The most important issue that arises in the above case is
what "independent means" means. There are a few cases that
demonstrate what the authorities take into account in deciding
whether a person is or is not of independent means. In
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RAI'IDIIAWA v ROMS SECRETARY, the appellant aged 63 had a pension
of £10 a month and two small farms in India from which he got
some income. He was staying with his children who provided
him with free board and lodging both of which he sought to be
considered. The Tribunal found that the appellant's income in
the U.K. was inadequate on its own to support him and he could
only manage financially by being able to live free of expense
with his children. In the circumstances it was of the view that
the person was not independent in means and particularly as
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"... his income cannot be taken in conjunction with his partial
dependence on his family in order to establish him as a person
of independent means". Although this case was decided under
the now repealed laws, it is still good law as the present rules
are the same. Accordingly a person cannot under the rules claim
the benefits he is receiving from his friends or relatives as part
of his income when assessing whether he is a person of independent
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means. In a later case of HOMB SECRETARY v RAVAL, the
Tribunal following the case of Randhawa above refused to take
into account the benefit of nearly free board and lodging offered
to an elderly couple, 62 and 59 years old, by their son.
However the Tribunal found that the couple "did not smoke or
drink alcohol and (were) vegetarians". They were "in receipt of
a pension and allowances" which was assured and guaranteed and
their weekly income was £20. It was held that although the
"income of £20 will leave little over after all expenses have
been met, ... the respondent and his wife will be able to manage,
leading a frugal life as has been their wont, even if they have
to pay for their own board and lodging". Their leave to stay
was thus extended for 12 months. This case is a good illustra¬
tion of the appellate authorites1 attitudes. As long as one
can show an assured income that is disposable in the U.K. for
his use and it can be shown, purely arithmetically, that he
can live on it, if only barely, then one may be allowed to stay
in U.K. as a person of independent means. The demand is haidly
onerous.
In another case an applicant had £9,000 in an Australian
bank which would have earned him an income of £1,500 p.a. in
interest and it was all disposable to him in the U.K. on
x 548request.
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It was held that he had adequate means, not merely for one year
or two but for the foreseeable future.
The word "independent mean3n is therefore used in such a
fashion as not to allow a person to remain in the U.K. largely
on the basis of moneys or benefits in kind given to him as
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income whether from outside or inside the U.K.
Wives and children under 18 years of people allowed to
remain in the U.K. on the basis that they have independent means
will be allowed into the country but there will be a prohibition
on their taking employment since their husbands are not allowed
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to take employment. Both the applicants and their dependants
will be given an extension of leave to remain provided at that
time they satisfy the Home Office that they are people of
351
independent means still. People of independent means allowed
to remain in the country for more than 6 months must register
352
with the police if they are visa nationals.
(5) Self-Smployed People;
Self-employed people with entry clearances are
admitted initially for 12 months if an immigration officer is
satisfied that they will be able to support themselves and
their dependants without recourse to public funds. They will
be prohibited from taking employment. If they have not so
satisfied the immigration officer then they may be allowed
into the country for 2 months initially and advised to make
1 353
further application to the Home Office. The problem that has
to be resolved is what a "self-employed person" is. The
rules have given an artist and a writer as examples of a self-
354
employed person. In one case a person applied for a
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variation of his conditions to stay in the U.K. to fulfil a
long-term recording contract which involved public appearance with
355
supporting English musicians. He was himself a musician.
He claimed that for the above reasons he would a3 an artist
satisfy the provisions relating to self-employment. The Tribunal
refused his submission and said he was an entertainer not a
self-employed person. It was of the opinion that the word
"artist" in the rules meant a person like a painter or sculptor
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rather than a 3inger. In another case an applicant sought an
extension of stay as "self-employed". He was proposing to
work on a commission basis selling and advertising space in a
named commercial directory and helping to promote sales of the
directory and also selling on a free-lance basis for a mail
marketing consultancy business. The Tribunal held that the
evidence showed that he was to be engaged under a contract of
service by the two companies and was not following an occupation
remotely resembling those of the instances given by the rules.
These two cases clearly demonstrate that the categories
of self-employed people are limited by the very strict interpre¬
tation of the word"self-employed".
Y/ives and children under the age of 18 of self-employed
people should be admitted into the country for the appropriate
357time anda restriction on employment imposed on them.
Obviously, an applicant must show that he can be able to support
himself and his dependents before they are admitted. They will
be granted extensions of stay in the U.K. if they show that they
are self-employed still and that they will continue to be able to
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support their dependants. Uon-Commonwealth self-employed
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people if admitted for more than 6 months are required to register
359
with the police.
All people allowed into the U.K. to take or seek employment,
or as businessmen, or as people of independent means or as self-
employed are not allowed to bring any other dependants
other than their wives and children under 18 years until and unless
the time limit on their stay in the U.K. has been removed i.e., until
they have been in the U.K. for 4 years and have been admitted for
i 360
settlement.
(v) People Coming for Settlement
People falling under this head are U.K. passport holders,
dependants of the U.K. nationals or/and settled residents, (i.e.
wives, children, parents and grandparents, distressed relatives,
husbands and those coming for marriage) and returning residents.
(1) U.K. Passport holders:
Where a non-patrial passenger is a holder of a passport
of the United Kingdom and Colonies and he presents a special
voucher issued to him by a British Government representative
overseas (or an entry clearance in lieu) he is to be admitted for
settlement. If he comes without the special voucher or entry
clearance granted for the purpose of settlement he is to be
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refused entry. It must be noted forthwith that the method of
issue of special vouchers is outside the scope of the immigration
362 tWI
appellate authorities and^cannot, moreover, be obtained in the
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U.K.. In the circumstances it is often advisable to apply
for an entry clearance for the purpose of settlement because
if it is refused one has under the Immigration Act 1971, a right
of appeal and, an entry clearance can be granted in the United
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Kingdom. In a good case there is no reason why the appellate
authorities can refuse to admit a person for settlement in an
appeal arising from such a refusal. The effect of this may well
be to circumvent the discretionary method of issuing vouchers
for settlement but the Rules and the Immigration Act anticipate
this by providing that one may apply for an entry clearance in lieu
of a voucher for settlement. A refusal of an entry clearance
automatically gives rise to an appeal.
The issue of a voucher or entry clearance for settlement
does not depend on the sex of the applicant so long as one
holds a passport of the U.K. and Colonies and is a British subject.
There are cases, however, where the issue of such a voucher or
entry clearance will depend on the marital status of a woman.
Thus, widowed women who cannot produce certificates of marriage
\
or "divorcees" who divorced without going through the courts, or
deserted women who cannot produce paper evidence of their situation
will most certainly find themselves in the predicament whereby they
hold British passports but cannot qualify for the grant of a
364
voucher or entry certificates.
Under the Rule above it is deliberately required of the
U.K. and Colonies passport holders to be in possession of the
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passports but unlike the old immigration laws, entry or leave
to enter is not dependent on whether or not the passport was
issued on behalf of the U.K. Government in a part of the
Commonwealth or by a U.K. Colonial Representative. The
criterion now is whether or not such a person is a citizen
of the U.K. and Colonies (or a British subject not possessing
that citizenship or the citizenship of any other
Commonwealth country or territory) who holds a U.K. passport
issued in the U.K. and Islands or the Republic of Ireland. In
that case he will be admitted freely without proof of patriality
unless the passport is endorsed to show that he is subject to
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immigration control. In addition citizens of the U.K. and
Colonies who hold U.K. passports wherever issued and satisfy
the immigration officer that they have been previously admitted
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for settlement are re-admitted freely. If this were not so
any person once accepted for settlement would forthwith lose
his right of exit for no reason and this would be tantamount
to a restriction of his freedom of movement.
A non-patrial citizen of the U.K. and Colonies or a British
subject not holding such citizenship nor that of any other
Commonwealth country is subject to an intractable problem if he
does not in fact possess a U.K. passport already. It has been
held, and it is indeed a rule of great antiquity, that the power
to grant or withhold passports in the U.K. is one of Her Majesty'
Royal Prerogatives and that the Foreign Secretary has a
discretion to accede to or refuse an application for such a
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passport. The prerogative may be exercised by a British
representative overseas or by a Governor of a Colony of the U.K.
or dependent territories and in these cases, like that of the
Foreign Secretary, the power to grant or refuse a passport is
absolutely discretionary. That being so a person who is a
citizen of the U.K. and Colonies or a British subject with no
such or other Commonwealth citizenship applying initially for
a passport (either in the U.K. or abroad) for the purpose of
settlement is placed in a predicament without a legal remedy.
If he is refused the passport he has no remedy and without such
a passport he cannot be issued with the voucher or entry
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clearance for the purpose of settlement under this head.
Moreover, those people whose U.K. passports were not issued in
the U.K. could still be refused the voucher for settlement and,
as has been noted, there is no remedy against this either.
Ihese are burdensome hurdles and it is sometimes easier for a
person without such British connections to settle in the U.K.
than them in spite of the fact that the U.K. Government has
certain obligations towards them.
A citizen of the U.K. and Colonies holding a British pass¬
port who presents a special voucher (or entry clearance in lieu
thereof) for the purpose of settlement will be admitted for
settlement. If he has an entry clearance for that purpose
which has been obtained by concealment or false misrepresent¬
ations of material facts then he will be refused entry into
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the U.K. Presumably this applies in respect of special
vouchers too. However, whereas an appeal lies to the appellate
authorities from a refusal of entry on grounds of concealment
and misrepresentations of material facts if the person was
holding an entry clearance, it is not clear if such an appeal
lies in the case where such concealment and misrepresentations
of material facts were employed to obtain a special voucher.
Since the Tribunal has held that the method of issuing special
vouchers lies outside the appellate uthorities jurisdiction, it
would seem that the appellate authorities will have no jurisdic¬
tion to entertain an appeal arising from a refusal of entry on
grounds that misrepresentation and concealment of material facts
were employed to obtain a special voucher.
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(2) Dependants of People Settled in the U.K.:
This section deals with dependants of a person who
is already in the U.K. and settled there, or who is on the same
371
occasion given indefinite leave to enter. Except for the
wife and children under 18 of a Commonwealth citizen who is a
patrial or was settled in the U.K. before the coming into force
of the Immigration Act 1971, the admission of all dependants will
depend on the ability and willingness of the settled person to
support and accommodate his dependants without recourse to public
^ 572funds.
It is a condition that a person coming into the U.K. for the
purpose of settlement as a dependant must be in possession of a
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current entry clearance granted for that purpose.
(a) Wives; The Rules provide that the wife of a
person who is settled in the U.K. or is on the same occasion
being admitted for settlement is to be admitted if the person
can support and accommodate her without recourse to public
funds and if she has a current entry clearance for settlement.
A member of H.M. Forces based in the U.K. but serving overseas
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is to be regarded as being in the U.K.. However, a woman
who has been living in permanent association with such a man
has no claim to enter, but may be admitted as if she were his
wife, due account being taken of any local custom or tradition
375
tending to establish the permanence of the association.
*
How does a woman prove that she is the wife of a settled
person in the U.K.? There have been problems in this area.
In-the first place the standard of proof of a marriage required
is on a balance of probabilities. In R. v HOKE SECRETARY ex
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■parte S.B. HUSSAIN, Widgery, L.C. Justice remarked that "I can
see no possible reason requiring a higher standard of proof ....
It would be quite unreasonable to assume that (the immigration rules)
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contemplate proof beyond dispute or even beyond reasonable doubt".
In spite of this dictum it is widely known that entries are
refused to wives on the ground that there were discrepancies
between the husband who may have been in the U.K. for years and the
wife. Discrepancies such as the timber of trees or houses on the
family land, the places, dates of birth of children, ages and
residences of other relatives etc. will normally lead to a
refusal of entry of the wife into the U.K.. Where the applicant
fails to produce documents such as a marriage certificate she
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will be refused entry almost automatically. The problem of
more
the wives is all the/worse because until recently documentation
of such things as marriages, deaths and births was not there or
if it was there it was not compulsory.
Domicile: A woman who has managed to prove that she is married to
a person admitted to the U.K. for settlement will not ipso facto
be admitted into the U.K.. Their marriage must be in accordance
with the English law if the husband's domicile is the U.K. in spite
of a provision for the local customs and traditions to be taken
into account. Reported cases reveal a very restrictive interpre¬
tation of "marriage" in relation to wives whose husbands are
settled and domiciled in the U.K.. A woman will not be allowed
to come into the U.K. if her marriage to her husband is the
second or the third one to the man and the marriage takes place
•Zr/Q
after the man is admitted for settlement in the U.K.. Thus
in A. MUSSARAT v HOME SECRETARY,the sponsor was resident in
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the U.K. since 1963. In 1970 while on a visit to his wife and
children in Pakistan he married his second wife under Pakistan
law. He subsequently applied for an entry certificate to
enable her to accompany him to the U.K.. The entry certificate
officer refused her an entry certificate on the ground that during
her marriage the husband had abandoned his Pakistan domicile
and acquired a domicile of choice in the U.K.. The decision
was reversed on appeal because the Tribunal was not satisfied
that there was sufficient evidence to establish a change of
domicile. This case is important because it establishes the
fact that even if a marriage is not valid according to the U.K.
laws or for the purpose of the U.K. immigration law, it will
nevertheless be recognised as valid if the man has not abandoned
his former domicile for that of the U.K. notwithstanding that
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he is settled in or is a citizen of the U.K.. Thus in one case
a woman was refused an entry clearance to join her U.K. settled
husband because she was married to the man under the Nigerian
customary or native law; the marriage was potentially polygamous
and accordingly unacceptable as a marriage for the purpose of
as
' immigration law. It was found/a fact that the man had not
abandoned his Nigerian domicile or for that matter taken the
English domicile and on that finding the wife was admitted to
.. join the husband.
case
In another /there was a proxy marriage which was irregular
in form and would not have been recognized as a marriage under
immigration law. The man had not abandoned his Pakistan
domicile for that of the U.K. and because of that the proxy
, .. . . . 381
marriage was held valid.
There is one exception to the holdings above. A woman who
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has been living in permanent association with a man settled in
the U.K. may be treated as his wife even if the woman i3 not
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actually married to him or if she is invalidly married to him.
The Tribunal has held that the exception is apposite to cover
not only single persons cohabiting as man and wife but also in
cases where one or other of the parties may already be married
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and therefore unable to contract with the other party.
In this case the question of domicile did not arise and was
never referred to. It, however, applies to wives of people
who are settled and domiciled in the U.K. since the irregularities
of a marriage do not, from the other cases, seem to form a ground
for refusal of leave to enter for a wife whose husband's domicile
is not the U.K..
The introduction of domicile into immigration law has certainly
complicated things. In the first place it is a loophole in
the policy package, if there is such a policy, of excluding
wives whose husbands are settled in the U.K. but whose marriages
do not conform to the law of the United Kingdom. Thus assuming
the U.K. prohibits polygamy on the part of people coming to settle
in the U.K., then to have introduced domicile into the law meant
that the policy is defeated since people whose domicile is not
the U.K. fall outside the exclusion list.
In the second place, the introduction of the term domicile
is being used to strike down people's personal laws of various
immigrant communities in the U.K.. This is something that only
an Act of Parliament should do. In relation to this the fact
that a polygamous marriage, for example, is not recognizable
for the purpose of immigration law amounts to a down-grading of
the immigrant communities' cultural values and it is indeed
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questionable whether immigration law is the proper instrument
for this. To prohibit a Mohammedan man settled in U.K. from
marrying more than one wife and at the same time allow them to
follow the teachings of the Koran without a specific staturory
authorisation seems to be blatant disregard of other people's
cherished "freedoms". Is it possible that the Home Office is
able
administering a policy which it would not be/ to enact into law?
Accommodation: One of the mo3t serious limitations upon the
right of a settled man to bring his wife to the U.K. is that he
must be able and willing to support and accommodate her without
384 the wife and
recourse to public funds. In an unreported case
her children obtained entry clearance certificates for the purpose
ox settlement. On arrival in the U.K. it transpired that the
husband was serving 30 months imprisonment for robbery. Although
the family was allowed entry on the technical ground that they
were the family of a Commonwealth citizen who settled in the U.K.
before the Immigration Act 1971 came into force, it was made
abundantly clear by the Tribunal that no person who was going to
be a charge on public funds would be allowed into the country.
The case also illustrates the difference between being able and
being willing to support dependants. Both conditions must be
satisfied before entry is granted.
385It has been submitted that if the husband is unable to
show that he is lawfully settled in the U.K. then his wife will
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not be allowed to come into the U.K. for settlement. In
another case it was held that the wife of a returning resident
was refused entry because the husband was, at the time of her
387
arrival, in Bangladesh. The Tribunal was heavily influenced
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by the fact that there was no evidence that the husband would
be returning to the U.K. and the mere fact that a person may be
entitled, as of a right to return to the U.K. is not sufficient
evidence that he will come back.
(b) Children; Children under the age of 18 who
have entry clearances for settlement and whose parents are willing
and able to support them without recourse to public funds are to
be admitted for settlement:
(a) if both parents are settled in the United Kingdom, or
(b) if both parents are on the same occasion being admitted
for settlement; or
(c) if one parent is settled in the U.K. and the other is
on the same occasion admitted for settlement; or
(d) if one parent is dead and the other parent is settled
in the U.K. or is on the same occasion admitted for settlement;
or
(e) if one parent is settled in the U.K. or is on the same
occasion admitted for settlement and has had the sole responsi¬
bility for the child's upbringing; or
(f) if the Secretary of State has authorised the admission
of the child with or to join one parent or a relative other
than a parent because family or other considerations make ex¬
clusion undesirable - for example, where the other parent is
physically or mentally incapable of looking after the child -
and suitable arrangements have been made for the child's care.
"Parent" includes the stepfather of a child whose father is dead;
the stepmother of a child whose mother is dead; and the father
as well as the mother of an illegitimate child. It also includes
an adoptive parent, but only where there has been a genuine
transfer of parental responsibility on the ground of the original
parent's inability to care for the child, and the adoption is not
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one of convenience arranged to facilitate the child's admission.
Parents who were settled in the U.K. before the coming into
the force of the 1971 Immigration Act and who are from a
Commonwealth country need not show that they are willing and
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able to support their children without recourse to public funds.
Moreover an unmarried and fully dependent son under 21 or an
unmarried daughter under 21 who formed part of the family
overseas (whether Commonwealth or foreign) may be admitted if
the whole family is settled in the U.K. or is being admitted
for settlement; otherwise children over the age of 18 must qualify
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for admission in their own right.
Discrepancies involving age will in some cases lead to a
refusal of entry of a child into the U.K. for settlement. The
problem of determining a child's age in countries with no birth
records and given the immigration authorities substantial ^
scepticism is still unresolved. At one stage it was thought
391that bone x-rays were a sure proof of age but recently "this
was rejected as a method of establishing the age of a child
because it is unlikely to be useful or true in cases of children
from poverty stricken areas e.g. Bangladesh, and particularly
392when a child is of a poor build and nutrition. 'The age of
the child is of primary importance in establishing that the person
settled in the U.K. is the father and also for establishing
that the child is within the accepted age of admission of 18 years.
Once it is accepted, rightly or wrongly, that a child is
under the age of 18 and that he will be supported in the U.K.
then the immigration authorities have to be satisfied that the
parent(s) is/are settled in the United Kingdom under one of the
several heads listed above i.e.,
393
(a) If the parents are settled in the U.K.. In a case
decided under the old laws which were in part materia with the
present Rule, the appellant applied for an entry certificate to
enable him to join his natural mother. His father and mother
were separated when he was one week old on his father leaving
Jamaica for the U.K. and since January 1956 neither the appellant
nor his mother had any further contact with his father. The
appellant's mother subsequently came to the U.K. where she settled
His application for an entry certificate was refused on the ground
inter alia, that the intention of the provision "... if both
parents are settled in the U.K." was to enable children coming
to the U.K. for settlement to be united with both parents.
Although the applicant was eventually admitted into the U.K.
by the Home Office on his father being found settled in the U.K.
it is still the law that an applicant wishing to come to the
U.K. for settlement as a child under the age of 18 must satisfy
the immigration authorities that both parents are settled in
the U.K.. This is a very strict and narrow interpretation of
the provision and it is bound to cause a lot of hardship.
Perhaps it ought to be clarified at this stage that even
the word parent is restrictively applied. It was ruled in one
case that it does not include the mother who has remarried a
U.K. resident who is not the child's natural father, both of whom
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are settled in the United Kingdom. This is an odd pronounce¬
ment. On the face of it it would seem to obliterate the word
step-father altogether. However, it is applicable to polygamous
228
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marriages. In a later case ■ decided without reference to that
above, it was held that two children of a first marriage of a
certain lady became the step-children of a man of her second
marriage because their natural father had, like in the other
case above, abandoned them and because of the frequent occurrence
and general acceptance of common law marriages in Trinidad.
Accordingly the woman's second man in marriage was a step-father
of the children. In the first case the second marriage of the
parties took place in the U.K. whereas in the second case the
second marriage took place in Jamaica. It might be inferred
from the cases following the reasoning above that since there
is no frequent occurrence and general acceptance of common law
marriages, i.e. de_Jhcto marriages in the U.K., the appellate
authorities will be more willing to recognise a "step-father"
relationship in cases where a marriage took place in another country
where such marriages are accepted and will probably refuse to
recognise such a relationship if the "marriage" took place in
the U.K.. Distinctions of these kind make the law so compli¬
cated apart from the fact that there is an air of unreality in
them.
(b) If both parents are on the same occasion being admitted
for settlement: "On the same occasion" is used in relation to
time and accordingly a child under 18 who does not accompany
his/her parents when they are being admitted for settlement in
the U.K. will be, in general, refused entry if he/she applies for
an entry later for the purpose of settlement in the U.K.. The
Home Office and appellate authorities have, however, recognised
that there are cases where a child may be left behind when the
parents are being admitted for settlement. Obviously each case
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will be considered on its own merits but the following reasons are
normally accepted, that is: when children stay behind to complete
their education or are staying at a boarding school or where
there were no sufficient financial means for bringing them to
3Q6
the U.K.. " Under the old law there was no limit on the
length of time for which a family could remain separated before
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it could be re-united by effluxion of time. This is no
longer the case for it must be noted that the Rules place an
upper limit of 21 years for an unmarried and fully dependent
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son and 21 years for an unmarried daughter. Therefore a child
who does not come with the family for settlement for any sufficient
and satisfactory reason or reasons has until the age of 21 at the
most to apply to come for settlement with the family.
(c) Children who are under 18 years: They are to be admitted
for settlement if one parent is settled in the U.K* and the other
is on the same occasion admitted for settlement or
(d) if one parent is dead and the other parent is settled
in the U.K. or is on the same occasion admitted for settlement.
In general no problems arise in the above provisions as long as
the family moves to the U.K. in one unit or, if that is not
possible, there are cogent reasons for leaving any member of the
family behind.
(e) Many problems have arisen in respect of the provision
that a child under 18 years i3 to be admitted for settlement if
one parent is settled in the U.K. or is on the same occasion
admitted for settlement and has had the sole responsibility for
the child's upbringing. It is the phrase "... sole responsibility
for the child's upbringing" that has caused many problems. In
general the phrase has been said to mean not simply the legal
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responsibility. It embodies the attitude of thoughtfulness and
care (for the child) ... throughout its life"In short
there must be legal and moral responsibility epitomised by such
demonstrations as showing that the sponsor "... had sole respon¬
sibility as against anyone else in loco parentis".In a
classic definition the Tribunal held that "... the words 'sole
responsibility' cannot reasonably be construed in their most
liberal terms to mean absolute responsibility of the parent
in the U.K. for the upbringing of the child ... because some
form of responsibility must nearly in all cases be exercised in
practical matters by the relative with whom the child is living
outside the U.K.. The issue of sole responsibility for the
upbringing is not to be, moreover, decided only as between one
parent and the other parent. The decision in every case will
involve consideration inter alia of the sources and degree of
financial support for the child, and whether there is cogent
evidence of genuine interest in and affection for the child by
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the supporting parent in the U.K.".
It follows from the above dicta that each case will be
considered on its own merits having regard to all the practical
realities of the situation before "sole responsibility" is acknow¬
ledged. A general look at the cases reveals that where there has
been substantial, if not entire, financial support from the parent
in the U.K. and continuous concern for the child's welfare and a
desire for re-union the child will be admitted for settlement under
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this clause. If the responsibility is shared between the parents
one of whom does not live in the U.K., then the child will not
403
qualify under this head.
In an interesting case a mother of 3 children married in Guyana
had her marriage dissolved in the U.K. where she was settled. The
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High Court of England gave her the custody of the children although,
in fact, the father had, from 1962 when the mother left Guyana for
the U.K. until 1972, supported the children continuously. In 1972
the mother applied for entry certificates to enable the 3 children
to join her for settlement in the U.K.. It was argued on appeal
that, inter alia, it was not within the power of the adjudicator to
render the Divorce Court's order a nullity by refusing the children
entry certificates to enter the U.K. for settlement. The Tribunal,
to which a further appeal was made, ruled that the adjudicator, and
immigration authorities accordingly, had power to interfere with
the custody order of the High Court. As the sponsor had not
satisfied the authorities that she had the sole responsibility of
the children (and she did not of course have it) the entry certifi¬
cate's decision refusing such certificates was in accordance with
the law and the immigration rules applicable. Accordingly a
court custody order could not be permitted to nullify the relevant
404
provisions of immigration law and the Rules made thereunder.
That decision can be criticised for its rigid application of
the immigration rules to the exclusion of the interests of the
children. Normally courts make custody orders where it is in the
interest of the children, morally and economically, to be with
one or other of the parents. To refuse the admission of such
children merely on a technicality of law, goes against the court's
considered views and makes immigration law oppressive and is wholly
inconsistent with the doctrine of judicial precedent. Some parallel
could be drawn here with the fact that courts have no power to order
the deportation of a person from the U.K. but it must be remembered
that there is a specific provision specifying that the courts can
only recommend the deportation of a person. To hold, therefore,
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in the absence of a specific provision, that a court's custody-
order of children is not binding on immigration authorities is
not only to ignore a judicial order but it also effectively deprives
the courts of the power of enforcement of such an order.
(f) A child under the age of 18 years will be admitted
into the U.K. for settlement notwithstanding that he has not
satisfied any of the above conditions if the Secretary of State has
authorised the admission of the child to join one parent or a
relative other than a parent because family or other considerations
makes exclusion undesirable. It was held very early that "... in
deciding in any particular case if family or other considerations
make exclusion of an (applicant) undesirable ... such considerations
must be applied to the country in which the (applicant) live3 and
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not those pertaining in the United Kingdom". Such conditions
may be, for example, the accommodation available at the present
home, the age and health of the relative in charge of the child,
ill-will in the present home,^^ etc..
The only time that the conditions for the child in the U.K. will
be considered is when it has been shown that conditions obtaining
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abroad show that the exclusion is undesirable. A comparison of
this kind and at this belated time is more of an hindrance than a
help because the approach of immigration authorities and appellate
authorities will invariably be that if conditions abroad are better
than those in the U.K. then the child will be refused entry. If
vthere is to be consistency with the general interpretations adopted
here then once it is established that the conditions abroad make
a child's exclusion undesirable the child should be admitted without
further reference or comparison with the U.K. conditions. In
other words the expression that "family or other considerations make
233
exclusion undesirable" should be applied in relation to conditions
abroad only.
There is an element of irrelevant considerations by the
appellate authorities when considering cases under the above
head. In at least two cases the Tribunal when giving reasons
for refusing entry certificates to applicants has said that the
applicants had at the time of application for entry reached an
age when they might be a help to their ailing relatives e.g.
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grandmother, grandfather or father. Unless this is a total
reversal of the specific provisions of the Rules it cannot by
any stretch of imagination be argued that such a reason forms
a family or other consideration which makes exclusion undesirable.
In one case, however, the entry certificate officer refused entry
to an applicant because, in relation to other people in Jamaica,
409
the applicant was better off than others. The Tribunal
reviewed the decision and in allowing entry to the applicant ruled
that "... the fact that there were worse conditions elsewhere in
Jamaica is not relevant, since bad conditions are not made better
410
by the existence of even worse conditions". This seems a good
finding.
The conditions making exclusions from the U.K. undesirable
must be in existence at the time the application for entry is made
and it is not sufficient, for this reason, to state that they are
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imminent. This attitude is necessarily harmful in that a child
will not be admitted into the U.K. for settlement under this head
unless it is demonstrated that the conditions making exclusion
undesirable actually exist. Surely if it can be shown that the
conditions are imminent and will cause damage, be it irreparable or
not, a child should be admitted for settlement immediately.
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Parent: The term "parent" is not defined in the Rules but only-
examples of what relatives may be called parents are given. In
the circumstances it is necessary to look at decided cases to see
how the appellate authorities have approached the issue. It has
already been noted above that the term "parent" does not include
a stepmother or a stepfather where the mother has married a U.K.
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resident who is not the child's natural father. In that case
the natural father was still alive. In a later case the Tribunal
categorically stated that where there is a reference to "both"
parents", in the provisions set out above, the word "step-parent"
cannot be taken into account when a child's natural parents are
413
both living. In other words the word "parent" does not include
a step-father or a stepmother where the child's natural parents
are both living. The effect of this dicttwlis that where a child's
natural parents are not living together as man and wife, de facto
or de .jure, the child will not qualify to come for settlement to
the U.K. unless both natural parents are settled in the UJC. whether
. . 414
as a family (man and wife) or not. However, for reasons already
given above it appears that this provision applies to cases where
not
the second marriages have/taken place in the U.K. and accordingly
step-parents are recognised notwithstanding that both parents are
still living if the second marriage took place outside theU.K. and
particularly if the so called "Common Law Marriages" are practised
and accepted there.
How about "adoptive parents"? It is a well established law
that the immigration authorities and appellate authorities will not
recognise an "adoptive parent" as such if in fact under the law of
his former country or under his personal law, on the basis of which
the
the adoption is claimed, does not recognise/adoption. Thus it
was held that the immigration officer acted according to the
Immigration Law and Rules when refusing an entry certificate to
a
an applicant who claimed that he was adopted by/sponsor (the
sponsor claimed the adoption also) because adoption is not recognised
415
under Mohammedan Law. In such cases the only way out is to
get an adoption order of a competent court; a mere attestation
by a magistrate or judge that a relative or a person is an
416
adoptive parent will not and does not suffice. The appellate
authorities are prepared to recognise a de facto adoption if there
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is no mandatory law to the contrary. Thus in a recent case,
the Tribunal held where a child was handed over to another person
when he was young (about 20 years previously) that the lack of
legal adoption formalities could not, in the context of the West
Indies, be held to preclude a de facto adoption. It must be noted
that the Tribunal was heavily influenced by the fact that the
child had been brought up and depended entirely on the person
to whom he was given and that he had in fact never depended on the
natural parents who had no part in his upbringing. A de facto
adoption cannot, ipso facto, entitle an applicant to entry for
settlement if other conditions cannot be proved. Thus in one
case a de facto adoption by a Hindu man was recognised by the
appellate authorities, but since he could not show that he had
had the sole responsibility in the upbringing of the child the
child could not be admitted into the U.K. for settlement.
A legal adoption, no matter how perfect, will not suffice
for the admission of a child into the U.K. for settlement if it
419
was concocted for the purpose of falicitating such an admission.
There has got to be a genuine desire to adopt a child as one's own
and without this desire,to effect an adoption merely for the purpose
of facilitating admission amounts to an abuse of the judicial process,
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it is submitted. The problem lies in distinguishing cases of a
desire to take a child as one's ovm and "bogus adoptions" when an
adoption has been made to facilitate the entry of an adoptive child.
In the case of MERCHANT AND OTTERS v ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICSR.
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BOMBAY, a Hindu de facto adoption was held invalid for the
purposes of immigration law because it was contrary to the mandatory
procedure for adoption under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
421
Act 1956, of India. It was argued that the doctrine of 'factum
valet' which means "what ought not to be done is valid when done"
422
applied but the Tribunal following certain authorities ruled
that the doctrine of "factum valet" was ineffectual in the case of
an adoption in contravention of mandatory provisions.
Finally, it is submitted that a brother is a parent in certain
cases for the purpose of the definition of the term "parent". In
423
one case the appellate authorities accepted the importance of
the custom and tradition in India, as in many other countries,
whereby it would be the expectation within an Asian family that on
the death of the father the eldest son should assume responsibility
for his brothers and sisters. Where it is proved that responsibility
is assumed by a brother or a sister then in a proper case they should
be treated as parents.
Children over 18 Years; It was noted at the beginning of this topic
on children that children aged 18 years or over must qualify for
admission on their own right subject to the concession that an
unmarried and fully dependent son under 21 or an unmarried daughter
under 21 who formed part of the family unit overseas may be admitted
if the whole family is settled in the country or are being admitted
for settlement. It must be stated straight away that one may cease
to be a member of the family overseas before the upper age limit
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of 21 years if "... circumstances, such as marriage and thus
the formation of a new family unit, or leaving home to work elsewhere,
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show that the person has separated from the original family unit".
The absurdity of this holding is that a person may cease to be a
member of the family unit merely by marriage when it is a custom or
tradition that such a marriage is a further extension of the family
unit wherever it is. This vould certainly be the case in an
extended family system. To assume, therefore, as the Tribunal held,
that a marriage creates another family unit is not only a plain lack
of appreciation of the local circumstances but an imposition of a
new concept of family on the immigrants. Whether that is desirable
or not is a difficult question to answer but there is hardly any
doubt that the official approach, and perhaps policy, is to stick to
the British concept of a family in immigration matters.
There is nothing in the above case to suggest that that policy
applies to children under the age of 18. Such children have an
unqualified right of entry and they should be so admitted whether
they are married or unmarried and whether or not they are dependent
on their parents who are settled or are being admitted for settle¬
ment in the U.K.
A child who remains behind, for any cogent reason, when the
rest of the family has emigrated to the U.K. and at the time of
application he is over 18 years will be granted entry. A cogent
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reason may be remaining behind to complete a degree course.
In this case he will be admitted as a member of the family unit
overseas and not in his own right. In BERNARD v ENTRY CLEARANCE
426
OFFICER. KINGSTON. the appellant, an unmarried girl aged 19 years
from Jamaica applied for an entry clearance to be able to join the
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rest of her family which was-settled in the U.K.. The girl had
a 2 year old child and it was said that the appellant received
some financial support from the child's father. She also received
financial aid from her parents but not as much as from her child's
father. In 1973 the appellant's 5 siblings, all under 18 year3,
had joined her parents then settled in the U.K. but she remained
behind. She said that if she was admitted she would leave her
child with her paternal grandmother for care.
After the evidence above the Tribunal was asked to rule on
whether she should be admitted into the U.K. for settlement as an
unmarried daughter under 21 who formed part of the family unit
overseas, the whole family then being settled in the U.K. or being
admitted for settlement. The Tribunal held that the facts did
not disclose any cogent reason why the appellant's parents had not
attempted to re-group the family sooner; and as the evidence
showed that at the date of application the appellant maintained a
fairly close association with the father of the 2 year old child,
it appeared that she had already formed or was in the process of
forming her own "family unit. Her application was property refused.
The Tribunal was influenced by the existence of customary law
marriages in Jamaica although the case as a whole gives the impression
that it came to that conclusion too readily. The important revela¬
tion of the case is that although the Tribunal cannot look at
dependency on the parents settled or being admitted for settlement
in the U.K. in the case of an unmarried girl, it is absolutely free
to look at all the other circumstances at the home of a girl
abroad and the behaviour of the parents, particularly in failing to
bring the girl for settlement with the other children.
For a son above the age of 18 years but below the age of 21
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years to be admissible for settlement under the above clause he
must show that he is unmarried and completely dependent on the
sponsoring parent. Thus where a son was partly dependent on a
father in the home country and partly on a sponsoring mother settled
in the U.K. and divorced from her husband, it was held by the
Tribunal that there was no complete dependency on the mother and
accordingly the son was not a member of the family unit still
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remaining in an overseas country. The fact that the son was
the last remaining member overseas of the family unit of whom his
mother in the U.K. was the head did not avail him. Dependency
must therefore be full and complete and in some cases what that
means will depend on what the appellate authorities understand it
to mean. The policy considerations of subjecting a boy under 21
years to prove that he is fully dependent on the sponsors while
leaving a girl under the age of 21 years free from such proof are
not clear but they (policy considerations) may probably by related
to the fact that girls, particularly from the Indian sub-continent,
rely on their parents in most matters including marriages, even at
that age.
A person who has passed the age of 21 years must be admitted on
his own right whether he is unmarried and/or fully dependent on the
parents. There is no scope under this Rule by which a person who
has passed the age limit can come to the U.K. for settlement with
APR
his or her parents; because after that age he/she is no longer
a member of the family unit overseas for the purposes of the Immi¬
gration Rules.
For children under the age of 18 years the time of application
for an entry clearance is not crucial if it i3 made well before they
are 18 yearB old. For children above the age of 18 and below 21
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years of age the application for an entry certificate is crucial
particularly when regard is had to the fact that to obtain an entry
clearance may take up to 2 years. For this reason it is important
to be clear on when an application for an entry clearance is made.
It is an established law that an application for an entry clearance
is made when a request is tendered for it in "quite unambiguous terms ...
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to be issued to a particular person". The request which can
only and must be made to an entry clearance officer may be oral,
or in writing through an application letter or by filling a form
given by the entry clearance officer. Thus "... tentative enquiries,
or preliminary steps towards ascertaining what is required or indica¬
tions of an intention to make an application are not regarded as
430
an'application duly made' ". The Immigration Act 1971 refers
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to an "application duly made" and the Tribunal has ruled that an
application may be held to have been "duly made" even though it
does not contain particulars required for consideration provided
that the request for an entry clearance, whether verbally or in
writing, is made in unambiguous terms for an entry clearance to be
432
issued to a particular person.
An application duly made for entry clearance before one is
over 21 years will be a valid ground for a claim to enter the U.K.
as a member of a family unit overseas even when the person is over
the age limit of 21 years, provided the consideration arises from
the application. It is also important to note that children under
the age of 18 years run a great risk if they do not apply for entry
clearances for the purpose of settlement well before they are 18 years.
(c) Parents and Grand-parents: Widowed mothers, widowers
aged 65 or over and parents travelling together of whom at least one
is aged 65 or over, should be admitted for settlement if wholly or
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mainly dependent upon children settled in the U.K. who have the
means to support them and any other relatives who would be admissible
as their dependants and adequate accommodation for them. Where
a parent has remarried admission should not be granted unless he
or she cannot look to the spouse or children of the second marriage
for support, and the children in the U.K. have sufficient mean3
and accommodation to support both the parent and any spouse or children
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of the second marriage who would be admissible as dependants. The
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same provisions apply to grandparents.
People seeking entry for settlement in the U.K. as dependants
of people already settled here must have entry clearances issued
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to them for that purpose. In BANO v HOKE SECRETARY, the
appellant, a widowed mother and citizen of India, applied for a
revocation of the conditions attached to her admission as a visitor
to children already settled in the U.K. so that she could be entitled
to settlement as a dependant. The Tribunal held that the fact
that she may be dependent on the children since she arrived in the
U.K. is irrelevant since, to qualify for settlement as a dependant
one has to show that he/she was dependent before he/she came to the
U.K.. Although no reference was made as to whether a person who
entered originally as a visitor may have conditions varied so as
to enable him/her to settle in the U.K. the case proceeded on the
basis that that was possible. Under the present rules it is in
fact possible to make an application for variation of leave to remain
in the U.K. for settlement if one came in originally as a visitor
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or in some other capacity. That being so, it follows that a
person wishing to come into the U.K. for settlement is required
to have an entry clearance for that purpose only if he is coming
to the U.K" as a dependant to settle. If he comes in some other
capacity like that of a visitor then he need not have an entry
clearance for the purpose of settlement as a dependant but in that
event should he wish to have a variation of the conditions of stay
so as to remain as a dependant of settled relatives which entitles
him to settle, then it must be shown that at the time he came in
that other capacity he t*as dependent on the people he/she wishes to
stay with as a dependant. That is the effect of the above case.
Accommodation; The Sponsor must show that he is willing and able
to support and accommodate his dependants without recourse to public
funds. The problem that has arisen in most cases is that of accommo¬
dation. It was held very early that accommodation belonging to
someone else other than the sponsor is not within the above provision.
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In another case the question of adequacy of accommodation was
examined at some length. In that case evidence was given that the
sponsor had rented a room for his father near his own. He was
paying £3 a week for the room, unfurnished, and it was understood
that the "lease" for the room could be terminated on 2/4 weeks
notice by either party. A letter was also produced from a
Medical Officer of Health of a different corporation (the sponsor
lived in Glasgow and the letter that came from a Medical Officer
of Health was based on houses in Huddersfield) setting out the
overcrowding standards under the Housing Acts which had been approved
by the Council (Huddersfield Council) and on the basis of the letter
it was argued that the rooms in the sponsor's house might well
satisfy the requirements and enable his father to live with him.
In the alternative it was said that the sponsor intended to obtain a
larger house.
On the above facts the Tribunal held that it "... would be
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difficult to accept the arrangements stated ... established that
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the sponsor 'had' adequate accommodation available for his father".
It further rejected the Medical Officer of Health's report because
it was based on a different council and not Glasgow Corporation.
It has also been held that the owner of a 2-bedroom corporation
house in which he and his wife live has not got adequate accommodation
for his 2 parents and brother coming to stay with him as dependants
and this was the case even if the sponsor intended to house his
dependent brother temporarily with a friend until he purchased a
bigger house.The Tribunal was heavily influenced by the
sponsor's meagre means in this case and therefore the case must not
be taken as stating a general principle. In fact, it has been held
by the Tribunal that when deciding whether a sponsor in the U.K
has adequate accommodation for the reception of a dependant parent,
with or without relatives, bona fide arrangements made for acquiring
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additional accommodation are not to be precluded. In this case
the sponsor had purchased his own house which had 5 bedrooms in
which he lived with his wife and 4 children. 4 dependants were
coming from India and since the maximum number of people allowed
in his own house was 7 he had entered into an agreement with a
neighbour who gave evidence that he owned a house with 3 bedrooms
and 2 living rooms in which he lived with his wife alone, having
no children, and that he had agreed with the sponsor to give him
free accommodation subject to sharing certain outgoings e.g.
rates and charges for gas and electricity. He further stated
that he came from the same village as the sponsor and knew the
sponsor's mother and three brothers. The sponsor's salary together
with his wife was £3,743 p.a.. In the circumstances the Tribunal
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was convinced that the sponsor had adequate accommodation.
Although each case will be considered on its own particular
facts it can be surmised that a person who has already purchased his
own house and has a reasonable income will be considered as
having adequate accommodation even when he has to rely on rented
accommodation to accommodate those dependants he cannot take into
his own house.
Public Funds: A sponsor must, in addition to accommodation, be
able to support his dependants without recourse to public funds.
In a case in which in 1973 a sponsor earned £30 a week, had saved
£563 and intended to buy a bigger house in which he, his wife and
3 dependants who had applied to come and settle in the U.K. a3
his dependants it was held that he (sponsor) did not have adequate
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means to support the dependants. To be able to support depend¬
ants one must therefore be able to show that he is in a position to
maintain in the U.K. a reasonable standard of life both for himself
444
and his dependants. It is not quite clear whether the "reason¬
able standard of life" is that which is reasonable in the opinion
of the appellate authorities or of the applicants. It is obvious
though that the standard of life, must be in relation to the United
Kingdom.
As a condition of admission a person wishing to come to the
U.K. for settlement must show that he is wholly or mainly dependent
on the sponsor. To be wholly or mainly dependent on a sponsor
one must show that the dependence is "... main and necessary"
Thus where it is shown that the resources of the parents are insuffic¬
ient to meet their own needs then dependence on a sponsor is proved.
In a case where it was argued that the parents were mainly dependent
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on remittances of a sponsor in' the U.K. because by custom the father
regularly distributed all the income from his two farms in Pakistan
to three other sons in that count:ry, it was held by the Tribunal
that the payment by the sponsoring son had not been proved to be
necessai*y for the maintenance of the applicants.^ It may have
been that the sponsoring son contributed most to the upkeep of
the parents but that did not prove that they were mainly dependent
on him. In other words the word "mainly" does not mean "mostly"
and accordingly whether the remittances are small or substantial,
they do not of themselves prove dependence. In the same case
the Tribunal, in what is a startling and probably wrong view, 3aid
that the fact that the applicants chose to distribute income from
his two farms to his sons, whether or not because of a prevailing
custom, cannot be taken into account in applying the U.K. immigration
control rules. It is submitted that that view is wrong. Dependence
is a question of fact and may be caused by what may or may not be
objectionable customs and traditions in the eyes of the immigration
authorities. It is a "relevant consideration" to take into account
such a custom as in the cases of customary marriages or adoptions.
One cannot, on the one hand, recognise customary marriages and,
on the other hand, refuse to recognise customs relating to the
distribution of property when deciding on what facts are "relevant
considerations". The problem that the Tribunal should have addressed
its mind to is whether or not, on the balance of probabilities and
having regard to the actual situation of the applicants, they were
mainly dependent on the sponsor. It is impossible to divorce
custom from an applicant when considering their physical or emotional
state for the purpose of immigration law. It is a necessary fact
when considering whether or not applicants can or cannot manage
447
with the remittances given to them by the sponsor.
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Dependence is judged mostly on the amount of financial assistance
given "but in very exceptional cases dependence may be proved by
emotional or physical dependence; for example a medically retarded
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adult child will be admitted as a dependant. Dependence must
also exist at the time of application for an entry clearance. If
on an appeal from a refusal of an entry clearance there is evidence
of subsequent facts which if before the entry clearance officer
might have influenced his decision in indicating some change in the
applicant's original circumstances, then it should form the basis
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of a new application, and the applicant must make a new application.
If, for example, the applicant were said not to be dependent on the
sponsor by the entry certificate officer and by the time the appeal
goes to the adjudicator or the Tribunal, as the case may be, new
and subsequent evidence shows that he/she is now dependent on the
sponsor, then a new application must be made. There are exceptions
to this rule, particularly where and when the appellate authorities
think that a new application would, in all the circumstances, be
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undesirable.
Dependants: Having settled the above problems it now remains to be
seen who qualify as dependants. It is clear from the Rules that this
provision is intended for widowed mothers, widowers aged 65 or over,
parents travelling together of whom at least one is aged 65 or over
and any other relatives admissible as dependants. Parents and grand¬
parents in those categories are admissible on grounds of dependence
but a parent or a grandparent who has remarried should not be granted
admission unless he or she cannot look to the spouse or children of
the second marriage for support. In PHILIPS v ENTRY CERTIFICATE
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OFFICER. KINGSTON. JAI-IAIGA. an unmarried mother under the age of
65 years applied for an entry certificate to enable her to settle in
\ V •
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the U.K. as a "widowed mother". The Tribunal held that unmarried
mothers were not to be equated with "widowed mothers". In its
opinion "... the propensity in [the Vest Indies] towards extra-marital
relationships resulting in childbirth cannot have been unknown
when the immigration Rules were drafted and approved and in the
circumstances the omission of a reference to unmarried mothers ...
seems ... to justify the inference that it was a deliberate exclusion
452
rather than an accidental omission".
Because of the literal interpretation given above to "widowed
mothers" it is clear that the term cannot be extended any further
than including "widowed grandmothers". There is clearly no age
limit required in the case of such widowed mothers before they become
admissible as dependants. Dependants were generally, under the old
Rules, required not to take employment and for that reason there are
cases where one is refused admission because being 30 years old
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there was no guarantee that she could not take employment.
There is no such requirement under the present Rules and it is
therefore submitted that as long as one establishes that she is a
"widowed mother" as defined then the question of her youth and
consequent fears of her taking employment are not matters that should
be taken into account.
There has been no occasion to define the term "widowers" but
if the literal interpretation is followed then it extends only to
a parent or a grandparent who is a widower and over the age of 65
years. A parent in this case probably includes an adoptive parent
but it will not include the natural father of an illegitimate child -
\ 454
following the decision of the Re M.(an infant). in which it was
held that the law does not recognise the natural father of an illegiti¬
mate child. This means, on the other hand, that the law recognises
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the natural mother of an illegitimate child but taking the restrictive
and literal interpretation of the word "widowed mother" it does appear,
surprisingly, that an unmarried mother of an illegitimate child
settled in the U.K. will not be considered a "widowed mother" and
accordingly will not in immigration law be admissible as a dependant
whereas, in fact, she is a dependant.
Widowers coming on their own must be over 65 years of age in
order to be admissible as dependants but where a married man is
coming with his wife who is 65 or more years old, then he need not
be 65 years old.
The words parent and grandparent include, by virtue of the words
"second marriage" in the Rule, step-parents or step-grandparents.
They may both be 65 years old or over, or one of them may be 65 years
or over in order to be admissible for settlement provided dependency
has been satisfactorily shown.
(d) Distressed Relatives; Relatives of people settled
in the U.K. or who are on the same occasion being admitted for settle¬
ment will be admitted to the U.K. as distressed people if they are 65>
or mora, years old and their settled relatives are able to support
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them and to provide adequate accommodation for them. To qualify
as a distressed relative the person must be isolated (that is, living
alone with no relatives in his own country to turn to) and distressed
(that is, having a standard of living substantially below that of his
own country). The concession should not be extended to people
below the age of 65 save in the most exceptional compassionate
circumstances, but may in such circumstances be extended to parents and
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grandparents and to more distant relatives.
In the first place, a person wishing to come to the U.K. as a
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distressed relative must have an entry clearance granted for that
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purpose.
In the second place, the person already settled in the U.K. or
is on the same occasion being admitted for settlement must be able
and willing to support them and provide accommodation for them as
well. To show that he can support and accommodate them the same
things as are discussed above in relation to admission of parents
and grandparents as regards support and accommodation must be proved.
In the third place, the person to be admitted must be a "relative"
in the sense the word relative is defined. The Rule lists brothers,
sisters, aunts and uncles as near relatives. There is scope for
extension of the word "relative" in its present context which is
"... the Secretary of State will authorise the admission as distressed
relatives of the near relatives (brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles)
of people settled in the U.K.". In order to be admissible one must
be 65 years or more and be "distressed". The word "distressed"
means isolated, that is, living alone with no relatives to turn to in
one's own country; and distressed, that is, having a standard of
living substantially below that of his own country. According to
the case of NUKHOPADHYAY v ENTRY CLSARAKGS OFFICKR. CALCUTTA.458
it was held that the definitions of the words "isolated" and
"distressed" which are to be taken in aggregate and not merged
were exhaustive and the words are intended to be taken in that
narrow sense for the purpose of immigration control. The Tribunal
did, however, find it difficult to interpret the definitions and in
particular the provision "... having a standard of living substantially
below that of his own country". It recommended an amendment to the
Rule; this has not yet been made. In the meantime to determine the
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the standard of an applicant's living "... regard must be had to
the individual circumstances of the applicant and to those of his
family and of the circle in which he moves in order to make a
realistic comparison of their respective standards of living and
to ascertain if the applicant's standard of living has fallen
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substantially below that of the relatives and friends".
To be isolated, that is, living alone with no relatives to
turn to, has been held to mean that the^e are no relatives "...
who would at all willingly accept responsibility for (the distressed
persons) in their homes''.^ ^ The fact that one is living with
relatives does not on that score alone make the person any less
isolated if the relatives are unwilling to help.
Under the Rules admission to the U.K. should not be given to
people under the age of 65 years except in the most exceptional
compassionate circumstances. A parent or a grandparent and even a
distant relative may be thus exceptionally admitted into the U.K. as
dependants notwithstanding that they are below the age of 65 years
if they are distressed and isolated.
(e) Husbands: A passenger who is married to a woman
settled in the U.K. or is on the same occasion being admitted for
settlement is himself to be admitted for settlement if he holds a
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current entry clearance granted to him for that purpose. The
general disqualifications based on false representation, deportation
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orders and so on apply with equal force. Husbands cannot,
however, be excluded from admission on grounds of restricted
returnablj.ity or on medical grounds.^ ^ Under the old Rules it
was "virtually impossible for husbands to be allowed to come and
remain in the U.K. with their wives in spite of the fact that their
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wives were settled in the U.K., unless there were special considera-
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tions making exclusion undesirable. It has been argued by
J.M. Evans that the old Rules were sexually discriminatory and caused
particular hardship to women of Asian origin who wanted to marry
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men from the Indian sub-continent. This was obviously the case
and accordingly with the accession of the U.K. to the E.S.G. member¬
ship the discrimination became glaringly grotesque as women employees
from the E.E.C. member states were allowed to bring their husbands.
Eventually the discrimination was abolished by a series of amendments.'
New Rules have again been drafted which give the immigration
authorities more power to refuse settlement where the marriage was
one of convenience and/or the parties have no intention of living
together permanently as man and wife. The draft Rules are being
challenged in Parliament but if they become law then the settlement
of a husband in the U.K. with his settled wife will no longer be
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unconditional since he will be subjected to a 12 months test period.
(f) Marriages: A man seeking to enter into the U.K.
for marriage to a woman settled in the country and intending
to settle himself should be admitted if he holds a current entry
clearance for that purpose. If he holds such an entry clearance
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then unless he /otherwise disqualified he well be admitted initially
for 3 months and advised to apply to the Home Office once the
marriage has taken place for the time limit on his stay to be
re oved. Further, if he proves that one of his grandparents was
born in the U.K. and Islands he should be admitted for settlement
immediately on production of a current entry clearance showing that
he comes to the U.K. for the purpose of marriage to a U.K. settled
woman.
Under the present Rules which are due for amendment as indicated
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above there is no way one can invalidate a formally celebrated but
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sham marriage concocted for the purpose of immigration law. In
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SILVER v SILVER, the wife who was a German subject, had gone
through a form of marriage with the respondent, who was a British
subject, in order to enable her to remain in England. The spouses
they
separated immediately after their arrival in the U.K.; ^never co¬
habited, and met only twice in the next 29 years when the wife
commenced proceedings for the nullification of the marriage as she
wanted to marry another man. Gollingwood J. held that as the parties
had freely entered into the marriage contract with the intention of
becoming man and wife, "the marriage was perfectly valid and could not
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be affected by any mental reservations. The Scottish Courts
have taken a different andindeed startling view which might be a
source of difficulties in family law although it is a straight
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forward matter in immigration law. In MAHMUD v MAHMUD, a man
and a woman went through a ceremony of marriage on February 27, 1975
before the registrar in a registry office in Glasgow. They did not
live together thereafter or have any sexual relations. The husband
rA.
raised an action in 1977 for a decla^tor that the marriage was null
and void by reason of lack of consent. The Court was told that
both parties were practising Moslems and that the pursuer believed
that she would not be truly married until there had been a religious
ceremony conducted in accordance with the tenets of the Moslem faith.
The religious ceremony never took place and on that ground the court
took the view that "... the appearance before the registrar was
solely, to comply with the formalities of Scots law as to the consti¬
tution of a marriage in Scotland", and the woman's consent was given
in that belief and the belief that there would be a religious
ceremony afterwards. Since that religious ceremony never took place
there was no consent and the girl did not therefore "... agree to
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be married by that procedure" i.e. of celebrating the marriage
before the registrar as required under Scottish law. Like in
the case of Silver above, in thi3 case there wa3 no consummation
of the marriage and the parties never saw each other.
The differing views of the two courts have great repercussions
in family law but in immigration law they are simply marriages and
whether a court of law declares them valid or not will not, in
immigration law, matter that much because under the Rules a
marriage that is sham is as valid as one that is not and it follows
that a person will invariably be admitted for settlement if it has
taken place.
In most cases there will be a prohibiton to take employment
imposed on men admitted into the U.K. for the purpose of marriage
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and they are of course admitted in a temporary capacity, and, a
man admitted in a temporary capacity has not got an unfettered right
of settlement, without regard to other relevant considerations under
the Rules on his subsequent marriage to a woman settled in the U.K..
A woman seeking to enter into the U.K. for the purpose of
marrying a man settled in the U.K. should be admitted if the
immigration officer is satisfied that the marriage will take place
within a reasonable time. She may be admitted for up to 3 months
and advised to apply to the Home Office for removal of the time
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limit once the marriage has taken place.
It may also be appropriate to impose prohibition on employment.
In any case they may be inadmissible for concealing material facts or
for giving false information and so on.
(g) Returning Residents: There are two categories of
returning residents; that is, (i) Commonwealth citizens who were
settled in the U.K. before the coming into force of the Immigration
Act 1971 and were settled in the U.K. at any time during the 2 years
settled in the U.K. when they left and they have not been away for
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more than 2 years.
With regard to the first category of returning residents the
Immigration Act provides that they must be settled in the U.K., i.e.,
be ordinarily resident without being in breach of the immigration
laws, and they must not be subject to any restriction on their
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leave to remain. In addition the Rules require that they must
have been settled in the U.K. during the two years preceding their
return to the U.K..480 ' In R v HOME S3CRETARY BX PARE MUGHAL.481
it was held that such a returning Commonwealth citizen has not only
to be settled in the U.K. at the coming into force of the Immigration
Act 1971, but he must also show, on the proper construction of
S.1(2) of the Act that he was physically present in the U.K..
Moreover, the effect of s.1(5) of the Act, depriving the Secretary
of State power to make rules making such returning Commonwealth
citizens any less free than they were, was that such a citizen must
satisfy an immigration officer that he is ordinarily resident in the
U.K., or had been so at the time during the 2 years preceding his
entry. Ordinary residence for the purpose of this section means
being in the U.K. without being in breach of the immigration law
or. Rules. An appellant must therefore show that his first entry
was lawful in order to succeed under this head. A person may have
entered clandestinely and still be considered as lawfully ordinarily
resident if he entered the U.K. before March 9, 1968. It was held in
4-TT
preceding their return and (ii) other non-patrials who were
under the Commonwealth Immigrants
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Act 1962, 110 duty imposed by implication on a Commonwealth citizen
to present himself to an immigration officer for examination on
his arrival in the U.K.. It follows that if a person entered
into the U.K. clandestinely before the above date his entry was
perfectly lawful and if he remained in the U.K., in the physical
sense of the tern, when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force then
he qualifies as a settled Commonwealth citizen.
A person who claims to have been ordinarily resident in the
U.K. when the Immigration Act 1971, came into force must prove also
that he was lawfully ordinarily resident in the country, i.e., he
entered and remained in the country without being in breach of the
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immigration laws. The onus is on him to show this.
Commonwealth Citizens; A Commonwealth citizen who qualifies for
admission under this head, his family i.e., his wife and children
under the age of 16,^areto be admitted for settlement at the time of
entry of the man or at a laterchte irrespective of whether they have
been previously resident in the U.K. or not.
Under the Rules a settled person or a person who is on the
same occasion being admitted for settlement will be allowed to bring
his wife and children under the age of 18 if he can show that he
is able and willing to support them. However it is specifically
provided that this requirement does not apply to Commonwealth citizens who
have a right of abode or who were settled in the U.K. on the coming
485
into force of the Immigration Act 1971. The effect of this is
to comply with 3.1(5) of the Immigration Act 1971, which provides
that wives and children of people settled in the U.K. at the date
of coming into force of tha Act shall not be made any less free
than they were. Accordingly a person who has qualified under this
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head as a settled Commonwealth citizen does not have to show that
he can support and accommodate his wife and children before they
(wives and children) are admitted into the country for settlement
* 4- 486as dependants.
Since the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of R v C3ISF
IMMIGRATION OFFICER, HEATHROW AIRPORT.487 it is clear that the wife
of a Commonwealth citizen who has lo3t her Commonwealth citizenship
by reason of her country going out of the Commonwealth will not be
covered by s.1(5) of the Immigration Act 1971, and accordingly the
husband must show that he can support and accommodate her with the
children. In addition she must have an entry clearance which is not
mandatory for other wives who qualify under s•1(5) •
With regard to the second category, that is, non-patrials from
foreign and Commonwealth countries who were settled in the U.K.
before they left and who have not stayed away for more than 2 years,
they will be admitted as returning residents if they show that they
were so settled before they left, that they did not receive assistance
from public funds towards the cost of leaving and that they have
not been away for more than 2 years. If they have been away for a
longer period they will still be admissible if they have lived in the
U.K. for most of their lives or for a considerable period and they
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have close family ties in the country. Possession of an entry
clearance for this category of people is not mandatory unless one is
not a Commonwealth citizen in which case he must have a visa.
Commonwealth citizens are, however, advised to get entry clearances.
Members of their familites i.e. wives and children under the age of
19 years coming for settlement must have entry clearances before they
can be admitted. Moreover each person is required to show that he
can support and accommodate his dependants without recourse to
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public funds. There is no power to refuse entry to such a wife
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and children under the age of 18 years on medical grounds or for
reasons of a criminal record or because it is conducive to the
public good. However, entry may properly be refused where such wife
490
or children are subject to a deportation order.
A person who is not a patrial and falls under this head does not
have a right to enter the U.K. simply on the ground that he is
resident there. He must also satisfy the immigration officer that
he has been lawfully settled, that is, he has been lawfully ordinarily
resident during the past two years before his return. As was
noted in relation to the Commonwealth citizens settled in the U.K.
before the coming into force of the Immigration Act 1971, a person
who came clandestinely into the U.K. before the coming into force of
the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, that is, before March 9, 1968,
will under the "Bhagwan Gap" be considered to have entered and
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remained in the U.K. legally.
The onus of proving lawful entry into and the subsequent stay
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in the U.K. is on the person.
Ordinary Residence: Does being ordinarily resident in the U.K. mean,
literally being in the U.K. physically? In most cases it does
mean that but there is no need to restrict the meaning of the term
to the mere physical presence. In ENTRY CBRTIFICATB OFFICER, BOMBAY
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y JQSHI. the respondent first entered the U.K. in 1 955 and he was
joined there by his wife in 1957. A son was born to them in the
U.K.. The family returned to India in 1958 and later the respondent
was admitted to the U.K..unconditionally in 1964. In June 1964 he
entered into salaried employment with a U.K. firm as an overseas sales
representative. He left for India in 1965 on the firm's business
and returned to the U.K. in December 1966 and was admitted conditionally
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for 6 months. On his application the condition limiting his stay-
was revoked in February 1967. The respondent again left for India
in August 1968 as the company's overseas respresentative and continued
working there until the firm's liquidation in January 1970. In
June 1971 he applied for an entry certificate as a returning resident
but his application was refused on the ground that he had not been
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ordinarily resident in the U.K. during the previous 2 years. It
was held by the Tribunal (affirming the decision of the adjudicator)
that on the facts above although the respondent was physically in
India during the preceding 2 years he had not up till January 1970
lost his status as a person ordinarily resident in the U.K.
because (inter alia) he had left the U.K. on the business of the
employers who were based in the U.K., and both he and the company
had intended the absence to be temporary and accordingly he could
properly be regarded as a returning resident.
The fact that the respondent had never set up a permanent
home in the U.K. and had no property or business connections in the
country were considered important but insufficient on themselves
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to show that a person is not resident ordinarily in the U.K..
A passenger who has been away from the U.K. too long to benefit
from the above Rule may nevertheless be admitted, if for example,
he has lived here for most of his life. In COSTA v ROMS S3GRSTARY,496
it was held that the example given above, that is, "... he has lived
here for most of his life" is by way of guidance but "... the under¬
lying principle of the paragraph was that if a person could not
establish that he had not been away from the U.K. for longer than
/
2 years that person must show strong connections with the country
4Q7
by a combination of length of residence and family or other ties".
In other words, the provision gave the immigration officers a
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discretion and that discretion is not to he exercised in favour
of a person unless he could show that he or she has strong connections
with the U.K. through length of residence and family or other ties.
Although the Tribunal found that the appellant in the case was
ordinarily resident in the U.K. for the first 5 years of her stay
and that she had very strong family ties in the country it (the
Tribunal) refused her leave to remain under the section because she
had stayed in the country illegally in breach of the Immigration
Rules by overstaying. Accordingly, in order for a person who
wants to come to the U.K. under the provision to be admitted he
must prove that he was lawfully ordinarily resident in the U.K.
before he/she went away or that he was settled in the U.K. before he
went away and for this reason, and particularly since it has been
held that a person may be ordinarily resident if he entered legally
a 498
but remained in breach of his/her conditions of stay, it can be
inferred that in a suitable case a person who has remained in the U.K.
in breach of immigration law may be exceptionally allowed to stay in
the country under the provision provided he entered lawfully.
Family Ties: What will amount to strong family ties and/or long
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residence are questions of fact. Thus in one case, a 50 year
Indian who had lived in the U.K. for 16 months more than 13 years
lived
earlier was held not to have/in the U.K. for a considerable length,
and been in another case*^^ a 66 year old woman who had lived in the
U.K. for 11 years was held not to have strong family ties in the U.K.
although the Tribunal said that her residence was considerable.
L. Grant and J. Constable submit, with justification, that the
Tribunal has adopted a comparative approach is ascertaining strong
family ties - "thus an applicant with more relatives in his country
of origin than in the U.K. is likely to fail in the appeal" - and
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considerable length of residence has tended to be calculated by
examining the applicant's age in relation to the period of his
501
residence in the U.K.. If one has lived in the country for a
short time the family ties must be strong in order to counter¬
balance .
A passenger whose stay in the U.K. was subject to a time limit
and who returns after a temporary absence abroad has no claim to
and
admission to re-enter/should be dealt with in the light of all the
relevant circumstances and the same time limit may be re-imposed or
502
it may be more appropriate to treat him as a new arrival. This
provision is intended for people who do not qualify either as
returning residents or as people who were ordinarily resident in the
U.K. previously but have been away for more than two years. It may
be appropriate to consider questions on compassionate grounds here.
A person who was ordinarily resident in the U.K. and has stayed
away from the U.K. for longer than 2 years and cannot show that he
has strong family ties or that he had been in the U.K. for a consider¬
able length of time and is not a passenger whose stay in the U.K. was
subject to time limit returning after a temporary absence may neverthe¬
less apply to the Secretary of State for admission into the U.K.0 As
this would be outside the Immigration Rules there is no remedy against
503
the person refused entry in such cases under the Appeals system.
Finally in the case of returning residents the requirement that
a
they must have not been away for longer than 2 years is/mandatory
requirement incapable of further extension. Applications for entry
clearances must be made within the 2 years and the return must also
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Under the Immigration Act of Kenya non-citizens of Kenya wishing to
enter the country must, in general, be in possession of Entry Permits or
Passes. There are ihiiteen classes of entry permits which are by their very
nature work permits, and eight classes of passes. A holder of a pass
3
cannot except in one case be allowed to take or seek employment or to
engage in any business, occupation, profession or trade0 Non-citizens
who hold resident's certificates and certificates of exemption need not
have an entry permit or pass in order to enter Kenya or to engage in any
specified occupation, business, profession or trade or in order to seek
or take a specified employment. Holders of residents' certificates and
certificates of exemption are an anomalous category and will be dealt with
separately.
Visas; In general nationals of most countries are required to have visas
U
before proceeding to Kenya if they are seeking to come as holders of passes.
There are two kinds of visas, that is, referrable and non-referrable.
Whether a visa is referrable or non-referrable depends on the existing
agreement between the Kenyan Government and any country whose nationals are
required to have visas prior to their departure for Kenya. For this reason
one must always check for any changes of the type of visa he is required to
have before leaving for Kenya. This is extremely important because a person
who is required to have a referrable visa must have one before arriving in
Kenya. If he does not do that he will be automatically deported from Kenya
on landing or on entry if he is coming by ship, train or by road. A
person who is required to have a non-referrable visa, on the other hand,
will not be automatically deported on arrival. He will be issued with a
visa at a port of entry if he offers satisfactory reasons why he did not
obtain it before starting the journey. If he has no satisfactory reasons
28U
he will also be deported. In either case a person who was required to have
a non-referrable visa and arrives without one will be, of necessity, subjected
5
to delay.
Mere possession of a visa is not sufficient to entitle a person who is
required to have one for the issue of a pass0 The visa must be valid at
the time of the arrival of the passenger at a port of entry; this means the
visa must not have expired by effluxion of time. A visa need not be given
for any specific purpose like in the U0K0 The reason for this is that a
work permit or pass which is issued on entry is the legal permit which
describes the purpose for 'which a person is admitted. This does not mean
that an applicant for a visa is not required to give any reason for wishing
to go to Kenya. He must do so, but unlike the U0K., he cannot be refused
entry merely because due to a change of circumstances he cannot claim entry
into the country for the original purposes. In other words, a visa need
/
not be limited to the purpose of entry at the time of entry as in the U.K.
It is only limited as to the time of entry; it is important for the purpose
of entry but has nothing to do with the number of entries that may be made
before it expires since that role is taken by passes, which will be looked
at shortly.
A visa which is obtained by or was issued in consequence of fraud or
misrepresentation, or the concealment or non-disclosure, whether intentional
\
or inadvertent, of any material fact or circumstance shall be and be deemed
. 6
always to have been void and of no effecto The effect of this provision is
that a person who was allowed entry into Kenya because of any of his false
representations or non-disclosure of facts when applying for a visa or a
pass or an entry permit will be deemed to have entered into Kenya illegally
since the written authority permitting the entry is ipso facto void whether
the representations or non-disclosure of material facts were made intentionally
7
or inadvertently. If the representations or non-disclosure of the material
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facts were made fraudulently or knowingly and the person knew or had reasonable
cause to believe the representations to be false or misleading then the person
is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand
shillings or to Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both
such fine and such imprisonment, and for this purpose it does not matter
8
whether the false representations were made in Kenya or outside Kenya.
It must be noted at once that whereas an inadvertent supply of false
information or omission of material facts invalidates a visa and whereas the
person's entry into Kenya thereby becomes unlawful, such an inadvertent
supply of false information or omission of material facts does not probably
give rise to the offence described above. For a person to be subject to
prosecution as above a clear intent or recklessness or negligence may be
proved.
Passports: All non-citizens wishing to enter Kenya must be in possession
of valid passports or some other valid travel document or documents of
9
identity. A holder of a passport or travel document or document of identity
means the person to whom such passport or such document is lawfully granted
10
or given by any authority recognised by the Government of Kenya and "... any
other person to or in respect of whom the same applies in addition to the
(principal) holder in like manner ... whether by reasons of the terms thereof
11
or by reason of any duly authorised endorsement or extension thereof."
A holder of a passport or a document therefore includes dependants whose names
are duly endorsed on any such document or passport or who are therein
described. It must be emphasised that the requirement for possession of a
passport or documents of travel or identity apply equally to non-citizens
seeking entry into Kenya as to holders of exemption certificates.
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Return Tickets: In addition to the above requirements a pass holder is,
in appropriate cases, required to be in possession of a valid return ticket
to his/her country of origin or valid onward tickets to countries of
12
acceptance. This is a particuarly important requirement for people who
want Visitors' Passes. Failure to comply with it in the case of visitors
may lead to a refusal of entry into Kenya. It is also required of British
passport holders of Pakistan, Indian and Bangladesh origin to produce four
thousand shillings or its equivalent on arrival as visitors otherwise they
13
will be refused entry and returned from whence they came forthwith.
Prohibited Immigrants; No non-citizen will be admissible into Kenya if he
is a prohibited immigrant notwithstanding that he is in possession of a
<| I
valid passport or a valid document or any other valid written authority,
except in very limited cases where he may be allowed to enter Kenya and remain
therein temporarily for such period and subject to such conditions as the
13
immigration officer may in his discretion determine. The following
categories of people are prohibited immigrantsi
(i) a person who is incapable of supporting himself and his dependants
(if any) in Kenya; or is
(ii) a mental defective or a person suffering from mental disorder; or
(iii) who (a) refuses to submit to examination by a medical practitioner
after being so required by an immigration officer; or
(b) is certified by a medical practitioner to be suffering
from a disease which makes his presence in Kenya undesirable
for medical reasons;
(iv) a person who, not having received a free pardon has been convicted
in any country, including Kenya, of murder or of any offence for which
a sentence of imprisonment has been passed for any term and who by
reason of such conviction is considered by the Minister to be an
undesirable immigrant;
(v) a prostitute, or a person living on or receiving or who before entering
Kenya lived on or received the proceeds of prostitution;
(vi) a person who in consequence of information received from any government
or from any other source considered by the Minister to be reliable, is
considered by the Minister to be an undesirable immigrant;
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(vii) a person or a member of a class of persons, whose presence in
Kenya is declared by the Minister to be contrary to the national
interests;
(viii) a person who, upon entering or seeking to enter Kenya, fails to
produce a valid passport to an immigration officer on demand or
within such time as that officer gives,
(ix) a person who was, immediately before the commencement of the
Immigration Act 1967, was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of the
old laws;
(x) a person whose presence in or entry into Kenya is unlawful under
any other written law;
(xi) a person in respect of whom there is in force a deportation order
made or deemed to be made under the Immigration Act 1967 or previous
laws; and
(xii) a dependant of any of the. persons mentioned in the foregoing
paragraphs ?^
The above grounds of inadmissibility are the only ones that may be
taken into account„ They are similar in scope to the grounds on which in
the U.K. a person may be refused entry if he is a non-E.E.C. non-patrial0
Both share one thing in common. When the Minister is considering whether the
entry of a person into the country is desirable or not for the public good or
national interests, as the Kenyan Act terms it, there are few things that
cannot fall within them,, However, whereas in the U.K. one can in certain
circumstances appeal against refusal of entry for reasons of public good,
in Kenya the Minister's decision that the entry of a person into the country
17
is against national interests is simply final,,
Deposits: There is a further restriction on non-citizens wishing to enter
Kenya and that restriction is exercisable at the option of an immigration
officer. As a condition precedent to the issue of an entry permit or pass
an immigration officer may, in his discretion, require a sum not exceeding
five thousand shillings or its equivalent to be deposited with him in respect
18
of each entry permit or pass. In lieu of the money to be deposited the
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the immigration officer may require the person or persons to enter into a bond
to provide security with or without sureties for a sum not exceeding the
19
amount of money stated above in respect of each entry permit or pass given.
In the alternative an employer of entry permit holders may be allowed, in the
discretion of the immigration officer, to enter into a covenant to provide
general security in respect of such entry permit holders and, their wives,
20
children under the age of 18 years and any other dependants in the sum not
21
exceeding five thousand shillings or its equivalent for each individual.
Immigration officers have the discretion to accept securities of an alternative
22
nature.
The purpose of such securities is, broadly speaking, for use in defraying
any expenses incurred or likely to be incurred by the Government of Kenya
in connection with the detention, maintenance, medical treatment or removal
from Kenya of the person in respect of whom the entry permit or pass was
'
23
issued and his wife, children and other dependants, if any.
Kenya is not a welfare state in the sense or to the extent that the
U.K. and other European countries are. If it were to assume the financing
of the responsibilities mentioned above it would, in effect, be a welfare
state for non-citizens and at the expense of the citizens. That would not
be tolerated politically and even economically. For these reasons it is
perhaps justifiable to demand the paid securities where it is thought by
\
immigration authorities to be desirable. However, when exercising their
discretion immigration officers must be wary not to use if as a punitive
measure against passengers. That is not what it is intended for. It is
a form of social security or insurance for the benefit of passengers when
any of the above situations do arise and in this regard they (immigration
authorities) are "trustees" of the money.
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The deposit becomes refundable to the passengers when the immigration
officer is satisfied that
(a) the person in respect of whom the deposit was made and his wife and
children and other dependants, if any, have left or are leaving Kenya;
or
(b) the person in respect of whom the deposit was made and his wife and
children and ether dependants, if any, are all dead; or
(c) the retention of the deposit is for any other reason no longer necessary.
Every security bond is to remain in force unless and until any of the
25
three things takes place.
If a security bond or a general security covanant is forfeited before
any of the above three things take place then an immigration officer will
make an application in a Magistrate's Court for an issue of a warrant of
attachment and sale of the moveable property belonging to any person bound
26
by such security to pay the sum specified in the bond or covenant. If
that person died after the security was forfeited then an immigration
officer will apply for a warrant of attachment and sale of the person's
27
estate. All orders made under this regulation are appealable and may be
28
reversed by the High Court. This is an important innovation in an area
that otherwise operates in the realms of discretion. It is submitted,
however, that a person against whose property a warrant of attachment and
sale is issued has in any case a right of appeal to the High Court -under
29
the Kenyan Constitution which guards against deprivation of property.
It must be remembered that a bond or covenant of security even when forfeited
does not constitute a contract since the essential elements of a contract
are palpably lacking. In that case the requirement of kttHMg executing the
covenant or bond is in reality a statutory requirement, and it also being a
statutory provision that the forfeiture of such a covenant or bond entitles
a Court to issue a warrant of attachment and sale, it follows automatically
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that the provisions of the constitution in respect of property are
attracted for the purpose of determining whether or not it is legal to
so attach the property<, This is important from another point of
view. If there was no right of appeal to the High Court it would be
open to argue that the Government is using the Magistrates courts as
a means of legitimising the attachment and sale of a person's property
which they cannot do directly under the constitution.
When a passenger produces a ticket or passage order in respect of
a passage to a destination outside Kenya that he will be leaving Kenya
permanently, the immigration officer will stamp the ticket or passage
order with a non-refund endorsement and if a deposit had been made the
30
whole amount or the balance thereof shall be refunded to the passenger.
It is an offence to cancel or vary the ticket or passage order after it




Pass holders are, loosely speaking, people who are coming to Kenya
for temporary purposes. Strictly speaking however, all people who come
into Kenya as pass holders are in a category that is not allowed to take
employment, engage in any business, trade, profession or occupation.
There are eight classes of passes, that is; a pupil's pass, a visitor's
\
pass, a dependant's pass; an intransit pass, and interstate pass, a
prohibited immigrant's pass, a special pass and a re-entry pass.
Before a passenger is issued with a pass he must have complied
with any prior conditions he may have been subject to. For example, if
a person who is required to have a referrable visa before his departure
for Kenya arrives without one he will not be given a pass of any kind.
On the contrary he will be deported forthwith. Where a person has
complied with the immigration requirements he is eligible for entry
and he may be given any one of the passes specified above depending
2?2
It must be mentioned that the issue of a pass is at the discretion of the
immigration officer. If he exercises his discretion in favour of issuing a
pass he has further discretion to issue it subject to such conditions as
32
he may specify. He may also cancel any pass or vary any term or
33
condition thereof at any time. The grounds upon which an immigration
officer may exercise his discretion are those of policy and expediency as
3I
intimated by the Minister for Home Affairs from time to time.
An immigration officer has no power to issue any pass until and unless
33
a fee in respect of the pass sought by the passenger has been paid.
Passes are generally issued on arrival at the port of entry into Kenya.
bach pass will now be examined.
(1) A Pupil's Pass
A person seeking to enter Kenya for the purposes of receiving
education or training in an educational or training establishment within
Kenya by which he has been accepted as a pupil may be issued with a pupil's
pass. A parent or guardian may, alternatively, make an application for
such a pass to the immigration officer, presumably where the child is under
the age of 18 years. An immigration officer will issue a Pupil's pass if
he is satisfied that the pupil has been accepted as such by an approved
institution of education or training, that there is adequate accommodation
for the pupil at the institution and that the issue of the pass will not
37
deprive a suitable citizen of Kenya of that accommodation.
There is in Kenya a list of approved educational or training establishments
which is normally obtainable from the Ministry of Education. This contrasts
with the U.K. where there is no list of approved institutions with the consequence
%
that a student may be refused entry into the country to study in an
established educational or training institution merely because the
immigration authorities do not consider the institution good or following an
haphazard policy decision as in SCHMIDT v HOME OFFICE [196?] 1 W.L.R. 338.
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Although an immigration officer has a discretion to issue a pupil's
pass, it is submitted that unless the pupil is inadmissible because he is a
prohibited immigrant, then the immigration officer's discretion will be
limited to the three issues, i.e. whether the pupil has been accepted by an
approved institution, whether there is adequate accommodation and whether or
not it will deprive a suitable citizen of Kenya of that accommodation. In
the U.K. the range of grounds that an immigration officer may take into
account is very extensive.
Subject to any conditions specified in a Pupil's pass the holder thereof
shall be entitled to enter Kenya within the period stated below and to remain
in Kenya for such period from the date of his entry as may be specified therein.
He will be free during the period he is allowed to remain in Kenya to re-enter
38
the country freely from Tanzania or Uganda. It would appear that the
period for which the holder of a Pupil's pass is allowed to remain in Kenya
39 '
is the length of his study and this clearly contrasts with the U.K. practise
where leave to remain must be renewed every li? months, and in some cases for
a shorter time.
If the holder of a Pupil's pass fails, within 30 days from the date of
issue of such pass or from the date of the holder's entry into Kenya,
whichever is the later, to enter as a pupil at the educational or training
establishment in respect of which the pass was issued, or having entered such
an establishment at any time thereafter leaves or ceases to be retained as a
pupil in the establishment, then with effect from the eqpiration of the
30 days, or, as the case may be, from the date on which he leaves or ceases
to be a pupil at the establishment his pass shall be deemed to have expired
and to be of no further validity or effectIn that instance his
further stay in Kenya is unlawful. However, it was noted that immigration
officers have power to vary the terms and conditions of a pass. In the case
of the holder of a Pupil's pass the power to vary the terms and conditions of
such pass would appear to be exercisable before the expiry of the pass through
any of the above occurrences. If it were otherwise then immigration
29k
officers would clearly be exercising a discretion which has the effect
of "reviving" or "redeeming" a pass which is invalid and of no effect in
law. That is clearly not contemplated or provided for in the immigration
Act 1967. The corollary of the submission is that, if the holder of a
Pupil's pass wishes to have his terms and conditions varied, then an
application to the immigration officer requesting for a variation of the terms
and conditions before the pass expires through any of the above occurrences
is necessary. This is true of U.K. also.
A Pupil's pass is limited to the institution or establishment at which
the holder thereof is accepted. He cannot, therefore, join a different
institution or establishment for study or training on the basis of a pass
that was given in respect of another institution or establishment. He can
only do that on his pass being accordingly varied by an immigration officer
as stated above. This again contrasts with the U.K. law where a person
seeking entry for the purpose of study may be admitted as a student with no
limitation to his studying in a particular institution. Although on the face
of it a student can transfer from one institution to another the U.K. immigration
authorities do not look kindly at it and it can in fact lead to very unpleasant
consequences. For example if the change from one institution to another
involves a change of the type of studies to be undertaken, then it forms a
basis for a new application of an entry clearance. The Kenyan law achieves
this by simply providing a pass that restricts a person to a particular
institution. A change of courses in that institution does not constitute a
ground for invalidating the pass although it might do under the U.K. law.
Finally, any person being in charge of an educational or training
establishment who allows a pupil who is required to obtain a pupil's pass to
attend such an establishment before such person is in possession of a pupil's
pass, shall be guilty of an offence.^
"Holder" in relation to a pupil's pass means the person in respect of whom
the same has been lawfully granted or issued and any other person to or in
O
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respect of whom the same applies in addition to the holder in a like manner
as to the holder, whether by reason of the terms thereof or by reason of any
j a
duly authorised endorsement or extension thereof. The effect of this
definition is that the spouse of the holder of a Pupil's pass can lawfully
come into and live in Kenya with the holder during the stay of the holder,
provided that the name of the accompanying spouse is endorsed on the pass of
the pupil. In this case the holder does not need a dependant's pass since
the wives of pass holders do not qualify as dependants.^ There is no
discrimination on grounds of sex as in the U.K., where female students may
not, apparently, be accompanied by their male spouses. There is the
possibility that the immigration authorities may demand a security or securities
in respect of the holder of a pass and the spouse. This will
normally be an effective disincentive against the bringing of spouses by
/
holders of Pupils passes. It must also be noted that a spouse coming with
a person who is the holder of a Pupil's pass cannot take any employment or
UU
engage in any occupation, profession, trade or business. In this
respect the U.K. law has a touch of humanity in that the wife of a student
will not usually be prohibited from taking employment.
(2) A Visitor's Pass
A person will be given a visitor's pass on arrival at a port of
entry into Kenya if he has complied with any requirements he is subject to
U5
before leaving for Kenya. A visitor's pass is granted to a person who
desires to enter Kenya for the purpose of a holiday or temporarily for the
purpose of conducting any business, trade or profession or any other temporary
purpose which an immigration officer may approve.^ Subject to the terms
and conditions specified a visitor's pass entitles the holder thereof to
enter Kenya within the period specified and to remain in Kenya for such period,
) 7
not exceeding 6 months from the date of entry into Kenya, as may be specified.
During the 6 months stay the holder may re-enter Kenya from Tanzania and
Uganda freely.^ The period of stay may be extended by an immigration
officer from time to time, but it shall in no case exceed one year from the
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date of the holder's entry. There is power for an immigration officer
50
also to vary the terms and conditions of such a pass.
The holder of a visitor's pass may not accept or engage in any form of
employment in Kenya, whether paid or unpaid without the prior written permission
of an immigration officer and if he engages or accepted employment without
such permission he will be guilty of an offence and with effect from the date
of such acceptance or engagement his pass shall be deemed to have expired
and to be of no further validity.
The provisions above are basically the same as the U.K. equivalents
with the exception that a visitor has no right to stay in the U.K. for
employment. A visitor could stay in the U.K. for longer than one year if
he can support himself but no visitor may stay in Kenya for longer than one
year in aggregate whether he supports himself or not. Besides, apart
from satisfying an immigration officer that one is coming for holiday or
temporarily for stated purposes, and apart from paying the security deposit
if requested to, one is not supposed to prove much more as in the U.K.
For example, there is no requirement that a visitor must show that he has
accommodation or that he will support himself without working, which matters
are crucial in the U.K.
There is no limitation on the reasons for which one may go to Kenya as
a visitor. Accordingly a person would be admitted as a visitor if he is
going for medical treatment or going to visit friends and relatives. The
only test he must satisy in this case is that the visit must be a temporary
one.
(3) A Dependant's Pass
Aiiy person who, being lawfully present in Kenya, or who is entitled
to enter Kenya by virtue of: (a) being a citizen of Kenya or (b) having been




person to whom s.l;(3) of the Immigration Act 1967 applies, may apply to an
53
immigration officer for a dependant's pass. It must be noted that the
categories of people allowed to bring dependants are no narrower compared with
the U.Ko where citizens, settled people and work permit holders are allowed
to bring their dependants. The important point of comparison is that the
concept of a dependant is wider in Kenya than in the U.K. A dependant, in
the case of Kenya, is a person who is by reason of age, disability or any
incapacity unable to maintain himself adequately or for some other reason
51,relies upon the applicant for his maintenance. The only problem is that
there are no standard tests of things like age, disability or incapacity or
inability to maintain oneself adequately. This is something the appeals
system under the U.K. immigration <law is helping to develop and it must indeed
be regretted that there is no way in which standard tests may be developed under
the Kenyan system.
i
Another significant point of comparison is that under the Kenyan system
it is the person who wants to bring his dependants into the country that
55
applies for a dependant's pass whereas in the UoK. a person wishing to go
into the country as a dependant must make an application on his own behalf and
appear for interview personally =,
As in the U.K., an applicant who wants to have his dependants to be
admitted into Kenya as such must show that he has an income sufficient to
56enable him to maintain and continue to maintain them, presumably during
their stay in Kenya. Thus a dependant's pass is not issued to the dependant
57but to the person who applies for it. Normally the immigration officer
will, in the case of the wife and children, endorse their dependency on the
58
entry permit of the holder if he has one0 But this is entirely at the
discretion of the immigration officer.
A dependant's pass shall, subject to the terms and conditions
specified therein, entitle the dependant in respect of whom it is issued to
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enter Kenya within the period specified therein and to remain in the country
59
thereafter during the validity of the pass, A dependant's pass lapses
immediately on the dependant being no longer dependent on the applicant
or if the applicant fails or is unable to maintain the dependant or if the
applicant leaves Kenya in circumstances which, raise a reasonable presumption
that his absence will be other than temporary, or if the dependant engages in
employment, or if the applicant dies.^ When a dependant's pass lapses it
is deemed to have expired and to be of no further validity.
A dependant's pass issued in respect of a woman living with her husband will
not be invalid by virtue of any occurrence of the above stated grounds
if she is offered or is doing a specific employment with a specific employer
which is of benefit to Kenya. A dependant's pass issued to such a woman
is of full effect for the unexpired time of its validity notwithstanding that
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she engages in such employment or has ceased to engage in such employment.
It must be noted that the effect of this provision is that such a wife
remains in Kenya on the authority of her dependant•s pass and on her entry
permit^ as wello
The possession of a dependant's pass does not entitle the person in
respect of whom it is issued to re-enter Kenya from Tanzania or Uganda
without further or other authority. Moreover since it is possible to bring
one's husband to Kenya as a dependant, where the wife is the principal applicant
it does not appear that the man enjoys the same benefits as a wife where the
husband is the principal applicant. Thus it is not stated that where the
wife (being the principal applicant of a dependant's pass) dies or fails to=
maintain the husband, or the wife leaves Kenya in circumstances -which raise
reasonable presumption that her absence will be other than temporary, or the
husband engages in employment the husband's dependant's pass will be valid
notwithstanding the occurrence of any of any of the above if he has an entry
permit of Class D; i.e. he has a specific employment from a specific employer
and his presence will be of benefit to Kenya. In this respect the provisions
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of the Regulations made under the Immigration Act 196? are sexually-
discriminatory.
The immigration officers will normally require securities for
dependants as noted above0
(ii) An In-Transit Pass
An in-transit pass is given to people who wish to enter Kenya for
the purpose of travelling to a destination outside the country. Before it
is granted an immigration officer must be satisfied that the applicant is
travelling to a destination outside Kenya, is in possession of such valid
documents as may be required to permit him to enter that other country and
is otherwise qualified under the law in force of the country of destination
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to enter into it. Thus a person asking for an in-transit pass would be
refused such a pass if he had all documents to enable him to show that
he was travelling to the U.K. but if he was at the same time subject to a
v
U.K. deportation order.
An in-transit pass is endorsed in the holder's passport and is valid
only for a maximum of 7 daysThis contrasts rather sharply with the
U.K. where a passenger in transit can be given for up to 6 months to remain
in the country.
(5) An Inter-State Pass
\
An inter-state pass is given to a person lawfully present in Kenya
and who by reason of his profession, business or employment or other calling,
is required to make frequent visits to Tanzania or Uganda.^ In other
words an inter-state pass is valid for re-entry into Kenya if the re-entry is
either from Tanzania or from Uganda. An application must be made for an
inter-state pass.^
An inter-state pass entitles the holder thereof to re-enter Kenya from
Tanzania or Uganda at any time during its validity, which is two years from
67the date of its issue. There may be conditions attached to the pass of
300
course. Such an inter-state pass will not entitle the holder to re-enter
Kenya as stated above if the presence in Kenya of the holder or re-entry
68
would for any reason be unlawful.
Immigration officers are vested with power to extend or vary the terms
69
and conditions of such an inter-state pass as they think fit or desirable.
However, in no case will the aggregate period of the validity of such an
70
inter-state pass exceed four years from its first date of issue. In the
event of the pass being cancelled after its issue the holder is required to
surrender it to the nearest immigration officer within seven days from the
date of cancellation. Failure to do so or possession of a cancelled pass
after the expiry of seven days from the date of notice automatically amounts
71
to an offence.
The holder of an inter-state pass includes dependants of the principal
holdervhose names are endorsed on the pass or included therein by
description or terrcs.72
(6) A Prohibited Immigrant's Pass
The most perplexing thing about a prohibited immigrant's pass is that
there are no rules on how the power relating to the pass may be exercised.
The definition of a prohibited immigrant has been given in this chapter.
Apart from that all that is known is that an immigration officer may in his
73
discretion, after an application by a prohibited immigrant, issue a prohibited
immigrant's pass to the prohibited immigrant, permitting him to enter and
remain in Kenya temporarily for such period and subject to such conditions as
nj ^
may be specified in that pass. This power is rarely exercised and when
exercised it is presumably done after consultation with the Minister for
Home Affairs. In that light it is probably expedient that there are no
guidelines as the Minister may have to take into account the political and
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individual circumstances at the time of application0 In any event a lack
of rules in this area means there are no standards and that justice cannot
be done in some cases and if it is done it is obvious that it cannot be
seen to be done.
In all other cases a prohibited immigrant who enters or intends or
attempts to enter Kenya by any means whatsoever, will be served with a notice
issued by an immigration officer prohibiting him from entering or requiring
75
him to leave Kenya within the time therein specified. The notice may
require the prohibited immigrant to remain on the ship, aircraft, train or
vehicle by which he enters or entered Kenya or it may order him to leave the
country by such means and within such period as will be specified or to comply
with such other requirements as to the place of residence, occupation,
security or reporting to a specified authority. If the person served with
such a notice fails to comply with the notice he will be in breach of the
77law unless he can prove that he has not at any time been a prohibited
. . + 78immigrant.
There is power for the Court to order, the distress of the person's
moveable property and for the sale of it to defray the expenses that may
have been or will be incurred by the Government of Kenya in connection with
the detention, maintenance, medical treatment or removal from Kenya of such
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a prohibited immigrant, his wife and children and other dependants. The
partial recovery of any such expenses will not prejudice the liability of any
surety for the balance nor will the issue or execution of such a Court order
00
be a condition precedent for the liability of the surety.
An immigration officer has power to cancel any notice to a prohibited
immigrant when he thinks it fit to do so. However, where he does not
cancel it he may in his discretion require the carriers of the prohibited
immigrant or their agents to take reasonable steps to ensure that the
prohibited immigrant complis with the terms cf the notice served on him.
An immigration officer does that merely by issuing a copy of the notice to
8l
a prohibited immigrant to the carriers or their agents.
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(7) A Special Pass
A special pass is issued to an applicant who wants to be in Kenya
for the purpose of appealing to the Minister if he has been refused an entry
permit by an immigration officer, or to any applicant who wants to be in the
country for the purpose of applying for an entry permit or pass or for any
82
purpose which an immigration officer considers suitable. A person whose
pass has expired or been cancelled may apply, quite properly, for a special
pass to enable him to wind up his affairs in the country before leaving.
A special pass may therefore be very important. It is submitted
that it cannot be issued to a prohibited immigrant. The latter's recourse
is to apply for a prohibited immigrants pass.
A special pass is given by an immigration officer for any period not
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exceeding three months and is not under any circumstances renewable.
(8) Re-Entry Passes
Re-entry passes are issued to people who propose to leave Kenya
temporarily or who have left Kenya temporarily and having been at the time
of their departure lawfully present in Kenya, failed for reasons which an
immigration officer is satisfied are good and sufficient, to apply for a
8ij.
re-entry pass before their departure. Such a re-entry pass is issued to
people who satisfy the immigration authorities that their presence in Kenya
on re-entry will be lawful otherwise than by virtue of the re-entry pass
8£
applied for. An applicant will be required therefore to be in possession
of a valid entry permit or pass at the time of re-entry into the country.
A person who holds a resident's certificate or a certificate of exemption
does not, of course, need a re-entry pass since he falls outside the
immigration Regulations relating to passes. Moreover, holders of an
inter-state pass, a pupil's pass and a visitor's pass do not need re-entry
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passes since they are entitled by virtue of their passes to re-enter Kenya
from Uganda or Tanzania.^ But that is as far the exemption goes. It does
not exempt any such inter-state pass holder, or such pupil's pass holder or
such visitor's pass holder from the necessity of possessing a re-entry
pass if re-entry into Kenya is from anywhere other than the two countries.
In fact it is expressly provided that except as stated above no person is
entitled to re-enter Kenya after any period of absence therefrom save under
a re-entry permit or an entry permit or pass (other than a re-entry pass)
issued to him since he left the country0 It appears that a re-entry from
Tanzania and Uganda is more kindly viewed than re-entries from other
countries. There is nothing in this submission to relieve the absurd
situation whereby a student already in possession of a pupil's pass will not
be required to have a re-entry pass when re-entering Kenya from Tanzania or
Uganda whereas if he is re-entering Kenya from any other country he will be
expected to have either a fresh pupil's pass or a re-entry pass. This is the
case for visitors also. In this particular case it seems that the East
African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are regarded as one
country or region for the purposes of immigration law.
A re-entry pass is normally endorsed in the passport of the applicant
unless he left ifenya without the re-entry pass for good reasons and wishes to
have one later.
The normal period of validity of a re-entry pass is for the expected
\
period of absence from Kenya but will in no case exceed two years from the
89date of its issue. The holder of a re-entry permit is entitled to re-enter
Kenya from time to time during its validity. It is therefore and by far the most
important document if one intends to go out of Kenya during his stay there„
. Finally, it must be noted that every pass holder unless exempted by the
Minister by notice in the Gazette is required to pay fees for the pass. If
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If the fees remain outstanding for 90 days from the date the issue of a
pass has been approved by a notification in writing, then that approval
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ceases automatically. Further, any person who commits any offence as
mentioned above is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand shillings
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine
and imprisonment.^
Entry Permits
The idea of using entry permits and therefore immigration law as a
strategy for economic self-sufficiency was central to the 1956 Immigration
Act and the 1967 Immigration Act. Sessional Paper No. 78 of 1956 clearly
stated that the future of immigration policy of the Government would be
largely based on economic considerations. The 1956 Act accordingly created
several classes of entry permits and passes one of which a person was
required to have before he could be admitted into Kenya. The 1967 Immigration
Act followed the entry permits and passes created by the 1956 Act with the
"improvement" that no entry permit can confer permanent residence in Kenya
on its holder.
For the above reason one soon discovers that in the 1956 Immigration Act
the core issues of immigration law like settlement are of peripheral
interest. There is no relationship of any kind between the absorption of
the number of immigrants by the country and the system of entry permits0
Neither are entry permits related to racial harmony in the country except in
so far as it was felt that for purposes of stability it was necessary to
remove the economic imbalances between the minority immigrant communities and
the majority indigenous people. The process of these politico-economic
policies became known as Africanization0 Africanization was intended to be
a radical policy for the transfer of the economy from the hold of the minority
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immigrant communities to the majority African peoples. This is just where
the system of entry permits comes in for it was sought to withdraw all the
existing residents' certificates and substitute them with entry permits which
would give the Minister for Home Affairs "... more power and freedom to
92
deal with non-citizen residence and employment". The Minister now has
this power and it is restricted only by economic conditions. Thus no job
held by the holder of an entry permit is to be Africanised when no skilled
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African is available to take the job. The Africanization policy has been
and remains a gradual process and it takes proper account of the skilled
manpower available in the country. However, for any person who is not a
citizen of Kenya or an indigenfous citizen of Uganda or Tanzania and does not
rank as diplomatic personnel, to seek or take employment, or to engage in any
occupation, profession, calling, business or trade in Kenya he must have an
entry permit and his presence must be of benefit to Kenya, presumably in the
sense that there is no Kenyan available with comparable skill to do the job.
The following are the entry permits available for non-citizens wishing to
work in Kenya.
(1 ) Class A
A person who is offered specific employment by a specific employer,
is qualified to undertake that employment and whose engagement will be of
benefit to Kenya;
(2) Class B
A person who is offered a specific employment by the Government of
Kenya, the East African Community or any person or authority under the
control of the Government or the East African Community, and whose engagement
in that employment will be of benefit to Kenya;
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(3) Class C
A person who is offered specific employment under an approved
technical aid scheme under the United Nations Organisation or some other
approved agency (not being a diplomatic personnel) and whose engagement
will be of benefit to Kenya;
(h) Class D
A person who is the holder of a dependant's pass, who is offered
specific employment by a specific employer, whose engagement will be of
benefit to Kenya.
For an entry permit of any of the above classes to be issued, there must
be proof of the employment at the time of application for the entry permit.
It is no proof, of course, that one has been offered a job. An immigration
officer must be further satisfied that there is no Kenyan citizen of comparable
skill available to do that job. For this purpose an immigration officer
must take account of the advice given by the Kenyanization Personnel. Bureau,
which evaluates whether jobs available or occupied by non-citizens can be taken
over by Kenyans„ The Bureau runs a man-power register which is used for
reference of the Kenyan citizens with skills„ The Bureau therefore works
with the immigration department to ensure that skilled citizens are hired
9k
for any available jobs before entry permits are issued.
Moreover, entry permits are issued on the understanding that effective
training programmes are undertaken to produce trained citizens within the
95
time specified. An applicant will therefore be refused an entry permit
if the employer fails to produce such a programme to the immigration
authorities. Before an entry permit is issued information must also be
given to the immigration authorities on the educational, technical or
professional qualifications of the applicant and his previous experience
307
and also the post the individual is going to hold, the staff he will
supervise directly and the supervision to which he himself will be subject 4k,
together with the estimated value of materials or money fear which he will be
96
responsible for. All the information is necessary for the purpose of
assessing whether there are Kenyan citizens with skills to do the job and
whether the training of Kenyan citizens is being undertaken„
It is noxv widely acknowledged that the Immigration Act has not worked
well in the effective Africanization of the economy for which it was
passed. During the debate on the Act it was pointed out that the Act would,
be abused by the process of removing "... a person from a key point that he
occupies and push him ahead somewhere as a technician, and then claim that
an African with that technical knowledge is not available and so keep that
97man." This has certainly proved to be the case for a study that was
undertken in 1971 uncovered a process whereby "... changes of job titles .,0
(enabling) expatriate^ personnel to become either consultants or experts with
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a hike in remuneration." Moreover, employers generally raise job entry
requirements, exaggerate work experience, job descriptions and responsibilities
as a means of arresting the Africanization programme. It is submitted that
the Act leaves a lot to be desired in this particular area.
Even where Africanization has been undertaken to a great extent it is
known that senior posts and key posts are not relinquished to Kenyan citizens.
Colin Leys has noted, for example, that "oo. The Financial Director would
tend to remain expatriate to protect the investment ... and two or three of
the principal operations managers also tend to be expatriates, with Africans
typically occupying senior posts in sales, personnel management and public
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relations. This practice therefore prevails heavily in top management
positions. A citizen will generally be categorised as a General Manager
when he has no executive power; the power will be with an expatriate executive
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director.
It must be noted also that evasion of the requirement to have an entry-
permit can be easily done by "... setting up a "regional" office in Nairobi
(or any Kenyan town) whose Foreign personnel", it is claimed, "do not need
entry permits because they are responsible for a much wider area of operations
than Kenya alone.
Although the public service has almost been fully Africanized as a
result of the efforts of the Government of Kenya through the Immigration Act,
a lot remains to be done in the private sector where widespread abuses of the
Immigration Act exist. The discussion above is based on the assumption
that the Kenyan Immigration Act is essentially an economic measure. There
are many reasons why a person may wish to emigrate to Kenya. Generally
speaking there is an economic element in cases of people who come to the country
voluntarily, but that does not mean that the person's desires are simply to
seek employment or work. Not much account of this is taken by the Act.
(5) Class £
A person who is a member of a Missionary Society approved by the
Government of Kenya and whose presence in Kenya will be of benefit to Kenya.
It must be noted straightaway that the use of the terms "a member of
a Missionary Society" is a very wide one. A member includes a Minister of a
church, a lay preacher, pastor, clergyman, a nun, lay brother, cantor or any
\
ordinary member of any such missionary society. He must be coming to Kenya
for the purpose of employment whether paid or unpaid. This is a very wide
use of the term as other immigration laws restrict the admission of people
going into a country for religious reasons to Ministers only.""^
To be approved by the Government of Kenya a Missionary Society must
102
be registered first in accordance with the Societies Act'of Kenya. It
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is therefore necessary for the applicant to show that he is a member of a
Missionary Society that is duly registered under the Societies Act before he
can become eligible for an entry permit.
(6) Class F
A person who intends to engage, whether alone or in partnership,
in the business of agriculture or animal husbandry in Kenya and who
(a) has acquired or has received all permissions that may be
necessary in order to acquire an interest in land of
sufficient size for the purposej and
(b) has in his own right and at his full and free disposition
sufficient capital and other resources for the purpose, and
whose engagement in that business will be of benefit to Kenya.
For any non-citizen to acquire land in Kenya for any purpose he must
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get the consent of the President of Kenya. This is normally done through
the Ministry of Lands.
Having got permission to own ind it is up to the applicant to apply to
the Ministry of Agriculture for consideration as to whether or not he has
sufficient land in size and suitability for the purpose of agriculture and/or
animal husbandary and as' to whether or not he has at his full and free
disposition sufficient capital and other resources for that purpose. He
must also satisfy the Minister that the investment will be of benefit to
Q
Kenya. Thus a person who wants to come and farm pyrethrum might, for example,
not be considered as engaging in something that will be of benefit to Kenya
since pyrethrum is in good supply.
It is only when an applicant has been thus approved and when he has
got or is assured of getting any licences that are required for that purpose
that he becomes eligible for the entry permit. Before one applies for an
entry permit most of the ground work will have been done therefore.''^
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(7) Class G
A person who intends to engage, whether alone or in partnership,
in prospecting for minerals or mining in Kenya and who,
(a) has obtained, or is assured of obtaining, any prospecting
or mining right or licence that may be necessary for the
purposej and
(b) has in his own right and at his full and free disposition
sufficient capital and other resources for the purpose,
and whose engagement in that prospecting or mining will
be of benefit to Kenya.
A person wishing to engage in prospecting and mining must similarly
apply for permission to do so from the Ministry of Natural Resources and
obtain the necessary licences before he can be eligible for an entry
permit.
(8) Class H
A person who intends to engage whether aJbne or in partnership,
in a specific business, trade or profession (other than a prescribed
profession) in Kenya and who --
(a) has obtained or is assured of obtaining, any licence,
registration or other authority or permission that may
be necessary for that purpose; and
(b) has in his own right and at his full and free disposition
sufficient capital and other resources for the purpose
and whose engagement in that trade, business or profession
will be of benefit to Kenya.
If the applicant wants to engage in business or trade he must apply to
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the necessary permissions.
Having got these permissions and any necessary licences, he then becomes
eligible for the entry permit above.
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(9) Class I
A person who intends to engage, whether aLone or in partnership,
in a specific manufacture in Kenya, and
(a) has obtained, or is assured of obtaining any licence,
registration or other authority or permission that may
be necessary for that purpose; and
(b) has in his own right and at his full and free disposition
sufficient capital and other resources for the purpose, and
whose engagement in that manufacture will be of benefit
to Kenya.
The necessary permission will be from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
. An applicant must also have obtained or be assured of obtaining any other
licences he/she may be required to have before he/she becomes eligible for
an entry permit.
(10) Class J
A member of a prescribed profession who intends to practise
that profession whether alone or in partnership, in Kenya, and who
(a) possesses the prescribed qualifications; and
(b) has in his own right sufficient capital and other
resources for the purpose, and whose practice of that
profession will be of benefit to Kenya. The members
of the prescribed professions are:
(i) Medical profession - those entitled to registration
as medical practitioners under Medical
Practitioners and Dentists Act;
(ii) Dentists - those entitled to registration as dentists
under the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act;106
(iii) Legal Profession - those who are advocates within the
meaning of the Advocates Act;1^7
(iv) Surveyors - those Land surveyors and surveyors entitled
to be licenced as surveyors under the Survey Act''
and those who are Fellows or Professional Associates of
the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors respectively;
included in this category are estate agents, valuers
and land agents if they are fellows of the Royal
Institute of Chartered Surveyors. This is a great
defect in the Immigration Act because as those qualified
under the Chartered Institute of Surveyors wUl be from
the UoK. by reason that the courses are offered there-
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It follows that it will be a long time before the
Africanization-programme is fully completed in this
field. Efforts to encourage Kenyans to be members
of that professional body can be easily frustrated
by various administrative means of the overseas
professional bodies although perhaps this is unlikely0
There is therefore a case for localizing professional
and other qualifications0
Pharmacists - those entitled to registration as
pharmacists under the Pharmacy and Poisons Act;
Architects and Quantity Surveyors - those entitled to
registration as architects or quantity surveyors under
the Architects and Quantity Surveyors Act;"^^
Veterinary Surgeons - those entitled to registration or .
to be licensed as veterinary surgeons under the Veterinary
Surgeons Act;''"'''
Engineers - those who are members or associate members
of a list of engineering institutions or hold equivalent
qualifications ;
Nursing profession - those entitled to registration
under the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act;'' ^
Physiotherapists - those holding a qualification of a
Chartered Society of Physiotherapy or hold an equivalent
qualification;
Accountants - those who are members or associate members
of a list of accounting institutions or hold equivalent
qualifications; and
Chartered Secretaries - those who are fellows or associate
fellows of the Ins tainte of the Chartered Institute of
Secretaries or the Corporation of Certified Secretaries
or hold equivalent qualifications.113
It is evident that most of the professional qualifications are overseas
based and more particularly U.K. based. Two things call for comment here.
Firstly, since the Immigration Act 1?67 was part of the total effort to
Africanize the economy it seems appropriate to comment that to have some of
the professional qualifications based overseas can be a severe limitation to
the speedy africanization process. Obviously the flow of professionally
qualified people will be outside the control and supervision of the Kenyan
Government. From experience, the flow of qualified Kenyans, depending on
the overseas institutions as it does, is going to be small® To that extent










This can only be attributed to the gap or defect of the Immigration Act
1967 which favours foreign professional qualifications. Perhaps this
is what Martin Shikuku MCP., meant in 196? when the Bill was being
discussed in Parliament that to retain entry permits for non-citizens would
1 1 )
effectively "... nullify the Bill".
Secondly, most of the professional qualifications are UoK. based.
Perhaps this explains why the words "... or equivalent qualifications..."
occur after some professional qualifications0 The use of those words leaves
the immigration authorities with the discretion to recognize professional
qualifications from other foreign countries other than the U.K. The
discretion may not necessarily be abused but 4, is almost certain professional
people from such other foreign countries would find it harder to get entry
*
permits vis-a-vis U.K. professional people.
Where any entry permits A to J above has been issued to an applicant
and the applicant without first getting the written approval of the
immigration officer; q
(a) fails to engage within llj. days of the date of issue of the entry
permit or of that applicant's entry into Kenya, whichever is later, in
the employment, occupation, trade, business or profession in respect
of which the permit was issued; or
(b) has ceased to engage in the employment, occupation, trade, business
or profession or;
(c) has engaged in any employment etc. whether or not for remuneration
or profit, other than the one for which he was issued an entry
permit; then that entry permit will automatically cease to be
115valid and the presence of that person in Kenya will be unlawful.
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If an applicant is outside Kenya when such entry permit above is issued
then the entry permit ceases to be valid only if the applicant fails to
enter Kenya by virtue of that entry permit within 6 months from its date of
116
issue. However, an immigration officer may in his discretion extend the
117
validity of the entry permit for a further 6 months.
When holders of entry permits A to C cease to engage in their employment
then the specified employer in the entry permit must report to the
immigration officer in writing of the event within seven days failing which
118
he will be guilty of an offence. An employer of entry permit holders of
classes A, D and E will also be guilty of an offence if when so requested
by an immigration officer he fails to supply within thirty days the names
and duration of service of citizen and non-citizen employees in his firm or
if the information he supplies on such request is or may be reasonably
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known to be false in any material particular.
(11) Class K
A permit in this class may be issued to a person who -
(a) is not less than 21 years of age; and
(b) has in his own right and at his full and free disposition
an assured annual income of not less than the amount stated
below; being an income that is assured, and that is derived
from sources other than any such employment, occupation,
trade, business or profession as is referred to above and
being an income that either;
(i) is derived from sources outside Kenya and will be
remitted to Kenya; or
(ii) is derived from property situated, or a pension or
annuity payable from, sources in.Kenya; or
(iii) will be derived from a sufficient investment capital
to produce such assured income that will be brought
into and invested in Kenya; and
(c) undertakes not to accept paid employment of any kind should
he be granted an entry permit of this class; and whose
presence in Kenya will be of benefit to Kenya.
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The amount of assured income that an applicant for the Class K
entry permit is supposed to have is: (a) if it is a man without a wife
or dependent children it must be K.£1,200 p.a.; (b) if it is a
woman without dependent children it must be K.£1,000 p.a.; (c) if it is a
married man or widower with dependent children it must be K.£2,500 p.a.
and (d) if it is a woman with dependent children it must be Ko£2,000 p.a.
The prescribed amounts are the minimum amounts of annual assured income an
applicant must haveD One must check in the Gazette to obtain the exact
sums at a particular time.
An entry permit of Clfess K will remain valid for as long as the holder
thereof has in his own right and at his full and free disposition the
appropriate assured annual income. This class of entry permit is the most
favourable for people who want to settle in Kenya. The particular entry
permit is designed for people who have investments or wish to have
investments in Kenya without which, and in the absence of any outside
O
sources of income, they cannot survive in Kenya0
It was noted elsewhere in this chapter that a dependant's pass is
normally to be endorsed on the entry permit of the applicant or principal
holder of the entry permit. It is at the discretion of an immigration
officer to do so however. As will be appreciated from the provisions
relating to class K entry permit the holder thereof is not allowed to accept
paid employmento Since the "holder" of an entry permit includes dependants
whose names are either endorsed on the entry permit of the principal holder
or applicant or by reason of the terms of the entry permit it follows that
dependants of the holder of the class K entry permit will become holders
of that entry permit by reason of either of the above actions. That being
so dependants as holders of the entry permit of class K will be guilty of an
offence if they accept paid employment.
However there is nothing to stop or prevent a dependant whose name is
not endorsed on the entry permit of the principal holder or who is not a
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holder of such an entry permit by reason of any terms of that entry permit
from engaging in paid employment. This will always be the case if the
dependant is in possession of a dependant's pass and class D entry permit which
have nothing to do with the entry permit of the applicant. For this reason
it is always best to apply for a dependant's pass and class D entry permit
if the dependants would wish to be employed. The best thing to do is simply
to arrive in Kenya initially on one•s own as the holder of a classK entry
permit. When all is fine one must then apply for dependants passes from
the immigration office; and later for class D entry permit. This works
out convenientlyo If, however, one applies for an entry permit of that
class for himself and his dependants then their names will almost invariably
be endorsed on the entry permit. That means:that they are automatically
holders of that entry permit and cannot, like the principal holder, engage
in any paid employment.
The provision relating to class K entry permits deliberately omits the
mention of unpaid employment of the holder of that entry permit. That being
so, the holder(s) of that class of entry permit can legally accept unpaid
employment. It is not hard to see that that is a loophole in the Act. A
120
firm may take a person as an 'Unpaid employee" but there is nothing in
the Act to stop the employer from giving that person substantial allowances
or benefits or even honorarium payments, or substantial directorship fees.
This can of course be easily stopped by providing that the holder of the
entry may not accept unpaid employment as well or by providing a clause that
bars indirect or disguised employment, as in the U.K.
It is abundantly clear that provided the holder(s) has/have the assured
annual income as prescribed and with prior approval in writing, there is
nothing to stop them from engaging in self employment, for example, in
business or trade. The Act simply requires that the assured annual income
must not be obtained either by reason of paid employment or by reason of
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engaging in any occupation, profession, business or trade. All that this
means is, as long as the assured income can be shown to be flowing in from
the permitted sources then provided prior written approval of an immigration
officer has been obtained the holder(s) thereof may engage in any paid employ-
121
ment or self-employment freely. Self-employment is analogous and
almost co-extensive with a contract for services which differs markedly from
paid employment which is a contract of service. This also constitutes a
leeway in favour of holders of entry permits of class K.
(12) Class L
This applies to person who is not in employment, whether paid
or unpaid, and who under the repealed Acts was issued with a resident's
certificate, or who would have on'application been entitled to the issue of
such certificate, or who has held an entry permit or entry permits (whether
issued under the present Act or under the repealed Act or both) of any of
the foregoing classes of entry permits A - K for a continuous period of not
less than 10 years immediately before the date of application, and whose
presence in Kenya will be of benefit to the country. It was noted that a
person who held a resident's certificate under the former Act of 1936 or
is deemed to hold that certificate by virtue of S.18(2) of the 1967 Act
is virtually free of control under the present law. This is because under
the repealed Act a resident's certificate had, inter alia, the effect of
conferring on its holder power to stay in Kenya for life without being subject
122
to removal or deportation. Such a person still remains virtually free of
control under the present immigration law (the 1967 Act) until he
is required by the l-Iinister for Home Affairs at any time by notice in the
123Gazette to apply to an immigration officer for an entry permit. If he
is so required then on application hew'll be issued with an entry permit of
class L if he was previously holding an entry permit of any of the above classes
A - K inclusive, for a period of not less than 10 years immediately before
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the date of his application„ If he held the entry permit for a lesser period
then s.l9(l) of the Act provides that he has to settle for a pasSo In the
latter case the stay of the person in Kenya is by that action curtailed to
the extent of the validity of that pass. In the alternative the immigration
officer may issue a provisional entry permit of the class of entry permit he
12li
previously heldo A provisional entry permit for so long as it remains in
force has the same effect as an entry permit of the same class of Classes A - K
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above. A provisional entry permit remains in force for the period therein
specified or, if no period is specified, until it is revoked by an immigration
officer; it continues in force thereafter for three months after the dde on
which the notice was issued, or is published in the Gazette, whichever date
is earlier, and it then expires. The holder thaeof must then leave Kenya
within the three months before it expires„
A person who held an entry permit for ten or more continuous years
before he is invited to apply for an entry permit will be given a class L
entry permit notwithstanding that he previously held any of the other entry
permits A - K, if he can show* that his stay in Kenya will be of benefit to
the country, whatever that means. To hold a class L entry permit as opposed
to a pass or a provisional entry permit means that the person's stay in Kenya
is more secure than in the other two cases0
The holder of an entry permit of classes K and L will be guilty of
an offence if he engages in any employment, occupation, profession, business
or trade without the prior approval in writing of an immigration officer.
If he is refused leave to take employment or to engage in any occupation,
profession, business or trade then it means he must sit and do nothing no
matter how able bodied he is. If he takes employment or engages in any
occupation, profession, business or trade in defiance of a refusal then he
not only becomes guilty of an offence but his entry permit ceases to be
127
valid. If his entry permit ceases to be valid then he must leave the
country. It would be very harsh, to put it mildly, to expect people who
h»ve worked -in the enuntrv for as lonr as ten vears or Deonle who are brinrins?
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valuable investments in the country to sit at home regardless of their
age if they are at the same time given virtually permanent terms of
residence in the country. This may be likened to compulsory retirement
with the right to starve.
(13) Class M
This applies to person who is a refugee, that is to say, is,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of
his nationality or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence for any particular reason and
is unable or, owing to such fear, *is unwilling to return to such country;
127
and any wife or child over the age of 13 years of such a refugee.
This provision comprises refugees strictly so called, and stateless
peopleo It has its own definition of child for the purpose of the
Immigration Act 1967. This cannot be accepted without criticism. It
is obvious that the influx of refugees causes a great deal of hardship
both to the State of sanctuary and to the individual involved. It does
not make matters easier to refuse a refugee permission to bring his
children over 13 years when they will in all probability be helpless at
that age. It is true that children over 13 years of age and other
"dependants" of the refugee will be admissible on their own account but
that is subjecting the whole family to an ordeal instead of one member
only.
A person to whom an entry permit of Class M is issued is free of
the immigration law in relation to self-employment. Accordingly he can
engage in any occupation, trade, business or profession without need of
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any approval. However the Act is curiously silent on whether or not such
refugees may accept eirpLoyment without or with the approval of an immigration
officer. The omission is probably deliberate and that being so refugees
cannot be allowed to take employment^paid or unpaid„ That restriction
is hard to justify in the case of a person who is a genuine refugee.
A child of a refugee under the age of 13 need not have an entry
129
permit or pass for the purpose of entry into or stay in Kenya.
Immigration officers are authorised to keep registers of and give
identity documents to all refugees; that is holders of Class M entry
.. 130
permit.
General; Having looked at all the entry permits it is now necessary to
look at points of general application. Firstly, an entry permit issued
in respect of a person not present in Kenya at the time of issue ceases
to be valid if that person fails to enter Kenya within 6 months from the
131
date of issue. However, immigration officers have a discretion to
extend the validity of such an entry permit for a further 6 months when it
132
must expire irrevocably.
Secondly, an immigration officer may at any time cancel an entry
133
permit or vary the terms and conditions as he may think fit. This
is a very serious matter and it is presumably because of that that it is
made compulsory for immigration officers to consult the Minister for his
1 3|l
confirmation of a cancellation of an entry permit.
The period of validity of an entry permit is at the discretion of an
135
immigration officer. This is entirely sensible if account is to be
taken of whether or not these are skilled Kenyans available in the market
to take up jobs held by entry permit holders. Normally, however, an
entry permit for employment is given for two years initially. There is
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ample power to extend the period of validity of an entry permit. It
may not, however, be issued or extended for a period exceeding five years
137
from the date of issue or renewal. An entry permit's longest life is
five years but it can be renewed any number of times provided that the
period of validity of each renewal does not exceed five years„ A person
who has not become a citizen of Kenya after five years residence still
needs an entry permit to enable him to remain and/or work in Kenya.
There are no provisions equivelent to the U.Ko settlement provisions that
enable a person who has been in the country for up to five years to
remain in the country without any restriction whatsoever„ For this reason
a person who is not a citizen of Kenya is perpetually a migrant worker
until he/she becomes a citizen of /ihe country0
Subject to any exemptions made by the Minister every entry permit is
"1 38
given on the payment of a prescribed feeQ The fees are payable within
90 days from the date the applicant thereof has been notified by an
O
immigration officer in writing that the entry permit has been approved
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failing which the approval is automatically invalidated. The fees are
varied from time to time by the Minister by notice in the Gazette but it
must be noted that they are generally substantial„ For example, entry
permit of Class A is issued on payment of £200 sterling., The amount is
also to be paid for every year of the validity of the entry permit or its
renewal0
Finally, the phrase "„„° will be of benefit to Kenya" as used in
relation to all the entry permits confers on immigration authorities the
widest possible discretion. It is submitted that when considering whether
a non-citizen's presence in Kenya will be of benefit to the country
economic, political and social factors may be taken into account. Thus
the mere satisfaction of the regulations by a non-citizen applying for an
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entry permit forms only a part of all the possible things that may be
taken into account. This power should be used very sparingly because
by its very nature it is liable to abuse and interpretation problems.
For example, is an immigration officer qualified to judge whether or not
the admission of a non-citizen will be of bad or good influence to the
Kenyan society at large? Moreover, is he qualified to judge what is
good or bad for the Kenyan society?
/
Exempted and Excluded People
Exempted and excluded people do not need to be in possession of either
passes or entry permits in order to enter or to remain and work in Kenya.
(a) Exempted People
It was noted elsewhere that the possession of a pass or an
entry permit does not apply to any person, or class or description of
<( I A
persons, exempted by the Minister by notice in the Gazette. So,
far the only people exempted are -
(1) all those who are in the employment of Harambee Secondary
Secondary Schools as teachers and who are not engaged in
any other employment, occupation, trade, business or
profession, whether or not for remuneration or profitj
(b) All those in the employment of Gertrude's Garden Childrens'
Hospitalj and
(c) the wives and children under the age of 18 years of the
exempted people in (a) and (b) above and who are not
engaged in any employment, occupation, trade, business or
„ . 1 Ui
profession•
Harambee Schools number more than 600 now. They are schools supported
by funds from a pool of contributions made by the community in that or
other area for the benefit of students who cannot find secondary school
places in Government supported schools or other institutions.
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If holders of exemption certificates remain in the country for five
years or over, then they are eligible to apply for citizenship„ But
as long as they remain non-citizens they are subject to the immigration
law to the extent that they cannot freely engage in any other work than
the one they were accepted into the country to come and do„ However, there
is nothing to stop a person in the employment of an Harambee School from
switching over to the employment of the Gertrude's Garden Children Hospital.
But their wives and children cannot take up jobs in the two institutions
without any permission. In all other respects exempted people are generally
free of immigration controls.
(b) Excluded People
The Minister has power .to exclude people who are otherwise
subject to control under the immigration law from the provisions of the
1 h2
Act. The people excluded presently are: (i) a passenger in, or a
member of a crew of any ship, aircraft, train or vehicle] (ii) a person
whose name and particulars are included in the passenger list or crew
manifest of the ship, aircraft, train or vehicle] and (iii) a person
proceeding in such ship, aircraft, train or vehicle to a destination
"I
outside Kenya. They are excluded from the necessity of having to
obtain an entry permit or pass as otherwise it is required under the Act.''^
The exclusion ceases automatically if such an exempted person fails to
continue his journey to a destination outside Kenya in the ship, aircraft,
train or vehicle in which he entered Kenya or, being a member of the
crew in another ship, aircraft or vehicle in the same ownership as that
1)
in which he entered Kenya.
A person who is so excluded and who is not a member of the crew must
leave Kenya by the ship, aircraft, train or vehicle in which he came.
That means that a person can stay in Kenya for a few days if at all. But
such a person may stay longer if the ship, aircraft, vehicle or train in
which he came is delayed for servicing or other reasons.
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A member of the crew may stay longer than an ordinary passenger
and there is no obligation, understandably, for them to leave in the
same ship, aircraft, train or vehicle in which they came. A person
excluded from the necessity of obtaining a pass or an entry permit as
above may have his leave to remain in Kenya for that limited time
11|6
terminated by an immigration officer at any time0 If it is terminated
then the person must leave, or apply for a pass or entry permit to enable
him to remain in the countryo"'^
Finally a prohibited immigrant cannot be permitted to enter Kenya
a a 1l*8as an excluded person.
CONCLUSION
The administration of immigration law in Kenya is entirely in
the hands of the immigration authorities. There is no appeals system
presumably because immigration is still considered a matter of "great
1i*9
public importance"o Presumably that means that xmmxgration is a
matter of great political economic and social importance to the Government.
Accordingly only the executive authorities who are, supposedly responsive to
political, economic and social climates are equipped to make decisions on
immigration matters. If that is so, it may be argued, by way of analogy,
that immigration matters are of just as much political, economic and
social importance to the U.KC in which there is an immigration appeals
system. Public importance of immigration matters is therefore not
inconsistent with the existence of an independent adjudication system»
The operation and administration of immigration in Kenya is markedly
different from that of the U.K. For example, the visa system is not as
widely or as rigidly applied in Kenya as in the U.K» This may well be
the case in future thougho On the thole the U.Ko system is overly
complicated and confusing, but this is largely due to the U.K.'s "legacies"
325
from the imperial era. On the other hand the discretion in the hands
of the Kenyan immigration authorities far exceeds that of their U.K.
counterparts, particularly in regard to the issue of entry permits or
passes. In some cases the power to grant or refuse entry permits
when taken on the whole is more diffused than that exercised by U.K.
immigration authorities. For example, if a Kenyan non-citizen
wanted an entry permit for the carrying out of a business he must
first of all get the requisite licences (probably from the Registrar-
General's Department or another Ministry); get consent to own land if
he requires it; satisfy the appropriate Ministry that he has sufficient
money for his intended business and get any other permission or
authority that may be necessary from various departments of the
Government. There are therefore myriads of differences, most of which
are small but essential. In both countries, however, a very tight
system of immigration control is operated. In the UiK. it may be said
that the controls hurt "coloured" immigrants more £han any other
racial group and in Kenya it may be said that the controls hurt people
of Asian origin and who are unfortunately not citizens of Kenya or have
not been so registered although they have been resident in the country
for a long time.
Finally, although a very high standard of immigration control has
been achieved in both countries there are signs that there will be
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CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES
In the preceding chapters a separate analysis of the immigration
laws of the U.K., on the one hand, and Kenya, on the other hand, was
made. It was not possible to make a comparative analysis of the
respective immigration laws in detail because of the nature and different
O
methods of operation of the laws. In this part which is going to
concentrate on the means and methods of control of the discretion of
immigration authorities the two countries will be dealth with together.
Discretion
The word discretion has been used in many places in the preceding
materials without any attempt to define it. In its technical or legal
meaning it may be described in the words of K.C. Davis. Thus an
immigration authority is said to have discretion when the effective
limits of his power leave him free to make a choice among possible
Courses 1
shoioee of action or inactionAs he explains himself, the words
"effective limits" mean not only the power to take a choice between two
or more authorised or legal courses of action but also discretion to take
2
action that is illegal, of questionable legality or to do nothing. It
is necessary to adopt KaC. Davis' definition because it is wide enough to
cover all the discretions, known or unknown, in the hands of immigration
authorities. For example in the U.K. case of R. v HOME SECRETARY EX PARTE
SAFIELA BEGUH^ the Court clearly recognised that in certain situations an
immigration officer had a discretion to do nothing.
The most serious difficulty in this chapter is that no one knows and
certainly no attempt has ever been made to list the number and extent of
immigration authorities1 discretions (both in interim stages and final
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stages of a discretionary decision). It is a reasonable presumption,
however, that there must be thousands of them. Although it has been
argued that discretion is not necessarily bad, and that it is indeed
useful and necessary in some cases, it is to be feared that discretion
of the amount and extent that immigration officers in the U.K. and Kenya
have truly constitutes a "...zone of administrative twilight in which
prejudices can play a significant part"
It is argued that in order to secure the minimum acceptable level of
justice, no matter how measured, there must be ways of controlling the
discretion that is now vested in immigration authorities in both the
U.K. and Kenya. This is far from saying that immigration authorities
are necessarily prejudiced. It is, rather, a recognition of the implicit
vulnerable nature^ of the human lot. Thus an immigration officer who
knows that his decision will be subject to close scrutiny and that in
some cases his discretionary decision will be reversed, altered, varied
or modified will try to look at any particular case in a way that affords
an individual the minimum acceptable justice.
The means and methods of control of the discretion of immigration
authorities will now be examined.
(1) Senior Officers
In the U.K. the power to refuse leave to enter to a passenger
is vested in immigration officers who must in all such cases have the
authority of the Chief Immigration Officer or an Immigration Inspector
before they can so refuse.^ In Kenya the position is slightly different.
The Immigration Act of Kenya provides that "in the performance of their
functions ... immigration officers shall act in accordance with such
7instructions as may be given by the Minister". In particular an
8 9
immigration officer cannot cancel any entry permit or a dependant's pass
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without confirmation or approval by the Minister respectively,, There
is no provision anywhere that immigration officers must consult the
Principal Immigration Officer as in the U0K„ It is however submitted
that as a matter of good administration the Principal Immigration Officer
is almost certainly consulted on all matters connected with ihe refusal of
entry of a person into Kenya or variation of conditions of stay in the
countryo
In any case in the matters that immigration officers in the U.K.^or
in Kenya are required to consult their seniors or their Minister as the
case may be, it is patently clear that their discretion is subject to
close scrutiny by their seniors or Minister and to that extent their
discretion is controlled.
There is no formal or procedural method of consultation. In many
ways it is best to keep the system at this level informal as the'kind of
legal technicalities one finds himself in when approaching the courts on
a matter of this kind should be kept out of the administration,,
The supervision by senior officers (U.K0) and the Minister (Kenya)
10
has been termed as "checking" of discretion by K.Co Davis. "Checking"
means no more than that a senior official must be consulted by an
immigration officer before the specified actions are taken,, This is
clearly a way of controlling the discretion of immigration officers and
must be encouraged as it guards against arbitrariness by the immigration
officers in the exercise of their discretion.
In assessing the effectiveness of the methods of consultation with
senior officers (U.K.) or the Minister (Kenya) one must be mindful of the
technical shortcomings of this system of control. Senior Officers or
the Minister, as the case may be, who countermand the mistakes of their
immigration officers will in most cases be unpopular and can,unless a
11
proper balance is kept, "... face the danger of undermining morale".
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It is possible therefore that in some cases senior officers or the
Minister do turn a blind eye on the mistakes of immigration officers
committed in the exercise of their discretiono It would be naive to
disregard the statement of K.C. Davis in this regard. Chief Immigration
Officers or Immigration Inspectors in the U.K. and the Minister or
the Principal Immigration Officer in Kenya are not independent of their
respective immigration officers because they "... have a continuing relation
with each other", and they often have ",0. official, psychological or
personal reasons for protecting that relation" so much so that the review
of the discretionary decisions of immigration officers in both countries
12
may be influenced by "... considerations other than the merits" of the
case before them.
There is one further thing worth noting. In Kenya consultation
with the Minister for Home Affairs by an immigration officer when the
matter in issue is a cancellation of an entry permit or a dependant's pass
is purely administrative. This point must be kept in mind because as
will be seen below in some cases the Minister acts in an "appellate"
capacity.
(2) The Appeals Systems
In the U.K. the appeals system created by the Immigration
1 3
Appeals Act 1969 is continued by the Immigration Act of 1971. As
was noted in the First Part the Immigration Appeals Act 1969 created
adjudicators and an immigration Appeals Tribunal to hear appeals from
many of the determinations of immigration authorities. Many of the
determinations of immigration officers are discretionary ones and
accordingly the adjudicators and the immigration tribunal are an important
cornerstone in the control of the discretion of immigration officers.
In Kenya the only instance remotely resembling the U.K. appeals
336
system is an appeal to the Minister for Home Affairs. The Immigration
Act of Kenya provides that "any person who has applied for an entry
permit of any of the classes E to M (inclusive) and who is aggrieved by a
decision refusing him such entry permit may in the manner and within the
time prescribed, appeal against the decision to the Minister, whose
decision shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court."''^
In the U.K. there is a two-tier appeals system to the adjudicators
and the immigration tribunal whereas in Kenya there is a one-tier "appeals"
system to the Minister„ An "appeal" to the Minister is not an appeal in
stricto sensu for a Minister is by his very position a partisan party to
the appeal of an immigrant. An appeals system as that of the U.K. is
preferred because it is independent and can override a Minister's
decisiono But the existence of an appeals system as the U.Ko one depends
in part on the publication of immigration rules and policies. If there
are no published immigration rules and policies then the creation of an
appeals system of the U.K. type would seem to be an extension of the
embrace of bureaucracy.
In both countries one now begins to see formalized methods of appeal.
In the U.K., depending on the type of appeal made or the section of the
1971 Act under which the appeal is made, there is a limitation period
within which such an appeal to an adjudicator or the tribunal, as the
15
case may be, must be made0 Moreover, it is a requirement that a person
refused leave to enter by an immigration officer must be given a notice
informing him of the decision, the reasons for the refusal and stating
16
his right to appeal0 In Kenya an applicant refused any of the entry
permits of class E to M (inclusive) may appeal to the Minister (through
the Principal Immigration Officer) within i|2 days from the date of his
being notified in writing that he has been refused any of the stated
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classes of entry permits„ The appeal must be made in a statutory
18
form together with any fees chargeable in that respect.
In both countries an appeal against the discretionary decision of
an immigration officer may be made in respect of specified matters only
and whether or not the specified matter relates to the entry of the
person or to the variation of the conditions of stay of that person0 As
has been noted, in Kenya the specified entry classes are S to M inclusive.
In the U.Ko there is also a limit to what these matters are, but for those
on which an appeal lies the immigration Act of the U0K0 1971 provides that
an adjudicator daall allow an appeal "... if he considers where the decisigm
or action involved the exercise of a discretion by the Secretary of State
19
or an officer, that the discretion should have been exercised differently."
It is important to remember that in Kenya the grant of all entry permits
(including the specified classes of entry permits for the purpose of
appeal) and all passes is at the discretion of an immigration officer
notwithstanding that a person has satisfied the statutory requirements
20
of an entry permit or pass he applied for. That being so it is
questionable why the refusal of entry permits, other than the specified
ones, and passes are not subject to some kind of formal appeal. There
is a parallel to be drawn with the U0K. Immigration Act 1971 in that
21
apart from exempting a list of matters from any kind of appeal it
further provides that "no decision or action which is in accordance with th
immigration rules shall be treated as having involved the exercise of
discretion by the Secretary of State by reason only of the fact that he
has been requested by or on behalf of the appellant to depart, or to
22
authorise an officer to depart, from the rules and has refused to do so."
Thus the exercise of the Secretary of State's power in this case is
unreviewable. The Tribunal has held that the effect of the provision is
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that although there is a right of appeal against the refusal of the
Secretary of State to grant entry to a person outside the immigration
23
rules, "the appeal must in all such cases be dismissed0 This is another
way of saying that the Secretary of State's discretion is unreviewable
for it is not possible in law to think or talk of an appeal without a
remedy as the case implied0
O
Because of the limited area of discretion that can be reviewed under
the appeals systems in both countries it means that a lot of discretions
go unreviewed if they fall within the excluded classes or excluded matters
in the U.K.
How effective are the appeals systems in both countries in controlling
the discretions of immigration officers that they can properly control?
This is a crucial question because without a certain amount of effectiveness
in their control one cannot justify their creation. For the reason that
the appeals systems in Kenya and U.Ko are different in structure it is
necessary to deal with each country's appeal system separately.
In Kenya the decision of the Minister following an appeal to him is
final and shall not be questioned in any courtThe most important thing
to note about an appeal to the Minister is that when he is deciding he
is not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity but in an
administrative capacity. The Court described.it in Re Maries' Application
as being "... no more than a prayer in aid of reconsideration, a request
to the Minister that he should reconsider the application of his policy
25
directive to the case of the particular applicant." In that case M.
a British subject entered Kenya in 1953 on a temporary employment pass
valid for four years. In 195? having been offered a permanent post
with the Nairobi City Council he applied to the Principal Immigration
Officer under s.l0(2) of the Immigration Ordinance 1956 for a Class G
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entry permit which was refused. His "appeal" to the Minister under
s.l0(5) of that Act was also refused upon which he applied to the High
Supreme Court of Kenya for orders of certiorari and mandamus to quash
the decision of the Minister on the ground that he was given no opportunity
to state his case and was not allowed to know or to test the evidence
against him0 The Court dismissed his motion for the reasons given above.
Although the case above was decided during the colonial time, it
is submitted that the courts would follow it at present because
immigration is still regarded as a matter of privilege and because the
Act vests the power to make decisions in the immigration officers and
the Minister. That being so an appeal to the Minister seems to be in
the nature of a request to the Minister to depart from the decision of
an immigration officer. It is possible to say that the Minister has
)
unlimited power to reverse the decision of hisimmigration officers.
i
However, since the applicant is not informed of the reasons for his being
refused any of the specified entry permits by the immigration officer
and since he may not be allowed legal representation or be informed of the
26
case against him, it is open to a conclusion that the control of
discretion by the Minister is not effective or cannot be seen to be
effective <,
In contrast a person who is refused entry to the U.K. is given
reasons for the refusal and is therefore informed of the case against
him. Moreover, legal representation is always allowed and in some
27
cases at the expense of the U.K. Government0
In the U.K. adjudicators and the tribunal have power to allow
an appeal from a decision or action of the Secretary of State or an
immigration officer, as the case may be, if they are satisfied that the
2 8
discretion should have been exercised differently. J.Mo Evans has
3U0
submitted that the immigration appeals authorities have taken a very-
narrow view of their jurisdiction to review an exercise of discretion
29
on the meritso For example some decided cases do not reveal whether
the appellate authorities are dismissing an appeal because the facts
fall outside the scope of the discretion defined by the rules or outside
the principles formulated by the appellate authorities for the review
30
of discretionary powers. In two recent cases decided by the Court O
of Appeal it has been amply demonstrated that the appellate authorities
(adjudicators and the tribunal) take a very restrictive attitude in
their duty of reviewing the discretion of either the Secretary of State
31
or the immigration officers. This is entirely in line with the
32
appellate authorities' attitude that is revealed in COSTA v HOME SECRETARY0
33
In that case the rules, by virtue of which the issue arose, prescribed
that if an appellant had been away from the U.Ko for more than 2 years
preceding his departure from the U.K0 such an appellant would none the
less be admitted if he had Ived in the UCK. for most of his life. This
rule clearly gave the appellate authorities a discretion to admit such a
person into the UoK0 if, for example, he had lived in the U.K„ for most
of his life. When the case came before the Tribunal for decision it
stated categorically that it would not take into account compassionate
circumstances as that was not part of its dutyc It is self-evident that
in that instance the Tribunal regarded the example given above (that is,
living in the U.K. for a long time) as a limiting factor to their
discretion which is clearly not the case.
It is therefore submitted that by reason of the fact that the
appellate authorities have tden a narrow view of their jurisdiction to
review discretion they do not control that discretion effectively. This
is far from saying that they do not control discretion at all.
3l;1
The fact that the appellate authorities in the U.K. have power to review
decisions de novo (particularly the adjudicators) means that they
control discretion in the interim decisions as well as in final decisions.
The Kenyan system of appealing to the Minister would seem to have the
same effect although no one can force the Minister to exercise the power
to review a discretionary decision de novo, as the U.K. appellate
authorities are required to do by law.
It has been submitted by some writers that the U.Ko appellate
authorities are suspect to the fear that they tend "0.0 to rely on the
impressions of the British official abroad who has refused a certificate
of entry, and to reject the evidence of the documents, such as
affidavits or certificates of bisth, death or marriage presented by
35
applicants" mostly from India and Pakistan„ If this is so then it is
apparent that the discretion of immigration authorities from that area is
nodded through without a proper control of its exercise by the appellate
authorities. However, one must be wary of making unwarranted statements
on this particular issue because it is a well-known fact that a lot of
36
immigration rackets are operated in India and Pakistan0
On the whole therefore the U.K. immigration appeals system operating
independently as it does controls the exercise of discretion by the
Secretary of State and immigration officerso It is to be hoped that
the scope of the control it exercises will sooner or later be widened
to include the areas not now covered, for example, deportation.
The Kenyan system of appeal to the Minister in respect of the specified
entry permits is in its totality an administrative function and for that
reason one cannot be sure the extent to which it operates as a system of
open justice as the Minister has the discretion to grant an applicant
an oral hearing or legal representation. An appeal on the lines o4 the
3U2
is obviously called for urgently!, A. Kiapi has submitted that where
appeals such as in immigration matters lie to the Minister "... political
considerations may play a bigger role than the interest of the individual
37
affected". Therefore it is not really satisfactory to have appeals
to the Minister since in almost every such appeal to the Minister
political considerations will weigh more heavily in the decision he
O
makes.
(3) Courts of Law
In Kenya courts regard immigration as a privilege and accordingly
they have so far refused to interfere•with the decisions of the immigration
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authorities. More particularly the Kenyan Immigration Act provides
that the decision of the Minster*in relation to an appeal from a
refusal of any of the above specified entry permits will be final
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and shall not be questioned in any court. A series of cases by the
courts show that the mandatory terms of the Act that such a decision
ko
will not be open to question in any court will be upheld. Refusal
or grant of any other entry permit or pass is also at the discretion of
immigration authorities who exercise that discretion in accordance with
the directions or instructions of given by the Minister.
These discretions cannot apparently be reviewed by the Courts because in
III
Re Maries' Application the court held that the discretions are exercised
on grounds of expediency and policy of the Minister and since the Minister
may take into account extraneous matters (probably political matters) the
courts cannot review decisions arising from them. Moreover, the fact that
the courts in Kenya regard immigration as a privilege would seem to
preclude any review of discretionary decisions of immigration authorities
since there are no rights involved.
3U3
The U.K. courts have taken a different view with regard to the review
of discretionary decisions. The general rule is that a phrase
excluding the jurisdiction of the court to review discretionary decisions
gives those decisions protection only if the decisions are validly made.
Thus if the authorities act ultra vires their discretion or otherwise
exercise it contrary to the law the courts cannot be deterred from
1;2
reviewing their discretionary decisions. The main impact of this
interpretation that the courts have taken in the U.K. is that they are
normally free to review any discretionary decision whether of immigration
authorities or others. It has been argued that a distinction can be
made between "objective discretion" in which defined or ascertainable
criteria are given by an empowering legislation, against which the
decision-maker's choice or discretion can be measured, and "subjective
discretion" in which no guidelines as to the exercise of discretion are
j ^j
given. Whereas the courts have always controlled objective discretion
the control of subjective discretion is a recent legal development which
is viewed by some writers as a "disturbing" development.^ The
importance of the approach taken by the U.K. courts is that they are
able to control the exercise of discretionary powers of the Secretary of
State and the immigration authorities whereas the approach Isken by the
Kenyan courts does not permit them to control the exercise of discretion
either by the Minister or by the immigration officers0
In the U.K. the courts? power of review is limited by various reasons
but mainly by their narrow approach to the review of discretion relating
to immigration matters. Except in the most exceptional cases the courts
will not review the decisions of immigration authorities, whether
discretionary or not, unless there has been an appeal to the appellate
authorities in the first place. In R, v. PETKRKIN (ADJUDICATOR) EX PARTE
hB
SONI the court clearly accepted that it would not interfere with a
3hh
decision of an adjudicator which had an error of law on its face because
there was an opportunity for the appellant to appel to the Tribunal and
as he had not done so there was nothing the court could do. This
decision applies to the decisions of immigration authorities with
equal force. Accordingly, the narrow ground upon which the courts can
interfere with discretionary decisions clearly means that no effective control
O
of discretion by the U.K„ courts is made0
Remedies
In the U.Ko courts cannot interfere with any discretionary decision
made with regard to immigration law except by certain means0 The means
are, habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus ■> ^
In Kenya the use of habeas corpus by the courts is presumably pre-empted
by the fact that the Immigration Act 1967 expressly provides that a
person who is detained or held in any way by immigration authorities or
on their directions will be in lawful custodyThis is a privative
clause in its nature and effect and in a U.Ko case of R. v. GOVERNOR OF
BRIXTON PRISON EX PARTE SARNO [1916] 2 K0B0 7h2 it was held that a
clause that stipulates that the detention of a person shall be
deemed to be legal custody" does not preclude the court from deciding
whether or not the powers under the statute have been properly pursued.
It is hoped that the Kenyan courts will adopt this attitude and review
such detentions on jurisdictional grounds where possible0 Moreover,
in COX v HAKES (1890) 1$ App. Cas. 506 it was held that as "000 a general
rule, the courts are unwilling to interpret any statute in such a way
as to curtail habeas corpus unless the statute refers to the writ"o It
is submitted that the case forms part of the Kenyan common law because it
was decided before the Reception Date of August 12, 1897 and accordingly
not
since the Immigration Act 1967 does/specifically refer to habeas corpus
3U5
the privative clause will not bar the courts from issuing it in a case
of detention -under the Acto
In the U.K. courts will review the discretion of immigration authorities
to detain or hold a person albeit on very narrow grounds. The U.K.
courts are prepared to exercise their discretion to issue habeas corpus
for the release of a person only if the applicant can show a prima facie
case that his detention is illegalo^7 In R. v. HOME SECRETARY EX PARTE
I g
MUGHAL Widgery LCJ held that habeas corpus was inappropriate where
the applicant was refused entry at a port of entry because he was not
technically in the country, and by refusing to return to his country
as a result of which he was detained, he was not denied his freedom but
merely chose to remain in custody. The court was in effect saying that
the applicant was not restrained, a reasoning which has been highly
h-9
doubted. Accordingly the use of habeas corpus has been limited to the
extent that the applicant must show that he was detained illegally and
that he was not detained following a refusal to return to his country
after leave for entry was refused. That the onus of proof is on the applicant
to show that he was illegally detained is an aditional limitation in that
it is often very hard to prove it because of the lack of documents. Thus
the exercise of the discretion to detain a person by immigration
.
authorities is only partially controlled or controllable by the courts
of law in the U.K.
The other method which is commonly used by the courts of law in the
U.K. to review discretionary decisions of immigration authorities is that
of certiorari and mandamus. Mandamus will issue to secure the performance
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of a duty to exercise a discretion and certiorari issues to quash an
order made by administrative authorities if the function of the authority
can be characterised as "judicial" even if partially/*'* Thus, although
there is no express statutory right of appeal from the appellate authorities
to the courts the latter can nevertheless review the decisions of the
.52or*r\ol 1 0 + 0 mifhAY'*! Hoq Vvtr moaviq r^-P +.V10 a"Krar£» Tomo^Tnc Ty-t
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K. v IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL EX PARTE S.G.H. KHAN the Queen's
Bench Division of the High Court issued the orders of certiorari and
mandamus to quash the decision of the appellate authorities and order
them to determine the issue afresh because on the facts before the court
there was no evidence to support their findings. It is important to note
O
that it was within the discretion of the appellate authorities to choose
what evidence to take into account.
In yet another case of R. v IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL EX PARTE K.
JKfAVKERASINGIIArT'^' the court held, when refusing orders for certiorari
and mandamus that the Tribunal was not required to look at any additional
or fresh evidence when considering whether to grant leave, for it was
within its discretion to take the view that it would not grant leave to
appeal by looking at the issues raised in the determination only.
It is clear from these cases that there is no general principle
upon which the courts will grant certiorari and mandamus in any particular
situation. However, it is as plain as can be that it is only in the
most exceptional cases that courts will issue a certiorari and mandamus
in respect of a decision of an adjudicator and before an appeal to the
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Tribunal has been made and determined„ It is equally certain that
that is the case with respect to decisions of immigration authorities
although it is doubtful that courts have any control over their exercise
of discretion,,
The last method by which the U„K. courts may and can control the
exercise of discretion by immigration authorities is if there has been a
56breach of natural justice by the authorities. In Re K.(H.) (an Infant)
Lord Parker C„J. held that ".0o good administration and an honest and
bona fide decision must „.„ require not merely impartiality nor merely
3b7
bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but of acting fairly, and to
the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case may allow,
and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is
working, only to that limited extent do the so called rules of natural
justice apply which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act
57
fairly." The court further noted that the duty to act fairly is
not precluded by the fact that there is no duty to act judicially.
In every case, therefore, immigration authorities and appellate
authorities have a duty to act fairly to the extent that the immigration
law and the rules and the circumstances of a case permit. This has been
clearly re-affirmed by the case of PADMORE v. HOHB SECRETARY„ However,
\
apart from the restricted approach given to naturaljustice by the
courts as spelled out above, there are two other restrictions. Firstly,
there is no exercise of discretion by the Secretary of State by reason
only of the fact that he has been requested by or on behalf of appellant
to depart, or to authorise an officer to depart, from the rules and he
59
has refused to do so. In HOI-IE SECRETARY v GLEAN the appellant appealed
to the Tribunal from the decision of the adjudicator that it would be
against the principles of natural justice to compel Glean to leave the
UoK. on grounds that he overstayed in the country in breach of his
conditions when his wife and two children elected to remain in the U.K.
as "they were entitled to doc The Tribunal held that the decision of the
Secretary of State to refuse Glean further leave to stay was in
accordance with the Immigration rules and therefore natural justice did not
apply.
Secondly, the courts have shown an extreme reluctance to review the
discretion of the Secretary of State on grounds of breach of natural
justice if the Secretary of State decides to deport a non-patrial on
3U8
on grounds conducive to the public good as bong in the interests of
national security„ In R. v HOME SECRETARY EX PARTE HOSENBALL60 the
appellant, Mr. Hosenball, had been served with a notice of the Secretary
of State1s intention to deport him on grounds conducive to the public
good as being in the interests of national security under s.3(5)(b) of
the Immigration Act 1971• He had no right of appeal under the appeals
system established by the Immigration Act but he was entitled to make
representations and appear before an independent advisory panel. He was
not given the details of the charges against him or the advice of the
panel to the Home Secretary. Accordingly Mr. Hosenball appealed to the
Court of Appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court refusing
certiorari to quash the decision of the Secretary of State as being in
breach of the rules of natural justice. The Court of Appeal, while
not saying that it would refuse to interfere with every decision of the
Secretary of State to deport a person on grounds conducive to the public
good as being in the interests of national security, adopted a very narrow
approach in that it said that where national security is involved then
the rules of natural justice must take the second place to national
security. Thus the duty to act fairly cannot be policed adequately in
such cases.
It must be noted that where there has been a breach of natural
justice then the courts can interfere with the discretion of immigration
authorities by means of certiorari and mandamus. In the area of
immigration law therefore, the protection of the status or interest of
a person follows the remedies available.
Although the courts not only control the discretion of immigration
authorities but also formulate rules against which the discretionary
decisions of immigration authorities may be tested, it is submitted
3h9
that their control is limited both by their narrow approaches, their
reluctance to interfere with discretionary decisions of immigration
authorities, the statutory limitations as to what they can review and
the nature and number of remedies available. In Kenya there is no
control by the courts except when the State wishes to enforce the decision
of immigration authorities against non-citizens. This is because the
Kenyan Gover^ient regards immigration to the country both as a privilege
and as matter of great public importance to be entrusted to the courts
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or tribunals. Thus the needs of an immigrant are not a fact or a
right but a matter of opinion and it is the Minister and the officials
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working under him who decide it and not the courts or tribunals.
Immigration is therefore a matter of ministerial discretion. The U.K.
immigration law has, from 191k when opportunities for review by the
courts of the discretionary decisions of the Secretary: of State were
allowed, moved to the point of clothing immigration authorities with the
duty of acting fairly in dealing with immigrants in favour of whom
succeeding Acts of 1962, 1968, 1969, and 1971 have created certain rights.
If these rights are not observed then the courts will review their decisions
by habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus. Perhaps the significance of
treating immigration as a matter of privilege and discretion as in Kenya,
and not of rights and law is that the government is free to regulate the
flow and employment of immigrants into the country according to the
economic ups and downs and according to the public pressure0 If an appeal
to a tribunal, or the courts was allowed as in the U°K0 then the government
would to some extent lose its control„ This may help to explain why
the grant or refusal of work permits is not a matter for the adjudicators,
the tribunal or the courts to decide in the UCK.
One distinction must be mentioned here0 In the U.K0 the■Courts are
35o
very reluctant to apply natural justice rules to decisions that are made
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by virtue of discretionary powers couched in very wide subjective terms.
In Kenya the courts have willingly applied rules of natural justice to
6U
non-judicial bodies with wide powers to exercise policy discretion
but, as has been stated elsewhere, this does not apply to immigration law
65
by virtue of the dicta of He L1ARLES APPLICATION case which categorically
prohibited any review of a discretionary decision on grounds of natural
justice if there is an unambiguous privative clause which takes away
the jurisdiction of the Court.
Human Rights
Finally the U.K. courts will not review the discretion of immigration
authorities merely because or by reason only that the immigration
authorities have refused to refer or did not look at the European
Convention on Human Rights. In R. v CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER, HEATHROW
AIRPORT^ the Court of Appeal held that the courses open to any
immigration authority was specifically laid down in the rules and there
was no need for any of them to look further. This decision was in
67
accordance with earlier decisions of R. v HOME SECRETARY EX PARTE 3. SINGH
and PAN-AKERICAH WORLD INCORPORATED v DEPARTMENT OF TRADE68 that if there
was any ambiguity in the U.K. statutes or any uncertainty in the law then,
and only then, could the courts refer to the Convention as an aid to the
interpretation of the statute or the principles of the law.
Further, it was held recently in the case of R. v HOI-IS SECRETARY
EX 3ARTE HOSENRALL that the European ^jommiGoiaa of Human Rights did not
apply to the discretion of the Secretary of State in deporting a non-
patrial on grounds conducive to the public good as being in the interests
of national security because that constituted an act of state falling
within the public sphere and did not constitute a determination of his
351
civil rights or obligations.
It would, appear therefore that the existence of the European
Convention on Human Rights has not done anything to abate the amount
of uncontrolled discretion in the hands of immigration authorities in
the U.K. It is submitted however, that in so far as the European
Commission on Human Rights remains in a certain sense a court of final
appeal it does itself control a good deal of discretion of immigration
70
authorities. For example, in SAHIJI MANJI LALJI PATEL the Commission
heard complaints by 25 East African Asians who were refused entry into
the U.K. to settle there permanently and in all the cases the Commission
rule d that the complaints were justified in that what was complained of
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FINAL REFLECTIONS
Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter says that the U.N.O.
will "seek to achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion". This is an affirmation of the democratic
demands of the U.N.O. for the extension of and respect for human rights.
The preceding chapters have in many ways been an attempt to unfold the
unjust practises of the United Kingdom and Kenya in immigration law.
This is mainly due to the fact that all the countries of the world do,
with varying degrees, subscribe to the notion of the sovereignty of the
state to control the entry into its own borders of non-citizens.
Citizenship is by definition the link between a physical person
and a state. As a rule citizenship extends to such a physical person
within the boundaries of the state and also beyond them. In the case
of^U.K.^citizenship used to extend to inhabitants of her former
dependencies and of the present existing dependencies. In most countries
of the world immigration into a country has always discriminated between
citizens and non-citizens. Thus in Kenya entry into the country by
citizens is uncontrolled whereas entry by non-citizens is severely
controlled. This used to be the case in the UoK. until 1962 when
legislative measures were introduced by the Government to control the
number of Commonwealth immigrants coming into the U.K. Inevitably this
involved discrimination on entry not only between citizens and non-
citizens but also between citizens and citizens depending on whether they
became U.K. citizens in the U.K» or by a connection with an overseas
country. However, due to the U.K.'s imperial history the number of
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people excluded from entry by the U.K. by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants
Act was smallo The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act tried to remedy the
problem but unsuccessfully and accordingly the 1971 Immigrants Act was
passed with its "infamous" 'patrial1 clause which restricted entry to
people with close connections with the U.K„, i0e. U.K. citizens whose
parent(s) or grandparent(s) was/were born in the U.K. By its very
nature the patrial clause discriminated in its effect between citizens and
citizens of the U.K. along racial lines in matters of entry unless one
became a U.K. citizen in the U.K. itself.
For people who have to have leave to enter and remain in the U.K.
or Kenya the preceding chapters reveal that there are statutory
discriminations in favour of the^rich and the male sections of either
society. Further, in the case of the U.K. the discrimination is based
on race. It must be said at once that these practises are contrary
to the U.N. Charter Article 1(3) above.
It is obvious that both countries have suffered international
opprobrium for their immigration policies but it is also true that both
of them "viewed the domestic costs of unpopular free entry and free stay
of immigrants" as overwhelmingly more important than all other factors.
To some extent therefore the immigration policies of both countries are
understandable even in their extremity. It, therefore, remains to
suggest the areas from which most of the more condemnable immigration
practises emanate or find their source and to suggest their cures.
In Kenya there is no question that the worst forms of immigration
malpractises come from the absence of an appeals system and the
blockade from court review of immigration authorities' decisions. The
Government has done its best to keep immigration matters out of the
courts through the Immigration Act 1967 in that the use of habeas corpus
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and review by the courts are expressly prohibited. There is nothing
inherently wrong-with immigration which should make it a monopoly of
ministerial discretion; and, indeed it is not inconsistent with the
sovereignty of the country to subject the decisions of the immigration
authorities to an independent tribunal whether that be the courts or an
advisory body. The courts are partly to blame for the lack of review
of immigration authorities' discretionary decisions in that unlike in the
U.K. they have refused to apply the principle of ultra vires more widely
and boldly. For example a privative clause should not be left to cloak
the decisions of immigration authorities if they are otherwise invalid.
It is true that the Kenyan courts were an intimate part of the authoritarian
administrative structure during the colonial time, but so many years after
independence having gone by, it is time they saw their proper perspective
in the rule of law and stopped pandering to the Government of the day
through extreme interpretations of the law.
The Government is also long overdue in legislating for some kind
of appeals system which would guarantee that a person has been properly
handled in accordance with the law even if it is a bad law. If and when
such an appeals system is established it should be under the office of
the Attorney-General so as to remove it from the pressures of politicians.
The decisions of the body should then be appealable to the courts of law
on points of fact and law. If national security is involved in any
appeal then the body or court should be able to hear the matter to determine
if such national security is involved. The system at the moment is
autocratic and could be abused with impunity.
In the U.K. the rodla cause of immigration problems is the lack of
nationality law that tdes account of the U.K. status as a nation among
many nations. The present British Nationality Act of 191*8 has been
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amended so many times that it has left the law in a complicated and
confused state apart from the fact that the concept of her nationality
is still based on the out-dated philosophies of her imperial era. .
Accordingly proposals have already been made for the reform of the U.K.
nationality laws. Unfortunately, however, the proposals follow, to
a very great extent, the patriality clauses of the Immigration Act 1971
and will therefore generate feelings of racial discrimination if followed.
For this reason also suggestions made in the proposals to retain dual
nationality apparently only for those who will have ihe right of abode in
those
the UoK. should be abolished. It is proposed that/who have the
right of abode in the U0K. will be those who are patrials under the
Immigration Act 1971* Asian U.K. passport holders from East Africa who
have made U.Ko their home and women citizens of the U.K. and colonies
who do not qualify for British citizenship in their own right but whose
husbands would become British citizens.
It is argued in para. 63 of the proposals (Cmnd. 6795) that it
would be expensive and complicated to ban dual nationality completely
because of the large numbers of people from the U.K. living abroad and
people from other countries living in the U.K. The latter reason must
be dismissed because other countries have non-citizen people living there
although there are no dual citizenships of the kind the proposals suggest
for U.K. in their nationality laws. The former reason that there are a
lot of UoK. people living abroad ignores the fact that the same privilege
of dual nationality is going to be open only to people who have recently
emigrated abroad wTho will be few. Moreover, the number will be even
lower than thought because dual nationality is likely to affect only a
few countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand from which the number
of people who will wish to come to the U.K» will, as now, be small in the
futureo Since the system of granting U.K. citizenship by naturalization
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or registration, will continue, there is every reason to feel that people
with U.K. connections and who wish to be its citizens will be
sufficiently taken care of. Abolishing dual nationality will therefore
not be as expensive or as complicated as the proposals suggest. On the
contrary it will simplify the nationality laws and erase the generation
of racial feelings from the contents of the law.
The problem of overseas dependencies is not one that is very
complicated. At the moment there are 3.3 million citizens of the U.K.
and colonies overseas of whom at least 2.6 million live in Hong Kong.
Host of these people in colonies like Hong King will not want to come
to the UoK. because the conditions at home are very attractive. That
leaves less than 1 million people in other overseas dependencies of
whom it is not suggested in the proposals that they will all want to
settle in the U.K. . It is submitted that the creation of an overseas U.K.
citizenship would have the effect of treating them as second class
citizens apart from the problems that will arise if it is created.
Therefore it is submitted that in order to abolish double standards on
matters of citizenship, people in the present U.K. dependencies should
continue to be citizens of the U.K. and colonies in the fullest sense
and accordingly they should be allowed free entry into the U.K. like
other citizens.
If those two improvements are made to the proposals then it will
simplify the U.K. immigration law on matters relating to entry and stay.
It only remains to mention that the remedies available to the
courts for controlling the discretion of immigration authorities are
few, cumbersome and too full of technicalities. As a matter of principle
there should be a general right of appeal to the courts from the appeals
tribunal. The courts should also avoid taking restrictive and narrow
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approaches to the law. And, finally, the matters in respect of which
there is no appeal either to the courts or the immigration appeals system
should be reduced drastically.
/
